United States v. Victor Medina Diaz

161 F.3d 18, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 33419, 1998 WL 614460
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
DecidedSeptember 8, 1998
Docket97-4164
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 161 F.3d 18 (United States v. Victor Medina Diaz) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
United States v. Victor Medina Diaz, 161 F.3d 18, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 33419, 1998 WL 614460 (10th Cir. 1998).

Opinion

161 F.3d 18

98 CJ C.A.R. 4700

NOTICE: Although citation of unpublished opinions remains unfavored, unpublished opinions may now be cited if the opinion has persuasive value on a material issue, and a copy is attached to the citing document or, if cited in oral argument, copies are furnished to the Court and all parties. See General Order of November 29, 1993, suspending 10th Cir. Rule 36.3 until December 31, 1995, or further order.

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
Victor Medina DIAZ, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 97-4164.

United States Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit.

Sept. 8, 1998.

Before McKAY, BRORBY, and MURPHY, Circuit Judges.

ORDER AND JUDGMENT*

BRORBY

This case involves the investigation of a narcotics distribution organization based in Salt Lake City, Utah. In March 1995, a vehicle with Utah license plates was involved in an armed confrontation on the border between the United States and Mexico. The United States Customs Service reported the incident to law enforcement officials in Salt Lake County. Soon after, a joint federal and state investigation was initiated, focusing on the home of the registered owner of the vehicle. The investigation revealed the likely existence of a drug ring, but the investigators were unable to uncover the scope of the criminal organization.

Looking to break open the investigation, a detective in the Salt Lake County Sheriff's Office, Kevin Judd, filed a forty-four page affidavit in support of the investigators' application for a telephone tap. In the affidavit, Detective Judd established probable cause for the wiretap and explained why it was necessary due to the ineffectiveness of ordinary investigative techniques. In response to the application, a Utah state court issued a wiretap order. Investigators employed the wiretap and obtained evidence against Mr. Victor Diaz.

Ultimately, Mr. Diaz was charged in a one-count indictment with conspiracy to possess methamphetamine with intent to distribute, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846. Prior to trial, Mr. Diaz moved to suppress the wiretap evidence. After holding a hearing, a magistrate judge issued a Report and Recommendation that the motion be denied. Over Mr. Diaz' objection, the district court adopted the magistrate judge's findings and denied the motion. Mr. Diaz then entered a conditional plea of guilty reserving his right to appeal the district court's denial of his motion. See Fed.R.Crim.P. 11(a)(2). The district court sentenced Mr. Diaz to the statutory minimum of 120 months in prison.

On appeal, Mr. Diaz contends the district court erred in finding the affidavit supporting the wiretap application satisfied the necessity requirement of 18 U.S.C. § 2518(1)(c).

"On appeal from a motion to suppress, we accept the district court's factual findings unless clearly erroneous, review questions of law de novo, and view the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party." United States v. Edwards, 69 F.3d 419, 428 (10th Cir.1995) (citing United States v. Williamson, 1 F.3d 1134, 1135 (10th Cir.1993)), cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1243 (1996). Whether the court's order authorizing interception of wire, oral, or electronic communications complies with the "necessity" requirement is a question of law we review de novo. See United States v. Castillo-Garcia, 117 F.3d 1179, 1186 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 118 S.Ct. 395, 139 L.Ed.2d 309 and --- U.S. ----, 118 S.Ct. 428, 139 L.Ed.2d 328 (1997). The defendant bears the burden of overcoming our presumption the wiretap authorization was proper. Edwards, 69 F.3d at 429.

The wiretap authorization challenged by Mr. Diaz was obtained pursuant to Utah law. See Utah Code Ann. § 77-23a-10. However, we must apply the federal standard, found at 18 U.S.C. § 2518, to determine whether evidence obtained from a wiretap is admissible in federal court. See United States v. Quintana, 70 F.3d 1167, 1169 (10th Cir.1995). Utah's wiretap statute is similar in all material aspects to the federal wiretap statute. Compare with 18 U.S.C. § 2518.

Section 2518 requires, in part, that the applicant for a wiretap make a full and complete statement concerning why it is necessary. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(1)(c). To do this, the applicant must explain "whether or not other investigative procedures have been tried and failed or why they reasonably appear to be unlikely to succeed if tried or to be too dangerous." Id. The judge granting the applicant's request must make a finding that "normal investigative procedures have been tried and have failed or reasonably appear to be unlikely to succeed if tried or to be too dangerous." 18 U.S.C. § 2518(3)(c).

We have held:

If any of the four categories of normal investigative techniques ... have not been tried, the government must explain with particularity why each of such untried techniques would be either unsuccessful or too dangerous. Those investigative procedures are: (1) standard visual and aural surveillance; (2) questioning and interrogation of witnesses or participants (including the use of grand juries and the grant of immunity if necessary); (3) use of search warrants; and (4) infiltration of conspiratorial groups by undercover agents or informants. In addition, if other normal investigative techniques such as pen registers or trap and trace devices have not been tried, a similar explanation must be offered as to why they also would be unsuccessful or too dangerous.

Castillo-Garcia, 117 F.3d at 1187. We require that the statements supporting a wiretap application "be factual in nature and they must specifically relate to the individuals targeted by the wiretap." Id. at 1188. As mentioned above, Mr. Diaz' contends the affidavit supporting the wiretap application did not satisfy this necessity requirement.1

Standard visual or aural surveillance

The affidavit explains that "[b]ecause of the surveillance consciousness of the conspirators, investigators are hesitant to conduct a more active surveillance than is described ... for fear of being detected by the suspects." It also asserts surveillance would provide insufficient evidence to prove the purpose of meetings among the suspects. The affidavit states that because the suspects are extremely cautious, extended surveillance would result in discovery of the investigators. In support of this point, the affidavit notes: "[The suspects] closely monitor their automobile mirrors and frequently look out of their windows, both at home and while in their automobiles, to ascertain if there are any suspicious persons or vehicles in the area." In one instance, investigators noticed they were being followed by a suspected member of the organization while they were following a suspect.

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161 F.3d 18, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 33419, 1998 WL 614460, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/united-states-v-victor-medina-diaz-ca10-1998.