United States v. Walker

607 F. Supp. 2d 1138, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 39413, 2009 WL 812026
CourtDistrict Court, S.D. California
DecidedMarch 25, 2009
Docket3:08-cr-00256
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 607 F. Supp. 2d 1138 (United States v. Walker) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. California primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
United States v. Walker, 607 F. Supp. 2d 1138, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 39413, 2009 WL 812026 (S.D. Cal. 2009).

Opinion

ORDER ON PETITION OF VIRGINIA HUGHES TO ADJUDICATE VALIDITY OF PETITIONER’S INTEREST IN FORFEITED PROPERTY

M. JAMES LORENZ, District Judge.

On December 9, 2008, Petitioner Virginia Hughes (“Petitioner”), petitioned the Court for a hearing to adjudicate the validity of her interest in a vehicle that was forfeited to the United States pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 853. As outlined below, Petitioner has failed to meet her burden for setting aside the forfeiture order. Accordingly, her petition to recover the forfeited property is DENIED.

I. Procedural Background

On January 30, 2008, an indictment was returned against thirteen defendants, charging conspiracy to distribute crack cocaine and methamphetamine. The indictment included forfeiture allegations relating to several vehicles and various amounts of U.S. currency. The instant petition relates to one of the vehicles, a 1998 Chevy Tahoe V8, bearing California License plate number 3XSH296 and VIN 1GNEK13R3WJ333366 (the “Chevy Tahoe”). The indictment alleges the Chevy Tahoe was driven by defendant Lee Vaughn Walker (“Walker”) and was used in the commission of the offenses. Petitioner is Walker’s mother.

On October 16, 2008, co-defendant Daphne Rosalinda Jackson pled guilty to Count I of the indictment (Conspiracy to Distribute Crack Cocaine). As part of her plea, she consented to the forfeiture allegations of the Indictment, including the forfeiture of the Chevy Tahoe. On October 24, 2008, the Court entered a Preliminary Order of Criminal Forfeiture (“POF”) forfeiting the Chevy Tahoe to the United States. 1

On December 9, 2008, Petitioner filed the instant petition pursuant to 21 § U.S.C. 853(n) and Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.2 asking the Court to adjudicate her interest in the Chevy Tahoe. She claims that she is the owner of the vehicle.

*1140 On January 22, 2009, the Court held a hearing on Petitioner’s claim. Both Petitioner and the Government presented testimony and evidence. After the conclusion of the hearing, the Court requested supplemental briefing and took the matter under submission.

II. Legal Standard

Under 21 U.S.C. § 853, the United States is entitled to forfeiture of any property constituting or derived from the proceeds of certain illegal drug transactions, or any property used to commit the illegal activity. 21 U.S.C. § 853(a). However, because § 853 acts in personam, “it permits the forfeiture of the defendant’s interests only, not the property of innocent parties.” United States v. Nava, 404 F.3d 1119, 1124 (9th Cir.2005).

The procedure for innocent third parties to assert their interests in forfeited property is provided in § 853(n). To successfully set aside the forfeiture of the Chevy Tahoe, Petitioner must show, by a preponderance of the evidence, that she:

has a legal right, title, or interest in the property, and such right, title, or interest renders the order of forfeiture invalid in whole or in part because the right, title, or interest was vested in the petitioner rather than the defendant or was superior to any right, title, or interest of the defendant at the time of the commission of the acts which gave rise to the forfeiture of the property under this section.

21 U.S.C. § 853(n)(6)(A) (emphasis added). The temporal requirement “at the time of the commission of the acts which gave rise to the forfeiture” applies to both “vested in the petitioner rather than the defendant” and the alternative “or was superior to any right, title, or interest of the defendant.” United States v. Hooper, 229 F.3d 818, 821 (9th Cir.2000). Therefore, to qualify for relief under § 853(n)(6)(A), Petitioner’s legal interest must have been vested in her at the time her son committed his crimes. Id.

“Under 21 U.S.C. § 853(n)(6) the ‘legal right, title or interest’ of the third party is determined by state law.” U.S. v. Alcaraz-Garcia, 79 F.3d 769, 774 (9th Cir.1996). See also United States v. Lester, 85 F.3d 1409, 1412 (9th Cir.1996) (“In drug forfeiture actions, ownership of property is determined by state law.”); Hooper, 229 F.3d at 820 (“State law determines whether Claimants have a property interest, but federal law determines whether or not that interest can be forfeited.”).

Under California law, “[t]he records of the DMV do not necessarily and conclusively establish the true ownership of a vehicle. A certificate of ownership is evidence of title, although not conclusive on the subject.” People v. Clifton, 171 Cal.App.3d 195, 200, 217 Cal.Rptr. 192 (1985). See also Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. McKenzie, 88 Cal.App.4th 681, 687-688, 105 Cal.Rptr.2d 910 (2001) (“Case law makes clear that DMV records are not conclusive on the issue of ownership. When warranted by the specific facts, the court will look ‘behind’ the transfer to see who, in fact, is the true owner.”). “There are several indicia of ownership. Title is one. Possession is another. The rights to transfer and to exercise control over property are also indicia of ownership.” Hoffman v. Connell, 73 Cal.App.4th 1194, 1200, 87 Cal.Rptr.2d 272 (1999). Therefore, the fact that the Chevy Tahoe is titled in Petitioner’s name does not conclusively establish her ownership. See e.g. United States v. One 1971 Porsche Coupe, 364 F.Supp. 745, 748 (E.D.Pa.1973) (holding forfeited vehicle’s owner of record was only a nominal owner since he had made a gift of the vehicle to his son, and the son had “sole possession and exercised dominion and control over it”).

*1141 III. Discussion

A. Petitioner’s Evidence

Petitioner contends that she is the true owner of the Chevy Tahoe. To support her claim, she offered documents showing she purchased the Chevy Tahoe from San Diego Imports Center on June 25, 2003 for $12,091.75. (Exhibit A to Pet. Supp. Mem.) According to the sales contract, she paid $11,000 cash and financed $1,091.75. (Id.) Petitioner is the registered owner of the vehicle. (Exhibit B to Pet. Supp.

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Bluebook (online)
607 F. Supp. 2d 1138, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 39413, 2009 WL 812026, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/united-states-v-walker-casd-2009.