Case: 15-10710 Date Filed: 09/03/2015 Page: 1 of 7
[PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT ________________________
No. 15-10710 Non-Argument Calendar ________________________
D.C. Docket No. 5:14-cr-00055-MTT-CHW-1
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
WAYNE WALKER,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Georgia ________________________
(September 3, 2015)
Before ED CARNES, Chief Judge, MARCUS, and WILLIAM PRYOR, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM: Case: 15-10710 Date Filed: 09/03/2015 Page: 2 of 7
Wayne Walker entered a conditional guilty plea to one count of
manufacturing counterfeit United States currency in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 471.
He appeals the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress. He contends that
the officers who found counterfeit bills in his home did not comply with the
“knock and talk” exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement and
acted unreasonably by going to his house at 5:04 a.m.
I.
Officer Jason Douglas and Sergeant Travis Douglas were working the night
shift on February 28, 2014. Because Officer Douglas had received information
that Michael Upshaw, who had an outstanding warrant, could be found at Walker’s
house, the two officers visited it that night and again in the early hours of March 1.
Walker’s house is located at the corner of Georgia Highway 49 and 111
Moore Place in Macon, Georgia. The back of the house faces Highway 49 while
the side of the house faces Moore Place (another road). The house sits about 100
feet from Moore Place. A gravel driveway runs from Moore Place and goes
directly under a metal carport that sits about 30 feet from the main door to the
house (there is also a second door to the house). The carport is entirely open on all
sides but covered by a metal roof. It is supported by five poles on each of two
sides.
2 Case: 15-10710 Date Filed: 09/03/2015 Page: 3 of 7
The officers first went to Walker’s house at 9:00 p.m. on February 28. They
knocked at the main door and the other door but no one answered. They left and
returned at 11:00 p.m. Again they knocked and again no one answered. The
officers noticed that parked in the open-sided carport was a Honda Civic that had
not been there when they were at the house earlier.
The officers drove past the house again a little after 5:00 a.m. the following
morning. They noticed that some house lights were on and the dome light inside
the Honda Civic was now on. As they approached the car they saw a person inside
with his head resting on the steering wheel. The officers testified that they were
trying to figure out who was in the car and whether the person was alright.
Sergeant Douglas therefore knocked on the car window, asked the person whether
he was alright, and then asked him to step out of the car. The person in the car
turned out to be Walker. The officers told Walker that they were looking for
Upshaw. Walker said that Upshaw was not at the house and, without being asked,
told the officers that they “were more than welcome” to come in and look for him.
Upon entering the house, Officer Douglas began searching for Upshaw. He saw
counterfeit $100 bills printed on white sheets of paper sitting on a shelf in plain
view. The officers did not find Upshaw, but they did decide that they had probable
cause to arrest Walker for the counterfeit currency.
II.
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Walker contends that the district court should have suppressed the evidence
of counterfeit money that the officers found in his home because their search was
illegal. “A motion to suppress evidence presents a mixed question of law and
fact.” United States v. Lewis, 674 F.3d 1298, 1302 (11th Cir. 2012). We review
the district court’s factfindings for clear error and its “application of the law to the
facts de novo.” Id. at 1302–03. We construe all facts in the light most favorable to
the party who prevailed in the district court and give “substantial deference to the
factfinder’s credibility determinations, both explicit and implicit.” Id. at 1303.
The “ultimate touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness.”
Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403, 126 S. Ct. 1943, 1947 (2006). Because
the home and the curtilage surrounding it is a “constitutionally protected area,”
Florida v. Jardines, ___ U.S. ___, 133 S. Ct. 1409, 1415–16 (2013), it is
“presumptively unreasonable” to search a home or its curtilage without a warrant,
Brigham City, 547 U.S. at 403, 126 S. Ct. at 1947 (quotation marks omitted).
Under the “knock and talk” exception, however, a “police officer not armed with a
warrant may approach a home and knock, precisely because that is no more than
any private citizen may do.” Jardines, 133 S Ct. at 1416 (quotation marks
omitted). That exception is based on the “implicit license” that all individuals
(including police officers) have to “approach [a] home by the front path, knock
4 Case: 15-10710 Date Filed: 09/03/2015 Page: 5 of 7
promptly, wait briefly to be received, and then (absent invitation to linger longer)
leave.” Id. at 1415.
The scope of the knock and talk exception is limited in two respects. First, it
ceases where an officer’s behavior “objectively reveals a purpose to conduct a
search.” Id. at 1416–17 (holding that using a police dog to sniff for drugs on the
front porch “in hopes of discovering incriminating evidence” exceeds the scope of
the knock and talk exception). Second, the exception is geographically limited to
the front door or a “minor departure” from it. United States v. Taylor, 458 F.3d
1201, 1204–05 (11th Cir. 2006).
