United States v. Villa

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: December 16, 2025
• Docket: 24-1940
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS DEC 16 2025 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, No. 24-1940 D.C. No. Plaintiff - Appellee, 2:22-cr-00245-WBS-1 v. MEMORANDUM* BRENDA VILLA,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of California William B. Shubb, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted December 12, 2025** San Francisco, California

Before: BUMATAY, JOHNSTONE, and DE ALBA, Circuit Judges.

Brenda Villa appeals her convictions for one count of conspiracy to commit

falsification of a record in a federal investigation, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371,

three counts of falsification of a record in a federal investigation, in violation of 18

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). U.S.C. § 1519, and one count of false declarations before a grand jury, in violation

of 18 U.S.C. § 1623. The charges arose from Villa’s obstruction of the federal

investigation into the death of Ronnie Price, an inmate at California State Prison,

Sacramento, during her employment there as a correctional sergeant. She argues

that the district court erred in (1) denying her motion for judgment of acquittal on

the false declarations charge and (2) admitting an out-of-court statement under the

coconspirator hearsay exclusion, Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2)(E). We have jurisdiction

under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and we affirm the convictions.

1. Sufficient evidence supports the district court’s denial of Villa’s motion

for judgment of acquittal. We will affirm a conviction if, “after viewing [the

evidence] in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact

could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.”

United States v. Shen Zhen New World I, LLC, 115 F.4th 1167, 1176 (9th Cir. 2024)

(quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979)).

Villa testified before the grand jury that when she responded to the incident

she “didn’t see anyone but [Officer] Aurich” with Price. When asked specifically if

she saw Officer Arturo Luna, she responded “I did not.” However, four

eyewitnesses testified that Villa and Luna were within mere feet of one another when

Villa arrived. Villa also emailed a reporting form to all officers involved in the use

of force incident, including Luna. Indeed, Villa concedes that Luna was present

2 24-1940 when Villa arrived.

A jury choosing to believe these witnesses could rationally conclude that Villa

saw Luna when she responded to the use of force, and that her grand jury testimony

was knowingly false. See United States v. Nevils, 598 F.3d 1158, 1170 (9th Cir.

2010) (en banc) (“We cannot second-guess the jury’s [witness] credibility

assessments”); 18 U.S.C. § 1623. As such, the district court did not err in denying

Villa’s motion for judgment of acquittal.

2. The district court similarly did not err in admitting Officer Pacheco’s out-

of-court statement that Villa told him to “keep [the incident] in house” as a

nonhearsay coconspirator statement under Rule 801(d)(2)(E). On appeal, Villa

challenges the district court’s factual determination that Villa and Pacheco were

coconspirators. We review the district court’s factual findings for clear error. United

States v. Saelee, 51 F.4th 327, 339 n.4 (9th Cir. 2022). We thus reverse only if they

were “illogical, implausible, or without support in the record.” United States v.

Sanmina Corp., 968 F.3d 1107, 1116 (9th Cir. 2020).

Villa emailed an incident report to everyone involved, including Luna. Villa

then instructed Officer Lopez to remove Luna from Lopez’s incident report because

Luna was “involved in the last” use of force incident and “it looks bad” to include

him. Villa also emailed Pacheco a final version of Pacheco’s incident report, which

did not mention Luna and his contradictory version of Pacheco’s actions. Upon

3 24-1940 receipt, Pacheco replied to Villa with the following: “Thank you Brenda! ‘give me

a hell yeah!!’”

As it must, the district court considered the government’s independent

evidence together with the proffered statement itself. See United States v.

Alahmedalabdaloklah, 94 F.4th 782, 834 (9th Cir. 2024) (“The independent

evidence of the conspiracy must be such that, taken together with the alleged co-

conspirator statement, the statement can fairly be said to be incriminating.”).

Faced with this evidence, the district court concluded that Villa and Pacheco

participated in a scheme to keep Luna’s name out of the incident reports. On this

record, we cannot say that the district court’s finding was “illogical, implausible, or

without support[.]” Sanmina Corp., 968 F.3d at 1116. We thus affirm the district

court’s decision to admit Pacheco’s out-of-court statement. See

Alahmedalabdaloklah, 95 F.4th at 834 (setting forth requirements under Rule

801(d)(2)(E) that “the government shows by preponderance of the evidence that: (1)

a conspiracy existed at time the statement was made; (2) the defendant had

knowledge of, and participated in, the conspiracy; and (3) the statement was made

in furtherance of the conspiracy”) (citation modified).

AFFIRMED.

4 24-1940