United States v. Wardle

CourtDistrict Court, D. Montana
DecidedApril 8, 2024
Docket2:23-cv-00020
StatusUnknown

This text of United States v. Wardle (United States v. Wardle) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Montana primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
United States v. Wardle, (D. Mont. 2024).

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF MONTANA BUTTE DIVISION

UNITED STATES OFAMERICA,

CV-23-20-BU-BMM Plaintiff,

vs. ORDER

CHRISTOPHER F. WARDLE; FIRST INTERSTATE BANK; FIRST AMERICAN TITLE COMPANY OF MONTANA, INC.; FEDERAL NATIONAL MORTGAGE ASSOCIATION; ACTION COLLECTION SERVICE, INC.; and TREASURER OF GALLATIN COUNTY, MONTANA.

Defendants.

BACKGROUND Plaintiff the United States (“United States”) brings this action to enforce federal tax liens against property owned by Defendant Christopher F. Wardle (“Wardle”). The property at issues is located at 365 Coffee Creek Road, Bozeman, Montana 59715 (“the Property”). (Doc. 1.) Wardle consented in a past U.S. District Court action to judgment in favor of the United States in the amount of $1,020,637.86 for taxes he failed to timely pay (“Judgment Liability”). (Doc. 48-1 at 2-3); (Doc. 48-7). The Judgment Liability remains subject to accrual of interest and other statutory additions and interest continues to accrue. (Doc. 48-3 at 4); (Doc. 48-1 at 3-4). The United States proffers

evidence that Wardle’s tax debt, as of December 18, 2023, equals $1,555,665.83. (Doc. 48-3 at 4.) Wardle contends that the United States miscalculates his tax debt but admits to owing $876,947.31. (Doc. 43 at 2-3); (Doc. 52 at 1-3).

The United States filed several Notices of Federal Tax Lien in Gallatin County (“Notices”) against Wardle to enforce the Judgment Liability. (Doc. 48-1 at 4-5); (Doc. 48-10). The United States failed to timely refile the Notices. See (Doc. 48-11.) The Notices were released as a result. See id. The United States subsequently

revoked the releases and reinstated the Notices. Id.; see (Doc. 48-9). Several other Defendants possess an interest in the Property. (Doc. 48-1 at 5- 6.) Defendants First American Title Company of Montana, Inc., and First Action

Collection Service, Inc., disclaimed their interests in the Property. (Doc. 36); (Doc. 13). Defendants First Interstate Bank and Federal National Mortgage Association (“Fannie Mae”) entered a stipulation with the United States as to lien priorities. (Doc. 40.)

Wardle moves the Court to dismiss the action and to release the federal tax liens on the Property. (Doc. 43.) Wardle requests, in the alternative, for the Court to stay proceedings. (Doc. 52-4.) The United States moves for summary judgment that

the United States may enforce its tax liens against the Property by judicial sale and that the proceeds should be distributed according to the above-mentioned disclaimers and stipulations. (Doc. 48.) The Court held a hearing on these motions

on March 14, 2024. (Doc. 55.) Wardle failed to appear personally, or through any representative, at the hearing. Id. LEGAL STANDARD

A court must dismiss a complaint if a complaint fails to “state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). A Rule 12(b) motion must be filed prior to the filing of a responsive pleading. “If, on a motion under Rule 12(b)(6) or 12(c), matters outside the pleadings are presented to and not excluded by the court,

the motion must be treated as one for summary judgment under Rule 56.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d). Summary judgment proves appropriate when “the movant shows that there is

no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). Only a fact that might affect the outcome of the case is a material fact. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). DISCUSSION

Wardle characterizes his motion as a motion to dismiss under 12(b)(6). (Doc. 43.) Wardle filed an answer in this matter, (Doc. 25), before asserting his 12(b)(6) defense and his motion relies on material outside the pleadings, including

attached exhibits, (Doc. 43-1, -2, -3). As a result, the Court proceeds as though Wardle and the United States have filed cross-motions for summary judgment. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b); Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d).

I. Property Sale Pursuant Section 7403 Wardle and the United States agree that Wardle continues to owe, at least, $876,947.31 of the Judgment Liability. See (Doc. 43 at 2-3.) Wardle disputes only

the amount of his tax liability and does not dispute that he remains liable for some amount to the United States under the prior judgment. (Doc. 43.) The United States submits as evidence transcripts based on Internal Revenue Service records that show unpaid balances remain as to Wardle’s Judgment Liability. (Doc. 48-5.)

Wardle cites no authority for the proposition that a delinquent taxpayer’s objection to the calculated amount of a tax liability prohibits the United States from enforcing a tax lien by selling the taxpayer’s property pursuant to 26 U.S.C. § 7403.

Section 7403(a) provides that the United States may sue to enforce a federal tax lien as to “any property, of whatever nature, of the delinquent, or in which he has any right, title, or interest” by forcing the sale of such property. A district court’s “equitable discretion in § 7403 proceedings” to prevent a foreclosure sale remains

limited. United States v. Rodgers, 461 U.S. 677, 708, 711 (1983). Courts consider four factors in situations where independent third parties— such as a spouse who co-owns the property as a tenant in the entirety—hold an

interest in the property that may be the subject of a forced sale under § 7403. United States v. Gibson, 817 F.2d 1406, 1407-08 (9th Cir. 1987). Those factors are as follows:

(1) the extent to which the government’s financial interests would be prejudiced if it were relegated to a forced sale of the taxpayer’s partial interest, (2) whether the third party with a nonliable separate interest in the property has a legally recognized expectation that his or her separate property will not be subject to a forced sale by the taxpayer’s creditors, (3) the likely prejudice to the third party, both in personal dislocation costs and practical undercompensation, and (4) the relative character and value of the interests held in the property.

Id. (citing Rogers); see United States v. Burtsfield, 553 F. Supp. 2d 1194, 1198 (D. Mont. 2008). No evidence exists in this case that a third party co-owns the Property with Wardle although parties other than the United States possess outstanding liens on the Property. The factors fail to lend support to the contention that a dispute over the exact amount of a tax debt owed should stymie § 7403 proceedings to force the sale of a property. The first factor clarifies the relationship between the taxpayer, the government, the taxpayer’s interest in a property, and the taxpayer’s liability. The amount of the taxpayer’s liability enters a court’s equitable consideration only by way of the government’s financial interests.

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Related

United States v. Rodgers
461 U.S. 677 (Supreme Court, 1983)
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.
477 U.S. 242 (Supreme Court, 1986)
United States v. Norman D. Carter, Cecilia P. Carter
906 F.2d 1375 (Ninth Circuit, 1990)
United States v. David Bruce Gilbert, M.D.
48 F.3d 1229 (Ninth Circuit, 1995)
United States v. Burtsfield
553 F. Supp. 2d 1194 (D. Montana, 2008)
United States v. Komron Allahyari
980 F.3d 684 (Ninth Circuit, 2020)
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323 F. Supp. 3d 1119 (N.D. California, 2018)
United States v. Layman
149 F. App'x 675 (Ninth Circuit, 2005)

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United States v. Wardle, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/united-states-v-wardle-mtd-2024.