United States v. Varraso

21 M.J. 129, 1985 CMA LEXIS 13542
CourtUnited States Court of Military Appeals
DecidedDecember 23, 1985
DocketNo. 46,216; CM 441203
StatusPublished
Cited by16 cases

This text of 21 M.J. 129 (United States v. Varraso) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Court of Military Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
United States v. Varraso, 21 M.J. 129, 1985 CMA LEXIS 13542 (cma 1985).

Opinion

Opinion of the Court

EVERETT, Chief Judge:

A general court-martial with officer members tried appellant on the charge that, “with premeditation,” she had “murder[ed] Private First Class Tammy MezaLuna ... by tying her hands behind her back with a belt, placing a rope around her neck and hanging her,” in violation of Article 118, Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. § 918. Varraso pleaded not guilty; but, except for the words “with premeditation,” she was found guilty as charged. Her sentence was a dishonorable discharge, confinement at hard labor for 8 years, total forfeitures, and reduction to the lowest enlisted grade. The convening authority approved this outcome; and the Court of Military Review affirmed.

15 M.J. 793 (1983).

In petitioning this Court for review appellant assigned seven issues, but review was granted only to consider:

WHETHER THE MILITARY JUDGE ERRED BY NOT INSTRUCTING THE COURT ON INTERVENING CAUSE EVEN THOUGH SUCH DEFENSE HAD BEEN RAISED, AND THE IN[130]*130STRUCTION WAS REQUESTED BY THE TRIAL DEFENSE COUNSEL.

I

A

At about 2:00 a.m. on September 29, 1980, Specialist Five Manuel Meza-Luna found his wife, Private First Class Tammy Meza-Luna, hanging from a rope which went over a tree branch and was tied to the base of another tree.1 Her body was leaning forward at an angle; and her knees were bent so that her height was reduced from an erect position by about two inches. He untied the rope from the base of the tree, loosened the noose around her neck, and noticed that her hands had been tied behind her back with a military belt.

Subsequent medical examination of Tammy’s body indicated that she had died between 8:00 and 10:00 p.m. on September 28, 1980, as a result of asphyxia from hanging. Dr. Faruk Presswalla, Deputy Chief Medical Examiner, observed marks around her neck which indicated that the noose had not been tightened. In his opinion, Tammy could have died “from asphyxiation by hanging even though her feet” were “touching the ground”; and he concluded that the asphyxiation was caused by suspension hanging and not by manual or ligature strangulation. He found no wrist chafing or other marks which would have indicated that a struggle had occurred when Tammy’s wrists were tied with a regulation Army belt.

At trial, the following facts leading to Tammy’s death were revealed. Prior to Tammy’s death, appellant had maintained a lesbian relationship with Specialist Four Rebecca Smith. However, on the evening of Saturday, September 27, Becky told her roommate “that she didn’t want to be a homosexual” and “that she was being physically” and sexually abused by appellant. Tammy Meza-Luna also heard Becky’s complaints and offered to help Becky get away from appellant. Later that same evening, Tammy entered into a homosexual relationship with Becky; and, because this came to his attention, the detachment commander directed Becky to stay in different quarters.

On the afternoon of Sunday, September 28, when appellant and Tammy visited Tammy’s husband, Manuel Meza-Luna, he and Tammy got into a fight, which appellant helped stop. Then Tammy found a knife and threatened to kill her husband and herself. Later, she again took the knife and threatened to cut her throat; but Manuel took the knife from her “without a struggle.” Before leaving with appellant, Tammy told her husband that she would be dead the “next time ... [he] saw her.” However, he did not believe her because of her previous ineffectual attempts at suicide.

At about 3:00 p.m. appellant and Tammy went to the quarters where Becky Smith was staying. There a disturbance resulted; the two visitors were pushed outside, and military police brought them back to their own barracks. When she arrived there, appellant was “very upset about something” and “was arguing and fussing.” The detachment commander “restricted [appellant] to the company area”; and soon thereafter she telephoned the company’s orderly room and “said that they was going to kill themselves.”