Walker contends that the officers exceeded the scope of the knock and talk
exception because they conducted an investigatory search when they approached
his vehicle. They did not, for two reasons. First, the officers’ behavior did not
objectively reveal a purpose to search. As their earlier visits to the house
indicated, the officers were trying to find someone to talk to about Upshaw’s
whereabouts. The officers did not approach Walker with the purpose of
“discovering incriminating evidence” — just to speak with the homeowner, which
is conduct that falls squarely within the scope of the knock and talk exception.
Jardines, 131 S. Ct. at 1416. Walker asserts that the officers were engaged in a
search because they did not know that he was in the vehicle when they approached
it. They knew, however, that a dome light was on, which indicated that a person
5 Case: 15-10710 Date Filed: 09/03/2015 Page: 6 of 7
might well be inside, and that fact was confirmed when they approached the car.
An officer may not know that a homeowner is inside a home when knocking on the
door, but the knock and talk exception permits knocking on the door to find out.
See id. at 1415.
Second, approaching Walker’s vehicle parked inside of his open-sided
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Case: 15-10710 Date Filed: 09/03/2015 Page: 1 of 7
[PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT ________________________
No. 15-10710 Non-Argument Calendar ________________________
D.C. Docket No. 5:14-cr-00055-MTT-CHW-1
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
WAYNE WALKER,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Georgia ________________________
(September 3, 2015)
Before ED CARNES, Chief Judge, MARCUS, and WILLIAM PRYOR, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM: Case: 15-10710 Date Filed: 09/03/2015 Page: 2 of 7
Wayne Walker entered a conditional guilty plea to one count of
manufacturing counterfeit United States currency in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 471.
He appeals the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress. He contends that
the officers who found counterfeit bills in his home did not comply with the
“knock and talk” exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement and
acted unreasonably by going to his house at 5:04 a.m.
I.
Officer Jason Douglas and Sergeant Travis Douglas were working the night
shift on February 28, 2014. Because Officer Douglas had received information
that Michael Upshaw, who had an outstanding warrant, could be found at Walker’s
house, the two officers visited it that night and again in the early hours of March 1.
Walker’s house is located at the corner of Georgia Highway 49 and 111
Moore Place in Macon, Georgia. The back of the house faces Highway 49 while
the side of the house faces Moore Place (another road). The house sits about 100
feet from Moore Place. A gravel driveway runs from Moore Place and goes
directly under a metal carport that sits about 30 feet from the main door to the
house (there is also a second door to the house). The carport is entirely open on all
sides but covered by a metal roof. It is supported by five poles on each of two
sides.
2 Case: 15-10710 Date Filed: 09/03/2015 Page: 3 of 7
The officers first went to Walker’s house at 9:00 p.m. on February 28. They
knocked at the main door and the other door but no one answered. They left and
returned at 11:00 p.m. Again they knocked and again no one answered. The
officers noticed that parked in the open-sided carport was a Honda Civic that had
not been there when they were at the house earlier.
The officers drove past the house again a little after 5:00 a.m. the following
morning. They noticed that some house lights were on and the dome light inside
the Honda Civic was now on. As they approached the car they saw a person inside
with his head resting on the steering wheel. The officers testified that they were
trying to figure out who was in the car and whether the person was alright.
Sergeant Douglas therefore knocked on the car window, asked the person whether
he was alright, and then asked him to step out of the car. The person in the car
turned out to be Walker. The officers told Walker that they were looking for
Upshaw. Walker said that Upshaw was not at the house and, without being asked,
told the officers that they “were more than welcome” to come in and look for him.
Upon entering the house, Officer Douglas began searching for Upshaw. He saw
counterfeit $100 bills printed on white sheets of paper sitting on a shelf in plain
view. The officers did not find Upshaw, but they did decide that they had probable
cause to arrest Walker for the counterfeit currency.
II.
3 Case: 15-10710 Date Filed: 09/03/2015 Page: 4 of 7
Walker contends that the district court should have suppressed the evidence
of counterfeit money that the officers found in his home because their search was
illegal. “A motion to suppress evidence presents a mixed question of law and
fact.” United States v. Lewis, 674 F.3d 1298, 1302 (11th Cir. 2012). We review
the district court’s factfindings for clear error and its “application of the law to the
facts de novo.” Id. at 1302–03. We construe all facts in the light most favorable to
the party who prevailed in the district court and give “substantial deference to the
factfinder’s credibility determinations, both explicit and implicit.” Id. at 1303.
The “ultimate touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness.”
Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403, 126 S. Ct. 1943, 1947 (2006). Because
the home and the curtilage surrounding it is a “constitutionally protected area,”
Florida v. Jardines, ___ U.S. ___, 133 S. Ct. 1409, 1415–16 (2013), it is
“presumptively unreasonable” to search a home or its curtilage without a warrant,
Brigham City, 547 U.S. at 403, 126 S. Ct. at 1947 (quotation marks omitted).
Under the “knock and talk” exception, however, a “police officer not armed with a
warrant may approach a home and knock, precisely because that is no more than
any private citizen may do.” Jardines, 133 S Ct. at 1416 (quotation marks
omitted). That exception is based on the “implicit license” that all individuals
(including police officers) have to “approach [a] home by the front path, knock
4 Case: 15-10710 Date Filed: 09/03/2015 Page: 5 of 7
promptly, wait briefly to be received, and then (absent invitation to linger longer)
leave.” Id. at 1415.
The scope of the knock and talk exception is limited in two respects. First, it
ceases where an officer’s behavior “objectively reveals a purpose to conduct a
search.” Id. at 1416–17 (holding that using a police dog to sniff for drugs on the
front porch “in hopes of discovering incriminating evidence” exceeds the scope of
the knock and talk exception). Second, the exception is geographically limited to
the front door or a “minor departure” from it. United States v. Taylor, 458 F.3d
1201, 1204–05 (11th Cir. 2006).
Walker contends that the officers exceeded the scope of the knock and talk
exception because they conducted an investigatory search when they approached
his vehicle. They did not, for two reasons. First, the officers’ behavior did not
objectively reveal a purpose to search. As their earlier visits to the house
indicated, the officers were trying to find someone to talk to about Upshaw’s
whereabouts. The officers did not approach Walker with the purpose of
“discovering incriminating evidence” — just to speak with the homeowner, which
is conduct that falls squarely within the scope of the knock and talk exception.
Jardines, 131 S. Ct. at 1416. Walker asserts that the officers were engaged in a
search because they did not know that he was in the vehicle when they approached
it. They knew, however, that a dome light was on, which indicated that a person
5 Case: 15-10710 Date Filed: 09/03/2015 Page: 6 of 7
might well be inside, and that fact was confirmed when they approached the car.
An officer may not know that a homeowner is inside a home when knocking on the
door, but the knock and talk exception permits knocking on the door to find out.
See id. at 1415.
Second, approaching Walker’s vehicle parked inside of his open-sided
carport, instead of going to his front door, did not exceed the geographic limit on
the knock and talk exception. A “small departure from the front door . . . when
seeking to contact the occupants” is permissible. Taylor, 458 F.3d at 1205
(citation and quotation marks omitted); cf. Coffin v. Brandau, 642 F.3d 999, 1005,
1012 (11th Cir. 2011) (contrasting a garage attached to a home and enclosed by
three walls and a door with a carport that is open and exposed to the public in
deciding whether an officer’s entry into the garage violated the Fourth
Amendment). The carport was located right next to the house and the officers
entered it because they had reason to believe the house’s occupant was sitting in
the car parked inside. They did not exceed the scope of the knock and talk
exception.
Walker also contends that going to someone’s house before sunrise to knock
on the door is unreasonable and exceeds the implied invitation that underlies the
knock and talk exception. That contention fails in light of all the circumstances
surrounding the officers’ actions. They had already visited the house twice to
6 Case: 15-10710 Date Filed: 09/03/2015 Page: 7 of 7
speak with its owner. When they arrived the third time at 5:04 a.m. and saw a light
on inside the vehicle, it was not unreasonable to think that someone was inside it.
Although many people might normally be asleep at that early hour, the light on in
the car indicated otherwise. The officers also saw lights on in the house. They did
not act unreasonably by approaching the vehicle, tapping on the window, and
asking Walker to step out. 1 Because their conduct was reasonable, the officers
complied with the Fourth Amendment. See Brigham City, 547 U.S. at 403, 406–
07, 126 S. Ct. at 1947, 1949. The district court therefore did not err in denying
Walker’s motion to suppress the evidence of counterfeit currency found in the
home.
AFFIRMED.
1 Walker argues that under Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 126 S. Ct. 1943 (2006), any warrantless entry into the home or curtilage that occurs in the wee hours of the morning must be accompanied by exigent circumstances. That decision held that police officers’ warrantless entry into a home at 3:00 a.m. was reasonable because exigent circumstances existed. Id. at 403– 07, 126 S. Ct. at 1947–49. It did not hold, however, that exigent circumstances must exist for a warrantless early morning knock and talk, which is not considered a search. 7