United States v. Walker

63 U.S. 299, 16 L. Ed. 382, 22 How. 299, 1859 U.S. LEXIS 728
CourtSupreme Court of the United States
DecidedApril 16, 1860
StatusPublished
Cited by11 cases

This text of 63 U.S. 299 (United States v. Walker) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of the United States primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
United States v. Walker, 63 U.S. 299, 16 L. Ed. 382, 22 How. 299, 1859 U.S. LEXIS 728 (1860).

Opinion

Mr. Justice CLIFFORD

delivered the opinion of the court.

This case comes before the court upon a writ of error to the Circuit Court of the United States for the southern district of Alabama. It was an action of debt brought by the United States upon the official bond of the defendant as collector of the customs for the district and inspector of the revenue for the port of Mobile. He gave the bond, with sureties, on the seventh day of September, 1850, conditioned that he had truly and faithfully executed and discharged, and that he would continue truly and faithfully to execute and discharge, all the duties of the office according to law. Neglect and refusal on the part of the defendant to pay to the plaintiffs certain sums of money received by him as such collector before the commencement of the suit, beyond what he was entitled to retain as compensation for discharging the duties of the office, constituted the breaches-of the condition of the bond, as assigned, in the declaration.

Those balances, as claimed by the plaintiffs, amounted to the sum of thirteen thousand one hundred and eighty-four dollars and forty-two cents; and the charge was, as alleged in the declaration, that the defendant had wholly failed and refused to pay the same. As appears by the transcript, the defendant pleaded the general issue, and that he had fully performed the conditions of the writing obligatory set forth, in the declaration.

To maintain the issue on their part, the plaintiffs introduced a certified copy of the bond given by the defendant, and two duly certified copies of transcripts from the Treasury Department, showing that the official accounts óf the defendant had been examined and adjusted .by the accounting officers of that department. According to those transcripts, the respective balances claimed by the plaintiffs, as the accounts are there *304 stated, had not been paid by the defendant, and remained due and payable at the time the suit was commenced.

No evidence was adduced by the defendant. He was charged in the account against him, as collector of the customs, with all sums collected from duties on merchandise, tonnage duties, hospital money, and for all sums received for rent and storage of goods, wares, and merchandise, stored in the public storehouses, for which a rent was paid beyond the rents paid by the collector. On the other side, he was credited in the account of official emoluments with the sum of three thousand dollars ás the maximum rate of the annual salary or compensation allowed to the collector of that port. Further details of those accounts are omitted, for the reason that the charge for rent and storage in the account of customs, and the credit for salary in the account of official emoluments, are the only two items which come in review at the present time.

Reference to the ninth section of the act of the seventh of May, 1822, will show that Mobile is not one of the seven ports enumerated in that provision, and consequently that the maximum rate of annual compensation or salary allowed to the office under that law was three thousand dollars, as limited by the tenth section, which includes all the ports not enumerated in the previous provision. All of the accounts of the defendant were adjusted at the Treasury Department upon the principle that the act of the seventh of May, 1822, was still in force, and that the maximum rate of compensation belonging to the collector was three thousand dollars, as therein prescribed. It was insisted by the defendant that the provision in question had been repealed by subsequent acts upon the same subject, and that the maximum compensation allowed by law to the office was six thousand dollars.

Assuming that the theory of the’ defendant was correct, then his accounts had been improperly adjusted, and there was nothing due to the plaintiffs. On the other hand, if the charge for rent and storage in his customs account was properly made, and the maximum rate of compensation belonging to the office was only three thousand dollars, then he was *305 justly indebted to the plaintiffs for the whole amount of the respective balances as stated in the transcripts.

After argument, the court instructed the jury, among other things, that “the act of 3d March, 1841, was the last and controlling law as to the amount of compensation which collectors are allowed annually to retain; and that, under that enactment, the collector of this port was entitled to a compensation of six thousand dollars per annum, provided the same was yielded from the office from commissions for duties and ■fees for storage, and fees and emoluments,, and any other .commissions and salaries now allowed and limited by law, or so much from those sourcés, not exceeding six thousand dollars, as the office yielded.”

That instruction affirmed the right of the defendant, under the act of the third of March, 1841, to a compensation of six thousand dollars per annum, or so much thereof, not exceeding that sum, as the office yielded from commissions of every description, fees and emoluments, including rents and storage, and salaries, as allowed and limited by law. Beyond question, it assumed that the tenth section of the act of the seventh of May, 1822, was repealed. Prayers for instruction were then presented by the district attorney, who was counsel for the. plaintiffs. He requested the court to instruct the jury to the effect that the- provisions of the act of the seventh of May, 1822, respecting the maximum compensation allowed to collectors of the customs, were not repealed by the act of the third of March, 1841, or by any other act, but that the same were.in Ml force; 2. That the only effect the act of the third of March, 1841, had upon the former, act, in so far as the same applied to a case like the present, was to create a new and additional source of emolument to such collectors, allowing them to retain not exceeding two thousand dollars for rent and storage of goods, wares, and merchandise, stored in the public stores, and for which a rent was paid beyond the rents paid by such collectors. Each of these prayers was separately presented, and separately refused by the court.

Another prayer for instruction was then presented by the district attorney. It affirmed, in effect, that it was the duty *306 of the defendant, as collector, whenever his emoluments in any one year exceeded three thousand dollars, after deducting the necessary expenses incident to the office, to pay the excess into the Treasury, and that the plaintiffs were entitled to recover for all such balances, thus ascertained, as were shown to be due from the evidence. Apply the first and third requested instructions to the facts of the ease, and it will be seen that they affirmed the principles adopted by the accounting officers of the Treasury, in restating the accounts of the defendant; and if correct, then the whole amount of the respective balances, as stated in the transcript, was due to the plaintiffs.

Taken together, they assume that the tenth section of the act of the 7th of May, 1822, is in full force, and that the defendant had no right, under the act of the 3d of March, 1841, to retain any portion of the amount received for rent and storage. Those prayers for instructions having been refused, the district attorney then prayed the court to instruct the jury as follows:

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Bluebook (online)
63 U.S. 299, 16 L. Ed. 382, 22 How. 299, 1859 U.S. LEXIS 728, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/united-states-v-walker-scotus-1860.