United States v. Walters

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
• Decided: January 21, 2000
• Docket: 97-6385
• Status: Published

Opinion

RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION Pursuant to Sixth Circuit Rule 206 ELECTRONIC CITATION: 2000 FED App. 0034P (6th Cir.) File Name: 00a0034p.06

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT _________________

;  UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,  Plaintiff-Appellee,   Nos. 97-6383/ v.  6384/6385 >   PHILLIP CHARLES GREEN

 (97-6383); SANTOS NEGRON  (97-6384); LARRY WADE  WALTERS, JR. (97-6385), Defendants-Appellants.  1 Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Tennessee at Memphis. No. 96-20098—Jerome Turner, District Judge. Argued: December 14, 1999 Decided and Filed: January 21, 2000 Before: NELSON and DAUGHTREY, Circuit Judges; BERTELSMAN, District Judge.*

* The Honorable William O. Bertelsman, United States District Judge for the Eastern District of Kentucky, sitting by designation.

1 2 United States v. Nos. 97-6383/6384/6385 Green, et al.

_________________ COUNSEL ARGUED: Robert C. Irby, Memphis, Tennessee, Randall P. Salky, THE LAW OFFICE OF RANDALL SALKY, Memphis, Tennessee, William F. Travis, Southaven, Mississippi, for Appellants. Jennifer Lawrence Webber, OFFICE OF THE U.S. ATTORNEY, Memphis, Tennessee, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Robert C. Irby, Memphis, Tennessee, Randall P. Salky, THE LAW OFFICE OF RANDALL SALKY, Memphis, Tennessee, William F. Travis, Southaven, Mississippi, for Appellants. Jennifer Lawrence Webber, OFFICE OF THE U.S. ATTORNEY, Memphis, Tennessee, for Appellee. _________________ OPINION _________________ BERTELSMAN, District Judge. The appellants, Phillip Charles Green, Santos Negron, and Larry Wade Walters, Jr., appeal from their respective convictions and sentences imposed for their part in a prison riot. Walters appeals an enhanced sentence pursuant to U.S.S.G § 3B1.1. Green and Negron appeal their convictions as participants in the riot and maintain they are not guilty of causing or assisting a riot under 18 U.S.C. § 1792. These cases arise from an inmate disturbance which erupted at the Federal Correctional Institution in Memphis, Tennessee, on October 20, 1995, at approximately 12:15 p.m. The disturbance, which began as a protest by inmates based on the alleged disparity in sentences for crack cocaine and powdered cocaine offenders, quickly grew into a riot. Inmates started fires in housing units and other buildings, broke windows, and destroyed government property. Among the property destroyed was that of Unicor, a company that used inmate labor to manufacture electronic cables for the Nos. 97-6383/6384/6385 United States v. 3 Green, et al.

Defense Department. The total cost of the rioting to the government was $3,445,165. During the course of the riot, over 100 inmates were treated for smoke inhalation. Seven inmates were transported to outside hospitals for treatment. Four prison staff members, along with a firefighter, were transported to area hospitals for treatment for smoke inhalation. On January 31, 1997, a federal grand jury sitting in the Western District of Tennessee returned an eight-count indictment charging Brian Torres,1 Walters, Negron, and Green with aiding and abetting, instigating, conniving, willfully attempting to cause, and assisting a riot in a federal prison in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1792, and willfully and maliciously destroying government property in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1361. Negron was additionally charged with the setting of a fire within the special territorial jurisdiction of the United States in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 81. Appellants received a jury trial in this matter commencing on April 29, 1997. The jury returned a verdict on May 14, 1997. Walters was convicted on one count of rioting in a federal prison and three counts of destruction of government property. Negron was convicted on one count of rioting in a federal prison and one count of destruction of government property. He was acquitted on the count for setting fire in the territorial jurisdiction of the United States. Torres was convicted on one count of rioting in a federal prison and one count of destruction of government property. Green was convicted on one count of rioting in a federal prison and was acquitted on one count of destruction of government property. Based on his conviction and criminal background, Walters was sentenced to ninety-two months of imprisonment to run consecutive to his current term of imprisonment and three

1 Torres was convicted at trial with the other defendants. However, he did not appeal his conviction and/or sentence. 4 United States v. Nos. 97-6383/6384/6385 Nos. 97-6383/6384/6385 United States v. 9 Green, et al. Green, et al.

