United States v. Veronza Leon Curtis Bowers

534 F.2d 186
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
DecidedJune 11, 1976
Docket74-2524
StatusPublished
Cited by48 cases

This text of 534 F.2d 186 (United States v. Veronza Leon Curtis Bowers) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
United States v. Veronza Leon Curtis Bowers, 534 F.2d 186 (9th Cir. 1976).

Opinion

OPINION

Before BROWNING and CHOY, Circuit Judges, and LUCAS, * District Judge.

PER CURIAM:

Appellant was convicted of murdering Kenneth C. Patrick, park ranger employed by the United States Park Service, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1114. We affirm.

The park ranger’s body was found beside Mount Vision Road in Point Reyes National Seashore. He had been shot three times with an Astra Pistol using 9 mm ammunition of Yugoslavian manufacture. Three spent 9 mm shell casings were found nearby. ' One was of Yugoslavian manufacture; another of Finnish manufacture bore the marking “VPT 44.” Four crossbow bolts fitted with hunting tips were also found in the immediate area.

*188 Evidence developed in subsequent investigation indicated that appellant Bowers, Alan Veale, and Jonathan Shoher had been stopped by the park ranger while on an expedition to poach deer, and appellant Bowers had shot the ranger. Appellant and Alan Veale were indicted for murder. The cases were severed for trial, appellant Bower’s trial to lead. Veale elected to testify against appellant. After appellant’s conviction, the indictment against Veale was dismissed.

1. The contention pressed most strongly by appellant is that the district court erred in denying a motion to suppress certain evidence seized during a search of a residence at 976 Vernal Road, Mill Valley, California. 1 The search was conducted pursuant to a search warrant. Appellant contends that the affidavit submitted to the magistrate did not establish probable cause. The affidavit is set out in full in the margin. 2 We are to pay “substantial defer *189 ence” to the decision of the magistrate. Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 111, 84 S.Ct. 1509, 1512, 12 L.Ed.2d 723, 726 (1964); see also Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, *190 270, 80 S.Ct. 725, 735, 4 L.Ed.2d 697, 707 (1959). Doing so, we conclude that the affidavit was sufficient, though by no great margin. The general basis of our eonclu *191 sion is this: the circumstances of the murder and the evidence found at the scene *192 suggested the existence of other undiscovered objects evidencing the crime, 3 in the main, these objects were of a kind (guns, ammunitions, archery equipment, clothes) likely to be found where the persons involved lived; and a web of circumstances connected appellant, Veale, and Shoher to each other, these three to the murder, and Veale and Shoher to the house to be searched.

Appellant is particularly insistent that the affidavit did not establish probable cause to believe the evidence of the crime would be found at the Mill Valley address. 4 “The magistrate is not required to determine whether in fact the items to be searched for are located at the premises to be searched, but only whether there is reasonable ground to believe they are there.” United States v. Damitz, 495 F.2d 50, 55 (9th Cir. 1974). This standard is met. From the information in the affidavit the magistrate could reasonably infer that at least some of the objects sought were probably at the Mill Valley address, even though “the nexus between the items to be seized and the place to be searched rested not on direct observation, as in the normal search- and-seizure case, but on the type of crime, the nature of the missing items, the extent of the suspect’s opportunity for concealment, and normal inferences as to where a criminal would be likely” to conceal the property sought. United States v. Lucarz, 430 F.2d 1051, 1055 (9th Cir. 1970). 5 The *193 objects sought were of a kind likely to have been retained for the six weeks that elapsed between the murder and the search, 6 and, as we have said, would probably be found where the perpetrators lived. Veale had admitted involvement in the murder (note 2, paras. 8,11). A bullet similar in size and markings to ones found at the murder scene had been discovered in a car owned by Shoher (notes 2, paras. 5, 19). Veale’s San Francisco apartment had been searched and the objects sought had not been found (note 2, para. 13). A group of which appellant, Shoher, and sometimes Veale, were a part, had moved to Mill Valley (note 2, para. 21). Veale’s girlfriend had twice telephoned Veale at the Mill Valley address (note 2, paras. 23, 24). Shoher’s car (note 2, para. 18) had been seen parked at this address (note 2, paras. 25, 26).

2. We agree with the district court that appellant failed to make a sufficient showing to require the government to affirm or deny that his counsel’s telephone had been tapped. Assuming the showing was sufficient to establish electronic surveillance had occurred, nothing offered suggested any connection between the claimed surveillance and this proceeding, as required by United States v. Alter, 482 F.2d 1016, 1026 (9th Cir. 1973). See United States v. Vielguth, 502 F.2d 1257, 1260 (9th Cir. 1974); United States v. See, 505 F.2d 845, 856 (9th Cir. 1974). The only possibly relevant showing concerned a telephone conversation between counsel and appellant’s wife, but the affidavits revealed that this conversation occurred many months before the murder and related to legal problems concerning children who were living with the Bowers.

Since the appellant made no showing requiring a government response, he cannot complain because the government voluntarily furnished certain tapes to the court for in camera inspection. United States v. See, supra.

3. Appellant contends that the prosecution was guilty of misconduct in failing to reveal that a prosecution witness had committed perjury before the grand jury. Witness Darnell Phillips testified before the grand jury that Alan Veale told him, “We [Veale and Bowers] shot the ranger.” Phillips later testified (at a trial other than appellant’s) that Veale told him “Daoud [Bowers] shot him.” Assuming

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534 F.2d 186, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/united-states-v-veronza-leon-curtis-bowers-ca9-1976.