ALARCON, Circuit Judge:
Walter David Tallmadge (Tallmadge) was indicted on January 10, 1986 for knowingly receiving six rifles after being convicted in the State of California of a crime punishable by a term of imprisonment exceeding one year in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(h)(1) (1982), and for knowingly receiving and possessing a rifle after having been convicted of a felony in the State of California in violation of 18 U.S.C.App. § 1202(a)(1) (1982). Tallmadge was also accused, in separate counts, of making false statements likely to deceive a federally licensed gun dealer in the acquisition of each rifle in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(6) (1982).
The facts are not in dispute. The government’s entire case was submitted to the district court on stipulated facts. Tallmadge stipulated he purchased and received the rifles described in the indictment on four separate dates in 1982. Tallmade also stipulated that prior to purchasing each rifle he answered “no” to question 8.b. on the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Firearms Transaction Record, which provides as follows:
Have you been convicted in any court of a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year? (Note: The actual sentence given by the judge does not matter — a “yes” answer is necessary if the judge could have given a sentence of more than one year. Also, a “yes” answer is required if a conviction has been discharged, set aside, or dismissed pursuant to an expungement or rehabilitation statute. However, a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year does not include a conviction which has been set aside under the Federal Youth Corrections Act.)
The stipulation also provides that Tallmadge signed the Firearms Transaction Record and certified that his answer to question 8.b. was true and correct.
In addition, Tallmadge stipulated that on October 10, 1978 he was convicted in the Superior Court for the County of Los Angeles in the State of California of the crime of illegal possession of a machinegun in violation of § 12220 of the California Penal Code, a crime punishable by a term of imprisonment exceeding one year. Cal. Penal Code § 12220 (West Supp. 1987). The stipulation further alleges that Tallmadge was told by the state trial judge on the date of sentencing, February 6, 1979, that he had been convicted of a felony. The stipulation also provides that on January 26, 1982, the state court “expunged and reduced to a misdemeanor” the 1978 conviction. The parties further stipulated that in the same state court proceeding Tallmadge was informed by the court “that the expunction order did not release him of the [769]*769obligation to disclose the prior conviction in response to a direct question or application for public office or licensure by any state or local agency.”
Tallmadge and his trial attorney testified in support of the defendant’s contention that as a matter of due process he could not be convicted of these federal charges because he was told by a federally licensed gun dealer that he could purchase a rifle because his state charges were reduced to a misdemeanor for all purposes. The district court found that their testimony was credible. Thus, in light of the stipulated facts, and the evidence offered by the defendant, the only issue before the trial court was the legal effect of the reduction of Tallmadge’s state conviction to a misdemeanor in light of the federally licensed gun dealer’s statement that he could lawfully purchase a long gun because the state trial judge had reduced the felony conviction to a misdemeanor. In order to review this narrow question, we must examine fully the facts surrounding the state court expunction proceedings and the representations made by the federally licensed gun dealer.
I. PERTINENT FACTS
A. Evidence Relating to the State Court Proceedings
Tallmadge appeared for sentencing on February 6, 1979 following his conviction for possession of a machine gun. The state trial judge stayed the imposition of sentence and placed the defendant on probation for three years. At this hearing, the prosecutor made the following statement to the court in Tallmadge’s presence in discussing the terms of probation:
I would like it explicitly made known to the defendant at this time as to the firearms that it refers to any kind of firearms, whether they be rifles, shotguns, handguns, ammunition, incendiary devices and explosives.
The state trial judge acquiesced. Later in the proceedings the state trial judge told Tallmadge that as a condition of his probation he could “not own, use or possess any dangerous or deadly weapons.” (Emphasis added).
