United States v. Waldeck

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: February 18, 2025
• Docket: 23-2235
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FEB 18 2025 FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, No. 23-2235

Plaintiff - Appellee, D.C. No. 9:22-cr-00059-DWM-1

v. MEMORANDUM* DAVID LOREN WALDECK,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Montana Donald W. Molloy, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted February 10, 2025 Seattle, Washington

Before: W. FLETCHER and NGUYEN, Circuit Judges, and BENNETT, District Judge.**

David Waldeck appeals from his conviction for possession of controlled

substances with the intent to distribute, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1).

Waldeck challenges the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress evidence

and its decision to admit expert testimony on drug prices. We have jurisdiction

under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The Honorable Richard D. Bennett, United States District Judge for the District of Maryland, sitting by designation. We review denial of a motion to suppress de novo. United States v. Zapien,

861 F.3d 971, 974 (9th Cir. 2017) (per curiam). Officers may conduct a traffic

stop if they have reasonable suspicion to believe that the driver has committed a

traffic violation. United States v. Lopez-Soto, 205 F.3d 1101, 1105 (9th Cir. 2000).

“Reasonable suspicion is formed by ‘specific, articulable facts which, together with

objective and reasonable inferences, form the basis for suspecting that the

particular person detained is engaged in criminal activity.’” Id. (quoting United

States v. Michael R., 90 F.3d 340, 346 (9th Cir. 1996)).

The district court correctly concluded that the investigators had reasonable

suspicion that Waldeck had violated Montana traffic law. Section 61-8-321(3)(a)

of the Montana Code Annotated requires vehicles to be driven in the right-hand

lane on all roadways having two or more lanes in one direction. Although the law

creates exceptions for drivers “preparing” to turn left or “exiting” left, Waldeck did

not fall within these exceptions. Mont. Code Ann. § 61-8-321(3)(b)(v), (3)(b)(vi)

(2023). He drove nearly three miles in the left-hand lane and passed several

intersections without making any indication that he intended to turn or exit left.

Thus, the investigators had reasonable suspicion Waldeck had violated Montana

law and lawfully stopped him for a traffic violation. The seizure of evidence from

his vehicle after the stop was therefore lawful.

2 Waldeck also challenges the district court’s decision to admit expert

testimony on drug prices. “A district court’s rulings on the admissibility of expert

testimony are reviewed for an abuse of discretion.” United States v. Hankey, 203

F.3d 1160, 1167 (9th Cir. 2000). The probative value of the expert testimony

cannot be “substantially outweighed by the risk of unfair prejudice, confusion of

issues, or undue consumption of time.” Id. at 1168 (citing Fed. R. Evid. 403).

The district court did not abuse its discretion when it admitted expert

testimony about drug prices. The value of the drugs found in Waldeck’s

possession was probative of his intent to distribute. See United States v. Sanchez-

Lopez, 879 F.2d 541, 555 (9th Cir. 1989). There was also not a substantial risk of

prejudice. The district court limited the expert’s testimony to drug prices, and this

testimony was not duplicative of other evidence.

Waldeck also argues that the expert’s brief testimony about the federal

standards for pursuing drug trafficking cases was unduly prejudicial. The parties

dispute the standard of review. But under any standard of review, the district court

did not err admitting the testimony. The expert testified about federal standards

generally and clarified that the factors were not relevant in every case. See

Hankey, 203 F.3d at 1167 (instructing that evidentiary rulings will be reversed

“only if such . . . error more likely than not affected the verdict”).

3 AFFIRMED.