years of supervised release. Negron received thirty-seven verdict. When a criminal defendant argues a “material” months of imprisonment to run consecutive to his current variance in the context of a bill of particulars, he must term of imprisonment and three years of supervised release. demonstrate that the variance prejudiced “substantial rights” Green received eighty-four months of imprisonment to run and that the variance took him by surprise or placed him at consecutive to his current term of imprisonment and three risk of double jeopardy. United States v. Hart, 70 F.3d 854 years of supervised release. Walters, Green and Negron each (6th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1127, 116 S.Ct. 1368, filed a timely notice of appeal. 134 L.Ed.2d 534 (1996) (citations omitted). “[A] variance is immaterial if it does not impair the defendant’s ability to The only argument Walters presents on appeal is that the defend himself through failing to identify the nature of the district court erred in enhancing his base offense level by four charge.” Id. (citing United States v. Robinson, 974 F.2d, 575, levels for being an organizer2or leader of criminal activity 578 (5th Cir. 1992)). pursuant to U.S.S.G § 3B1.1. This determination involves a question of fact and is reviewed for clear error. United The evidence in this case clearly supports the conclusion States v. Layne, 192 F.3d 556, 578 (6th Cir. 1999) (citing that Green had an active role in the riot sufficient to support United States v. Williams, 962 F.2d 1218, 1227 (6th Cir.), his conviction. Furthermore, any variance between the cert. denied, 506 U.S. 892, 113 S.Ct. 264, 121 L.Ed.2d 194 evidence and the bill of particulars is immaterial, and in no (1992)). “A finding is clearly erroneous if, after studying the way was Green taken by surprise or placed at any risk of entire record, [the court is] ‘left with the definite and firm double jeopardy in this case. Thus, this argument is without conviction that a mistake has been committed.’” Id. (quoting merit. United States v. Perez, 871 F.2d 45, 48 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 492 U.S. 910, 109 S.Ct. 3227, 106 L.Ed.2d 576 Therefore, finding no error in this matter, we hereby (1989)). AFFIRM the judgment of the trial court in all respects. In making a determination regarding enhancement under U.S.S.G § 3B1.1, “a district court should consider such factors as the exercise of decisionmaking authority, the nature of the defendant’s participation in the commission of the offense, the recruitment of accomplices, the degree of participation in planning or organizing the offense, and the

2 U.S.S.G § 3B1.1 provides: Based on the defendant’s role in the offense, increase the offense level as follows: (a) If the defendant was an organizer or leader of a criminal activity that involved five or more participants or was otherwise extensive, increase by 4 levels. 8 United States v. Nos. 97-6383/6384/6385 Nos. 97-6383/6384/6385 United States v. 5 Green, et al. Green, et al.

Likewise, in the present case, to interpret the statute as degree of control exercised over others.” Wright v. United Green and Negron ask this court to would require a finding States, 182 F.3d 458, 466-67 (6th Cir. 1999) (citing U.S.S.G that they engaged in no criminal activity although it is clear § 3B1.1 cmt. n. 4). These factors are only designed to provide they took part in the prison riot. guidance to the sentencing court, and there is no requirement that each factor be met. See United States v. Ospina, 18 F.3d Negron was one of a group of inmates who partially 1332, 1337 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 512 U.S. 1226, 114 S.Ct. destroyed cable assemblies that were in the process of being 2721, 129 L.Ed.2d 846 (1994)). built, and he threw a chair at a window. Green also broke glass and threw chairs. Obviously Congress did not intend The government bears the burden of demonstrating by a that such criminal activity go unpunished. Such a result preponderance of the evidence that an enhancement is would be absurd and do nothing to deter future riots. justified. See United States v. Feinman, 930 F.2d 495 (6th Cir. 1991). Establishing that Walters recruited others to join Therefore, we conclude the better reasoned interpretation of the riot is sufficient to justify an upward departure. See the word “assists” as used in 18 U.S.C. § 1792 is that of the United States v. Garcia, 20 F.3d 670, 674 (6th Cir. 1994), Third and Fifth Circuits. cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1159, 115 S.Ct. 1120, 130 L.Ed.2d 1083 (1995) (defendant’s recruitment of accomplices was a Thus, we hold that the fair and ordinary meaning of 18 factor justifying an enhanced sentence under U.S.S.G U.S.C. § 1792 includes the participation in a prison riot and § 3B1.1). is prohibited and punishable as a crime. Hence, we affirm the district court. The record contains the trial testimony of several witnesses that Walters’s role in the riot was sufficient to justify an Appellant Green advances several other arguments which enhancement. One witness testified that Walters encouraged can be disposed of in a summary manner. He alleges that the other inmates to join the riot and encouraged violence. (Jesse district court erred in curtailing his counsel’s cross Younger at 51/1/97 TR 294). Additionally, Walters “stated examination of government witnesses. Green, however, fails for everybody to join him before the staff did a count.” (Id. to demonstrate how he was prejudiced by the trial court’s at 298). moving the questioning along. Another witness testified that Walters yelled for the other Moreover, the standard of review of a trial court’s ruling on inmates to “‘Take [a staff member’s] [expletive deleted] keys, the admissibility of testimony and other evidence is for an take his [expletive deleted] radio, we have come to get our abuse of discretion. United States v. Bonds, 12 F.3d 540, 554 people, let our people go’, or words to that effect.” (Archie (6th Cir. 1993). Even in the case of a finding of abuse of Wiggins at 5/1/97 TR 360). discretion, a new trial is not required unless substantial rights are affected, as an abuse of discretion is otherwise harmless A third witness testified that Walters also instructed the error. We find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion inmates to get the staff’s video cameras. (Andrew Danner at in limiting some of the questioning on cross examination. 5/2/97 TR 580-81). A final witness testified that Walters was Hence, we reject Green’s argument on this issue. yelling: “‘[W]e (the inmates) can go in there and take the [other inmates] out[.] You all can’t stop us.’” (Mike Wallace Green also argues that the government’s testimony did not at 5/2/97 TR 622). Walters also encouraged others to join the conform to the bill of particulars enough to support a guilty 6 United States v. Nos. 97-6383/6384/6385 Nos. 97-6383/6384/6385 United States v. 7 Green, et al. Green, et al.