On January 4,1982, Tallmadge requested that the Probation Officer of Los Angeles County recommend to the state trial court that it should dismiss the pending criminal proceedings against him pursuant to Cal. Penal Code section 1203.4 (West Supp.1987) because he had complied with all the conditions of probation. The Probation Office advised the state trial court that Tallmadge had complied with all conditions of probation and was “deserving of having his offense fixed as a misdemeanor.” A probation termination hearing was held on January 26, 1982 before the same state trial judge who had originally suspended proceedings in the matter three years earlier.
The prosecutor argued that probation should be terminated but objected to the reduction of the offense to a misdemeanor. The trial judge observed that because Tallmadge’s conduct while on probation was “exemplary” the court would “apply the maxim ‘to err is human and to forgive is divine’ ” and reduce the offense to a misdemeanor under Cal. Penal Code § 17 (West Supp.1987).
The state prosecutor then made the following comments:
One other thing, your Honor. May I address the Court? There is one other thing. According to the regulation in 1203.4, it says that the order of reduction shall state and the probationer shall be informed that the order does not relieve him of the obligation to disclose the con-' viction in response to any direct question contained in any questionnaire or application for public office or for licensure by any state or local agency.
“Dismissal of an accusation or information pursuant to this section does not permit a person to own, possess, or have in his custody or control any firearm capable of being concealed upon the person or prevent his conviction under Section 12021.”
The trial judge then asked Tallmadge if he understood. Tallmadge replied, "Yes, sir.” Thereafter, the state trial judge signed an order reducing the offense to a [770]*770misdemeanor pursuant to Cal. Penal Code § 17 and terminating probation pursuant to Cal. Penal Code § 1203.4. In addition, the state trial court ordered that Tallmadge’s conviction be set aside, that a plea of not guilty be entered, and that case was dismissed pursuant to Cal. Penal Code § 1203.4.
It is clear from the reporter’s transcript of these state court proceedings that Tallmadge was ordered by the court not to carry any firearm while on probation. The record also discloses that three years later Tallmadge was told by the court, at the suggestion of the prosecutor, that he could not carry a concealable firearm under California law, notwithstanding the termination of his probation and the dismissal of the state charges. No statement was made to the defendant concerning his right to carry a nonconcealable weapon under federal law. It is also noteworthy that the state trial judge did not explain to Tallmadge the legal effect of the reduction of the charge of possession of a machine gun to a misdemeanor “for all purposes” under Cal. Penal Code § 17(b)(3).
After his probation was terminated, Tallmadge’s attorney told him there was no problem owning a nonconcealable gun.
B. Evidence Relating to the Due Process Defense
At the commencement of the bench trial before the district court, the trial judge advised counsel that he read the stipulated facts and the attached exhibits containing the relevant proceedings before the state trial judge regarding Tallmadge’s conviction for illegal possession of a machine gun under California law. The district court then inquired of defense counsel, Charles Weedman, “What is your defense?” Mr. Weedman advised the court that his client would testify
that he believed that when the felony— the underlying felony was reduced to a misdemeanor that thereafter the judge could no longer impose a sentence greater than one year, and, therefore, for him to purchase at least a long gun would be permissible under federal law.
The trial judge then inquired, “You are satisfied that his state of mind as you described it would be a defense, is that what you are saying.”
Mr. Weedman replied as follows:
Well, I am seeking to offer that evidence for whatever constitutional attack may be appropriate in this case.
I think that the form [Firearms Transaction Record] is misleading. I think it is constitutionally defective in that respect. Ignorance of the law is no excuse, and such testimony offered for that purpose, I imagine your Honor would not permit. But I think his reading of it in that fashion at least lays the foundation for a constitutional due process attack.
The district court then requested the government to state its position. The prosecutor replied that Tallmadge’s state of mind was not a defense.
After the foregoing colloquy concerning Mr. Weedman’s offer of proof, the government rested without calling any witnesses, relying on the facts set forth in the stipulation.
