United States v. Walter Wando Cha

837 F.2d 392, 1988 U.S. App. LEXIS 457, 1988 WL 1965
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
DecidedJanuary 19, 1988
Docket87-5178
StatusPublished
Cited by7 cases

This text of 837 F.2d 392 (United States v. Walter Wando Cha) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
United States v. Walter Wando Cha, 837 F.2d 392, 1988 U.S. App. LEXIS 457, 1988 WL 1965 (9th Cir. 1988).

Opinion

PREGERSON, Circuit Judge:

Appellant pled guilty to two counts of violating 18 U.S.C. § 922(m) (1982), causing false entries in firearms records. As part of the sentence, the court imposed a fine of $15,000 for each count. Appellant contends that the $30,000 in fines imposed by the district court constituted an illegal sentence because the Firearms Owners’ Protection Act provides for a maximum fine of $1,000 per count. We affirm.

BACKGROUND

Appellant was indicted on August 12, 1986 for participating in “straw purchaser” sales of firearms to persons who were not properly identified as the transferees on federal firearms records, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(m). Contrary to law, Cha sold firearms to an undercover agent who was posing as an illegal alien. The agent represented to Cha that he was a killer for hire who wanted to smuggle firearms to Mexico.

On December 5, 1986, appellant pled guilty to two counts of violating section 922(m). Prior to the time appellant entered his guilty pleas, the court ruled that the alleged violations of this section would be treated as misdemeanors, pursuant to the Firearms Owners’ Protection Act of 1986, 18 U.S.C. §§ 921, 922-926, 929 (Supp. IV 1986), which became effective November 19, 1986. At the time of his guilty plea, appellant was advised that he was subject to a maximum possible fine of $25,000 per count.

On January 6, 1986, the court sentenced appellant to 161 days on one count, five years probation on the other, and imposed a fine of $15,000 per count. On May 5, 1987, Cha filed a motion under Fed.R.Crim.P. 35(a) challenging the legality of the fine imposed. The court denied the motion, ruling that the 1984 Crime Control Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3623 (Supp. IV 1986), authorized the increased fines. We affirm.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

We review purely legal questions de novo. Trustees of Amalgamated Ins. *394 Fund v. Geltman Industries, Inc., 784 F.2d 926, 929 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 107 S.Ct. 90, 93 L.Ed.2d 42 (1986).

DISCUSSION

18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(2)(B) provides that “any licensed dealer ... who knowingly ... violates subsection (m) of section 922, shall be fined not more than $1,000, imprisoned not more than one year, or both....” Appellant argues that the $30,000 in fines imposed by the district court for two counts of violating 18 U.S.C. § 922(m) are illegal sentences because they exceed the maximum set forth in section 924(a)(2)(B). The government argues that 18 U.S.C. § 3623 authorizes the enhanced fine. 1 Section 3623, “Alternative Fines,” states that “an individual convicted of an offense may be fined not more than the greater of — (1) the amount specified in the law setting forth the offense ... [or] (5) in the case of a misdemeanor punishable by imprisonment for more than six months, $100,000.” We must decide which of the fine provisions controls in this case.

In construing statutes, our goal is to “ ‘ascertain the congressional intent and to give effect to legislative will.’ ... This intent may be ascertained from the plain language of the statute, or it may be necessary to look to the legislative history for guidance.” In re Cecchini, 780 F.2d 1440, 1442 (9th Cir.1986) (citations omitted). A statute’s title may also aid in construing any ambiguities in the statute. Russ v. Wilkins, 624 F.2d 914, 922 (9th Cir.1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 908, 101 S.Ct. 1976, 68 L.Ed.2d 296 (1981).

Both the plain meaning of the statutory language and the title of section 3623 support its application to this case. Section 3623 is entitled “Alternative Fines,” suggesting that the district court may rely on its provisions to enhance fines. The district court need not be limited by fine provisions set forth in the statute governing the substantive offense. Section 3623 does not ignore the substantive offense, but rather expressly provides that the court may impose a fine in the amount specified in the language of the substantive offense or, in the case of misdemeanors punishable by imprisonment for more than six months, $100,000, whichever is greater. Section 3623 thus clearly serves as an alternative to the fine limits set by the statute establishing the substantive offense, in this case, section 924(a)(2)(B).

The legislative history further supports this interpretation. The House Report on the Criminal Enforcement Act of 1984, which includes section 3623, stated that one of its purposes is to “make criminal fines more severe and thereby to encourage their more frequent use as an alternative to, or in addition to, imprisonment....” 1984 U.S.Code Cong. & Ad.News 5433. Congress also noted that “the maximum fines of present laws — except for some of the recently enacted ones and some of the regulatory offenses — are too low to constitute a significant punishments [sic] for the offense involved.” Id. at 5448-49.

Appellant argues, nonetheless, that because Congress passed the Firearms Owners’ Protection Act (section 924(a)(2)(B)) after section 3623, that Congress must have intended the provisions of section 924 to govern. At the least, Cha argues, this timing raises an ambiguity in the statute. However, Congress’ failure to address the interplay of section 924(a)(2)(B) and section 3623 when it passed section 924 does not establish any ambiguity. As we stated regarding an analogous question of statutory construction:

Petitioners read this silence as an “ambiguity” over whether Congress intended to authorize multiple punishment. Peti *395 tioners, however, read much into nothing. Congress cannot be expected to specifically address each issue of statutory construction which might arise.... [I]f anything is to be assumed from Congressional silence on this point, it is that Congress was aware of the Blockburger rule and legislated with it in mind.

United States v. Gann, 732 F.2d 714, 719 (9th Cir.), (quoting Albernaz v. United States, 450 U.S. 333, 340-42, 101 S.Ct. 1137, 1143-44, 67 L.Ed.2d 275 (1981)), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1034, 105 S.Ct.

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Bluebook (online)
837 F.2d 392, 1988 U.S. App. LEXIS 457, 1988 WL 1965, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/united-states-v-walter-wando-cha-ca9-1988.