riot by shouting for the inmates in the Delta Housing Unit to Thereafter, the Fifth Circuit reviewed the same issue in “mount up.” United States v. Bryant, 563 F.2d 1227, 1228-29 (5th Cir. 1977), and noted the split between the Third and Tenth This evidence is more than sufficient to establish Walters’s Circuits. The Fifth Circuit agreed with the Third Circuit leadership role in the riot by a preponderance of the evidence. holding that “assists” as used in the statute means “willful He clearly recruited other inmates to join in the riot and participation.” The court rejected the defendants’ argument directed them what to do. Thus, the district court did not err that the statute only prohibits instigating, causing, or in enhancing Walters’s sentence under U.S.S.G § 3B1.1. conspiring to cause a riot. It concluded that interpreting the language in such a manner would mean that participation in The next issue involves Green and Negron’s appeal a prison riot would no longer be a crime. Id. at 1230. The regarding the interpretation of 18 U.S.C. § 1792, which court stated that “[it] could not believe that Congress intended provides that “[w]hoever instigates, connives, willfully any such result.” Id. attempts to cause, assists, or conspires to cause any mutiny or riot, at any Federal penal, detention, or correctional facility, We find the following language from Bryant particularly shall be imprisoned not more than ten years or fined under persuasive. this title, or both.” The defendants argue that the word “assists” in the Negron and Green argue on appeal they were only mere statute must be construed in context with the surrounding participants in the prison riot and that such does not constitute words in the statute, and when this is done it is clear that a violation under 18 U.S.C. § 1792. This is an issue of first it means “to instigate, cause or conspire to cause” a impression in this circuit, although other circuits have spoken prison riot or mutiny, and does not prohibit mere on the issue with differing voices. Therefore, there exists a participation therein. We do not agree. The court was need for clarity in this circuit regarding the interpretation of correct in its decision in Farries, supra, when it said: 18 U.S.C. § 1792. Since this matter involves statutory construction, it is reviewed de novo by this court. See United The word “assists” must be given its plain meaning. States v. Kassouf, 144 F.3d 952, 955 (6th Cir. 1998). One who wilfully participates in a mutiny or riot plainly “assists . . . any mutiny or riot” and thereby In United States v. Rodgers, 419 F.2d 1315, 1317 (10th Cir. violates the statute. 1969), the Tenth Circuit held that “[t]he plain words of 18 U.S.C. § 1792 limit the offense to the instigation of or Furthermore, Blacks Law Dictionary, Revised Fourth connivance to cause a riot or mutiny and does not include Edition, 1968, defines “assists” as follows: participation therein.” However, the Third Circuit openly rejected the Tenth Circuit’s holding in Rodgers in United To help, aid, succor, lend countenance or States v. Farries, 459 F.2d 1057, 1063-64 (3rd Cir.), cert. encouragement to; participate in as an auxiliary--- denied, 409 U.S. 888, 93 S.Ct. 143, 34 L.Ed.2d 145(1972) To contribute effort —. The Third Circuit held that “the word ‘assists’ must be given its plain meaning. One who willfully participates in a mutiny Id., 563 F.2d at 1229-30 (internal citations and quotations or riot plainly ‘assists . . . any mutiny or riot’ and thereby omitted) (emphasis supplied). violates the statute.” Id. at 1064.