Tallmadge then testified that prior to purchasing any of the firearms described in the indictment he had a conversation with Lewis Ferguson. Ferguson was the president of Cole’s Manchester Arms (Cole’s). The firearms referred to in the indictment were purchased at Cole’s. The records of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms (hereinafter ATF) show that at all relevant times in this matter Cole’s was a federally licensed dealer in firearms. Ferguson signed each application for Cole’s license to engage in business as a firearms dealer. Tallmadge testified that “Mr. Ferguson said he had read and understood that I was in some kind of problem, and there may have been a felony conviction. And I said that was changed to a misdemeanor conviction, and there was no problem.”
Tallmadge testified that Ferguson agreed that there was no problem owning a gun because the felony conviction had been reduced to a misdemeanor.
Following Tallmadge’s testimony, the district court suggested that Mr. Weedman [771]*771testify. Mr. Weedman agreed to do so after Tallmadge waived his attorney-client privilege. The district court conducted the direct examination of Mr. Weedman.
Mr. Weedman testified that he advised his client that he could not purchase a firearm during the period of probation because “he stood convicted of a felony.” Mr. Weedman also testified that while the machine gun possession charge “was a state proceeding it was largely orchestrated by agents of the ATF.” ATF agents also testified at the trial of the machinegun possession charges.
Mr. Weedman testified that it is his view of the applicable California statutes that upon the reduction of a felony conviction to a misdemeanor it was no longer a felony conviction.
During Mr. Weedman’s testimony, the district court asked the government to comment on whether question 8.b. on the Firearms Transaction Record addresses the effect of the reduction of a felony to a misdemeanor. The government replied that Tallmadge was required to answer question 8.b. in the affirmative because CaLPenal Code § 1203.4 requires a person whose felony record is expunged to disclose his prior felony conviction in any application for licensure. The government again argued to the court that state of mind is not a defense to the receipt and possession charges. The court was told:
[T]he government’s position would be that the defendant’s belief that it was not a felony is irrelevant to the possession and receipt charges. He is guilty despite state of mind of possessing a gun as a prior felon and of receiving guns as a prior felon.
After this exchange, Mr. Weedman testified that he advised Tallmadge following the probation termination proceedings that he could legally possess “long guns” but not concealable weapons because the charge of possession of a machine gun had been reduced to a misdemeanor.
The district court found Tallmadge not guilty of each count charging him with making false statements concerning his pri- or conviction. The court concluded that “there wasn’t a requisite specific intent as regards 922(a)(6).” Tallmadge was found guilty of each count charging him with receipt and possession of a firearm, however, because the court concluded that his “subjective belief” that he had not been convicted of a felony or a crime punishable by imprisonment for more than one year was not relevant because these crimes are complete upon proof of knowing receipt or possession of a firearm.
During the sentencing hearing, the district court commented that the advice given to Tallmadge by his experienced criminal lawyer after his conviction was reduced to a misdemeanor could “disarm him.” It further noted that this fact, coupled with his “open and notorious purchase of weapons from a dealer that he knew in Santa Monica,” was “all consistent with a mens rea to the effect, look at, I am not doing anything wrong.” In explaining its conclusion that Tallmadge’s state of mind was not a defense to the charges of receipt or possession of firearms, the district court did not discuss the import of the evidence concerning the federally licensed gun dealer’s statement to Tallmadge that it would not be a “problem” to receive or possess weapons after a state trial judge has reduced a felony conviction to a misdemeanor.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Applicability of the Federal Statutes to Persons Whose State Felony Conviction Have Been Reduced To a Misdemeanor
Tallmadge claims that the federal statutes prohibiting (1) wrongful receipt of a firearm by a person who has been convicted of a crime punishable by a term of imprisonment exceeding one year under 18 U.S.C. § 922(h)(1) and (2) possession of a firearm by a person who has been convicted of a felony under 18 U.S.C.App. § 1202(a)(1), do not apply to him because his prior conviction for possession of a machinegun in violation of Cal.Penal Code § 12220, was reduced to a misdemeanor for all purposes after he successfully completed his probationary term.
