United States v. Wardlaw

977 F. Supp. 1481, 48 Fed. R. Serv. 182, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14538, 1997 WL 592097
CourtDistrict Court, N.D. Georgia
DecidedSeptember 22, 1997
DocketCriminal Action No. 1:97-CR-114MHS
StatusPublished

This text of 977 F. Supp. 1481 (United States v. Wardlaw) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, N.D. Georgia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
United States v. Wardlaw, 977 F. Supp. 1481, 48 Fed. R. Serv. 182, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14538, 1997 WL 592097 (N.D. Ga. 1997).

Opinion

ORDER

SHOOB, Senior District Judge.

This action is before the Court on defendants’ motions to suppress certain audio tape recordings; the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation (R & R),1 recommending that the motions be denied; and defendants’ objections to the R & R. For the following reasons, the Court rejects the R & R and grants defendants’ motions to suppress.

Background

Defendants seek to suppress tape recordings made by Jeffrey Wright, a former employee of Coca-Cola Enterprises, Inc. (CCE). In July 1994, during a union election campaign at CCE’s East Metro Sales Center, where he worked, Wright began recording telephone conversations at his home on a cassette player attached to his telephone answering machine. Wright recorded telephone conversations between himself and defendant Eric Turpin, CCE’s Atlanta Region Vice President, Human Resources, and Philip H. Sanford, CCE’s Vice President, Finance and Administration. Wright also recorded answering machine messages left by defendant James Wardlaw, CCE’s Atlanta Region Vice President and General Manager.

Wright did not preserve these original recordings. Instead, he selectively re-recorded the conversations on a dual cassette deck, deleting certain portions by pausing the duplicate tape so that it did not record the portions of the original that he wished to exclude. He then intentionally destroyed the original recordings by taping other material over them. According to Wright, the portions of the conversations he intentionally deleted consisted of “[rjacial remarks, girlfriend name, ... ask[ing] for a raise and ask[ing] for some Falcons tickets ... and [a] bunch of personal calls and curse words and stuff like that.” (Transcript of July 9, 1997, hearing before the Magistrate Judge, at 113.) Wright claims that he did not intend to delete any of defendant Turpin’s portions of the conversations but admits that he may have made mistakes during the re-recording process.

[1483]*1483In this manner, from four original cassette recordings, Wright created the two cassettes now identified as Government’s Exhibits (GEX) 1 and 2.2 A defense expert, Paul Ginsberg, examined these tapes and identified 28 “interruptions” caused by intentional “operator intervention.” Of these 28 interruptions, 25 involved deletions of the recorded conversation of unknown duration. Ginsberg found no evidence that anything was added or spliced into any conversation, and he confirmed that the portions of the tapes preceding and following the interruptions are accurate reproductions of the originals.

Discussion

After a de novo review of the record, the Court concludes that the tape recordings are inadmissible for two reasons. First, the government cannot properly authenticate the recordings under Federal Rule of Evidence 901, because the evidence shows that the tapes have been materially altered. Second, under Federal Rule of Evidence 403, the probative value of the edited tape recordings is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice to defendants and misleading the jury.

1. Authenticity

Authentication requires “evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what its proponent claims.” Fed.R.Evid. 901(a). As applied to tape recordings, this means that the proponent must come forward with evidence showing, inter alia, “the absence of material deletions, additions, or alterations in the relevant portions of the recording.” United States v. Biggins, 551 F.2d 64, 66 (5th Cir.1977).3

Furthermore, because “recorded evidence is likely to have a strong impression on a jury and is susceptible to alteration,” the evidence of its authenticity and accuracy must be “clear and convincing.” United States v. Ruggiero, 928 F.2d 1289, 1303 (2nd Cir.1991) (citations omitted); see also United States v. Blakey, 607 F.2d 779, 787 (7th Cir.1979). Thus, to, establish authenticity, “the. possibility of [material] alterations to the tape” must be eliminated “as a reasonable possibility.” United States v. Bright, 630 F.2d 804, 819 (5th Cir.1980).

Applying these standards to the facts of this case, the Court concludes that the government, as the proponent of the tape recorded evidence, has failed to carry its burden of authentication. First, it is undisputed that the tapes offered by the government contain no fewer than 25 separate deletions from the, original recordings, which were intentionally destroyed. While the government contends, and the Magistrate Judge concluded, that these deletions were immaterial, the weight of the evidence is to the contrary.

Wright himself testified that he deleted his requests for a raise and for football tickets. These are both “thing[s] of value,” 29 U.S.C. § 186(a), which, if given to an employee by management during a union election campaign, could constitute the same kind of alleged violation that led to the indictment in this case. Nonetheless, Wright has admitted to deleting these requests from his re-recordings, and it must be presumed that he also deleted defendant Turpin’s responses in the process. Such requests and the missing responses are obviously material. The fact that Wright erroneously believed them to be immaterial also calls into serious question whether other deletions Wright made in the tapes were material.

That Wright’s deletions were material is further indicated by other evidence. The tapes themselves reveal a critical deletion in the conversation in which defendant Turpin is explaining his understanding of his and defendant Wardlaw’s alleged agreement with Wright. (See GEX 9A at 7059, line 10.) Just as defendant Turpin is about to tell [1484]*1484Wright what he has agreed to do, Turpin’s statement is edited in mid-sentence. When the conversation resumes, it has moved on to another topic. -Clearly, defendant Turpin’s understanding of the alleged agreement that led to the indictment in this case is material. The government contends that this gap in the tape was not due to Wright’s editing but to a break in the cellular phone transmission. This contention, however, is purely speculative and in any event does not change the apparent materiality of the omitted portion of the conversation.

Wright’s claims that he deleted only immaterial portions of the tapes are further undermined by his own lack of credibility and by other evidence from the tapes themselves. The evidence shows that Wright has repeatedly misrepresented the nature of his recordings. When he initially turned over GEX 1 and 2 to the government, he falsely stated that the tapes were originals.

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Bluebook (online)
977 F. Supp. 1481, 48 Fed. R. Serv. 182, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14538, 1997 WL 592097, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/united-states-v-wardlaw-gand-1997.