Thereupon, the charge of quarters, Private First Class Charles L. Huff, started over towards the female barracks; and en-route he “ran into Specialist Knight,” who “said he had seen the girls going toward the woods with a rope.” Huff “went out toward the woods” to search for them and saw “them up on this tree” with a rope approximately % of an inch in diameter. After this interruption, appellant and Tammy returned to their barracks. Huff was on duty through the night, but he heard no “cries for help or” other “unusual noise[s].”

[131]*131Although appellant did not take the stand at her trial, her version of the events was presented by a statement she made to an investigator on September 30.2 According to this document, Varraso agreed with Tammy “to commit suicide”; and they went into the woods behind their barracks with a rope. Because of an interruption, they went back into the barracks, where they attempted unsuccessfully to commit suicide by drinking a mixture of Drano and water. Appellant went to sleep but was awakened by Tammy, who requested help in hanging herself. By this time Varraso had undergone “a change in heart about committing suicide.” However, she went out with Tammy and “put the loop around her” neck with “about 3 inches of slack between the rope and her neck.” Then, after saying “I still don’t believe you are going to do” it and after kissing Tammy on the forehead, appellant “returned to ... [her] room in the barracks and went to sleep.” Subsequently, she learned Tammy was dead.

B

Prior to findings, the military judge discussed his proposed instructions with counsel. In the judge’s view, lesser-included offenses of unpremeditated murder, voluntary manslaughter, and negligent homicide had been raised by the evidence; but assault had not been. Furthermore, all of the offenses had these “three common elements”: (1) the victim was dead; (2) her death resulted from appellant’s acts or omissions; and (3) the killing was unlawful.

Defense counsel requested the following instruction on intervening cause:

If there was an intervening cause between acts or omissions of the accused and the death of the deceased, the accused cannot be held responsible for the deceased’s death. Such an intervening cause is defined as an independent cause which intervenes between the original wrongful act or omission and the injury which turns aside the natural sequence of events, and produces a result which would not otherwise have followed from the act or omission and which could not have been reasonably anticipated. In determining what could have been reasonably anticipated you are instructed to consider what a reasonable person would anticipate under the circumstances known to him at the time of the alleged act or omission.

In discussing this requested instruction with the judge, individual defense counsel explained:

I would like an instruction on intervening cause to the extent that if the court would find or the jury would find that the deceased was in an area in a position from which she could extricate herself or could rescue herself and then intentionally went forward, slumped forward and killed herself, then that would be a separate intervening cause.
* * * * # *

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

United States v. Edwards
Air Force Court of Criminal Appeals, 2021
United States v. Girouard
70 M.J. 5 (Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces, 2011)
United States v. Henderson
52 M.J. 14 (Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces, 1999)
United States v. Saulsberry
43 M.J. 649 (Army Court of Criminal Appeals, 1995)
United States v. Hoskins
36 M.J. 343 (United States Court of Military Appeals, 1993)
United States v. Combs
35 M.J. 820 (U S Air Force Court of Military Review, 1992)
United States v. Valdez
35 M.J. 555 (U.S. Army Court of Military Review, 1992)
United States v. Crumley
31 M.J. 21 (United States Court of Military Appeals, 1990)
United States v. Johnson
26 M.J. 415 (United States Court of Military Appeals, 1988)
United States v. Vidal
23 M.J. 319 (United States Court of Military Appeals, 1987)
United States v. Henderson
23 M.J. 77 (United States Court of Military Appeals, 1986)
United States v. Jefferson
22 M.J. 315 (United States Court of Military Appeals, 1986)
United States v. O'Donnell
22 M.J. 911 (U S Air Force Court of Military Review, 1986)
United States v. Irvin
21 M.J. 184 (United States Court of Military Appeals, 1986)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
21 M.J. 129, 1985 CMA LEXIS 13542, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/united-states-v-varraso-cma-1985.