[772]*772Section 922(h)(1) applies to anyone “under indictment for, or ... convicted ... of a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year — ” 18 U.S.C. § 922(h)(1). Possession of a machine gun under California law is punishable by “imprisonment in the state prison, or by a fine not to exceed ten thousand dollars ($10,-000), or by both such fine and imprisonment.” Cal.Penal Code § 12220 (West Supp.1987). In order to avoid a felony conviction, Tallmadge requested at the time of sentencing before the state court trial judge that the court impose a sentence of one year in the county jail, and then suspend the imposition of sentence. That request was denied. Instead, the state judge suspended the imposition of sentence and placed Tallmadge on probation for a period of three years.
Tallmadge argues that the reduction of the crime to a misdemeanor upon the successful completion of the term of probation precludes prosecution under section 922(h). Under California law a felony is defined as “a crime which is punishable with death or by imprisonment in the state prison.” Cal.Penal Code § 17(a). We rejected a similar contention in United States v. Pruner, 606 F.2d 871 (9th Cir.1979). In Pruner, the defendant was also charged with a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(h)(1). Id. at 872. The indictment alleged that he had been convicted in California of receiving stolen property, a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year. Id. In 1968 California law provided that the punishment for receiving stolen property was “imprisonment in a state prison for not more than 10 years, or in a county jail for not more than one year.” CaLPenal Code § 496.1. The state trial judge sentenced Pruner to 60 days in the county jail, placed him on probation for three years, and fined him $250. Id. at 872. Under California law the crime became a misdemeanor on the basis of the sentence imposed. Id.
Pruner argued before this court that at the time he purchased the firearms, after-the imposition of sentence in the state court, his crime was not punishable by imprisonment for one year. Pruner, 606 F.2d at 872-73. We held in Pruner that in applying section 922(h)(1), “‘we look to state law solely to determine whether the maximum permissible prison term exceeds one year.’ ” Id. at 873 (quoting United States v. Houston, 547 F.2d 104, 106 (9th Cir.1976)). Thus, the maximum permissible punishment in California for possession of a machinegun is clearly covered by the language of 18 U.S.C. § 922(h)(1). Cal.Penal Code § 12220.
Tallmadge asserts that the reduction of the state charge of possession of a machinegun precludes his conviction for a violation of section 1202. Section 1202 applies to any person who “has been convicted ... of a felony____” 18 U.S.C. App. § 1202(a)(1). Section 1202(c)(2) defines a “felony” as “any offense punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year, but does not include any offense (other than one involving a firearm or explosive) classified as a misdemeanor____” Id. § 1202(c)(2).
Although the definition contains an exception for offenses classified as misdemeanors by a state, the exception is inapplicable to the instant matter because Tallmadge’s predicate conviction involved a firearm. Offenses involving a firearm are expressly excluded from the misdemeanor exception. Id.; Houston, 547 F.2d at 106 (construing section 1202); see also Dickerson v. New Banner Inst., Inc., 460 U.S. 103, 113-14, 103 S.Ct. 986, 992, 74 L.Ed.2d 845 (1983).
Tallmadge also argues that the statutes under which he was convicted are void for vagueness because they fail to give sufficient notice to potential violators. In addition, he claims that the district court erred in concluding that proof of intent was not required under section 922(b) and section 1202. We summarily rejected the vagueness argument as to section 1202 in Houston. 547 F.2d at 107. In Pruner we held that section 922(h) was a regulatory measure that did not require scienter. 606 F.2d at 873-74. As the language in the two sections is nearly identical, these holdings apply equally to both.
[773]*773B. Entrapment by Estoppel
Although the district court expressly found that Tallmadge believed that he could receive and possess rifles without violating federal law because of the reduction of his state conviction to a misdemean- or for all purposes, it rejected his state of mind-due process defense on the ground that scienter is not a defense to those offenses. In reaching this conclusion, the district court did not consider the applicability of the due process defense of entrapment by estoppel. In fairness, it should be noted that while defense counsel advised the court that his defense to the charges was based on due process grounds, he failed to cite any authority concerning the constitutional consequences of official misleading. The issue of entrapment by estoppel was not before us in Pruner or Houston.
In United States v. Hsieh Hui Mei Chen, 754 F.2d 817 (9th Cir.), cert, denied, 471 U.S. 1139, 105 S.Ct. 2684, 86 L.Ed.2d 701 (1985), we described the defense of entrapment by estoppel as follows: “Entrapment by estoppel applies when an official tells the defendant that certain conduct is legal and the defendant believes the official.” Id. at 825 (citing Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559, 85 S.Ct. 476, 13 L.Ed.2d 487 (1965)). In Hsieh Hui Mei Chen, one appellant contended that the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury on the defense of entrapment by estoppel. 754 F.2d at 825. We affirmed because the evidence showed the official “told [the defendant] ... that the conduct was illegal, and [the defendant] ... stated that she knew her actions were unlawful.” Id.
The concept of unintentional entrapment by an official who mistakenly misleads a person into a violation of the law was first applied by the Supreme Court in Raley v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 423, 79 S.Ct. 1257, 3 L.Ed.2d 1344 (1959). In Raley, the appellants were convicted of contempt for refusing to answer questions about Communist or subversive activities at sessions of the Unamerican Activities Commission of the State of Ohio. Id. at 424, 79 S.Ct. at 1259. The appellants had claimed their privilege against self-incrimination after they were informed by the Commission Chairman that they had a right to do so under article I, section 10 of the Ohio Constitution. Id. at 425, 79 S.Ct. at 1259. The Commission’s advice was contrary to Ohio law. Id. at 438-39, 79 S.Ct. at 1266-67. An Ohio immunity statute deprived them of the protection of the privilege against self-incrimination. Id. The Supreme Court reversed the convictions. The Court expressed its holding in the following language:
We hold that in the circumstances of these cases, the judgments of the Ohio Supreme Court affirming the convictions violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and must be reversed, except as to one conviction, as to which we are equally divided. After the Commission, speaking for the State, acted as it did, to sustain the Ohio Supreme Court’s judgment would be to sanction an indefensible sort of entrapment by the State — convicting a citizen for exercising a privilege which the State had clearly told him was available to him.
Raley, 360 U.S. at 425-26, 79 S.Ct. at 1260.
In Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559, 85 S.Ct. 476, 13 L.Ed.2d 487 (1965), the Supreme Court applied Raley in reversing the conviction of persons who were arrested for picketing across the street from a courthouse. Id. at 571, 85 S.Ct. at 484. The defendants were given permission to hold their demonstration on the west side of the street by the Chief of Police. Id. at 569-70, 85 S.Ct. at 483. Some time thereafter the demonstrators were ordered to disperse by the Sheriff. Id. at 570, 85 S.Ct. at 483. They were arrested for refusing to obey the dispersal order. The court concluded that at the time of his arrest, Cox was “justified in his continued belief that because of the original grant of permission he had a right to stay where he was for the few additional minutes required to conclude the meeting.” Id. at 572, 85 S.Ct. at 485. The Court in Raley held that “[t]he Due Process Clause does not permit convictions to be obtained under such circumstances.” Id. at 571, 85 S.Ct. at 484.
[774]*774More recently, in United States v. Pennsylvania Indus. Chem. Cory., 411 U.S. 655, 93 S.Ct. 1804, 36 L.Ed.2d 567 (1973), the Supreme Court, relying on Raley and Cox, held that it was error to deny a corporate defendant the right to present evidence that it had been affirmatively misled by the responsible administrative agency into believing that the law did not apply in this situation. Id. at 670-75, 93 S.Ct. at 1814-17.
In 1972, we applied the defense of official misleading to the conduct of a local draft board in United States v. Timmins, 464 F.2d 385, 386-87 (9th Cir.1972). We held in Timmins that the defendant must show that he relied on the false information and that his reliance was reasonable. Id. at 387; see also United States v. Lansing, 424 F.2d 225, 227 (9th Cir.1970) (to establish the defense of official misleading, the defendant must establish “that his reliance on the misleading information was reasonable — in the sense that a person sincerely desirous of obeying the law would have accepted the information as true, and would not have been put on notice to make further inquiries”).
In the matter before us, the uncontradicted evidence established that Tallmadge received and possessed firearms in reliance upon the representation of a federally licensed gun dealer that a person convicted of a felony in a state court could purchase firearms if the offense had subsequently been reduced to a misdemeanor. We have no doubt that under the doctrine of entrapment by estoppel a person could not be prosecuted under 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(h)(1) and 1202(a)(1) if an ATF official had represented that a person convicted of a felony can purchase firearms after the charge has been reduced to a misdemeanor. Here, the misleading statement regarding the lawfulness of Tallmadge's proposed conduct was made by a licensee of the federal government. We noted in Pruner that Congress has placed a duty on firearms dealers to question their customers regarding a possible criminal record. 606 F.2d at 874. A licensed dealer may not sell a firearm to any person if he knows or has reasonable cause to believe that such person “is under indictment for, or has been convicted in any court of, a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year____” 18 U.S.C. § 922(d)(1) (1982).
The Department of the Treasury requires a licensed firearms dealer and a prospective buyer to fill out a form entitled Firearms Transaction Record to permit the licensee to determine if he may lawfully sell a firearm to such person. The form also requires the firearms dealer “to alert the transferee [buyer] of certain restrictions on the receipt and possession of arms.” The form further provides that “[t]he transferor [seller] of the firearm is responsible for determining the lawfulness of the transaction____” To fulfill this duty the form provides that the firearms dealer “should be familiar with the Gun Control Act of 1968 (18 U.S.C. Chapter 44) and Title VII, Unlawful Possession or Receipt of Firearms, (82 Stat. 197), and 27 CFR Part 178 (Commerce in Firearms and Ammunition).”
Thus, Congress has not only granted certain persons the exclusive right to engage in the business of selling firearms, it has also given them the affirmative duty of inquiring of a prospective buyer whether he has a criminal record that would make it unlawful for him to purchase a firearm. 18 U.S.C. § 922(d)(1). In addition, the Treasury Department requires licensees to inform buyers concerning the restrictions imposed by Congress on the purchase of firearms. Clearly, the United States Government has made licensed firearms dealers federal agents in connection with the gathering and dispensing of information on the purchase of firearms. Under these circumstances, we believe that a buyer has the right to rely on the representations of a licensed firearms dealer, who has been made aware of all the relevant historical facts, that a person may receive and possess a weapon if his felony conviction has been reduced to a misdemeanor. See Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 373-75, 78 S.Ct. 819, 821-22, 2 L.Ed.2d 848 (1958) (entrapment activities of an unpaid [775]*775informer cannot be disowned by the government).1
Tallmadge did not rely solely on the misleading representations of the licensed firearms dealer. He also sought and obtained advice from an experienced criminal lawyer regarding his right to possess a nonconcealable firearm in light of the state trial judge’s admonition against possessing a concealable weapon. He was told by his attorney that he could possess a “long gun.” The uncontradicted evidence establishes that Tallmadge’s reliance on the firearm dealer’s misleading information was reasonable in light of his attorney’s legal opinion that he could purchase a rifle, and the comments of the state trial judge and the deputy district attorney at the probation termination proceedings. The prosecution and conviction of Tallmadge for the receipt and possession of firearms, after he was misled by the government agent who sold him the weapons into believing that his conduct would not be contrary to federal law, violated due process.
REVERSED.