United States v. Vandegrift

7 Ct. Cust. 77, 1916 CCPA LEXIS 43
CourtCourt of Customs and Patent Appeals
DecidedMay 1, 1916
DocketNo. 1659
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 7 Ct. Cust. 77 (United States v. Vandegrift) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Customs and Patent Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
United States v. Vandegrift, 7 Ct. Cust. 77, 1916 CCPA LEXIS 43 (ccpa 1916).

Opinion

Martin, Judge,

delivered tbe opinion of the court:

The merchandise in the present case is described on the invoice-as ■‘•red ferrolite flooring tiles.”

The appraiser returned the tiles as “semivitrified,” and the collector accordingly assessed duty thereon at the rate of 5 cents per square foot under paragraph 72 of the tariff act of 1913.

The importers protested against the assessment, denying that the tiles were “semivitrified,” and claiming them to be dutiable under the same paragraph at the rate of 1⅜ cents per square foot as ■“tiles, plain unglazed, one color, exceeding two square inches in size.”

The protest was sustained by the Board of General Appraisers, and the Government appeals.

The following is a copy of paragraph 72, tariff act of 1913:

72. Tiles, plain unglazed, one color, exceeding two square inches in size, 1⅜ ceñís per square foot; glazed’, ornamented, liand-painted, enameled, vitrified, semivitrified, decorated, encaustic, ceramic mosaic, flint, spar, embossed, gold decorated, groo.ved, and corrugated, and all other earthenware tiles and tiling, except pill tiles and so-called quarries or quarry tiles, but including tiles wholly or in part of cement, 5 cents [78]*78per square foot; so-called quarries or quarry Liles, 20 per centum ad valorem; mantels, friezes, and articles of every description or parts thereof, composed wholly or in chief value of earthenware tiles or tiling, except pill tiles, 30 per centum ad valorem.

It will be observed from the foregoing statement that the sole question in the present case is one of fact, namely, whether the imported tiles are semivitrified, and if not, whether they are plain unglazed tiles. The board has found upon the testimony in favor of the latter classification, and the court is now called upon to decide whether this finding is sustained by sufficient evidence.

In the tariff act of 1894 no provision was made for “semivitrified” tiles. That act apparently divided all tiles into two classes with respect to vitrification, namely, tiles which were “plain, * * * not vitrified” and tiles which were “vitrified.” The following is a copy of paragraph 78 of the act of 1894:

78. Tiles, plain, not glazed, ornamented, painted, enameled, vitrified, or decorated, twenty-five per centum ad valorem; ornamented, glazed, painted, enameled, vitrified, or decorated, and encaustic, forty per centum ad valorem.

In the tariff revision of 1897 the classification of “semivitrified” tiles appeared for the first time in tariff enumerations. Paragraph 88 of that' act reads as follows:

88. Tiles, plain unglazed, one color, exceeding two square inches in size, four cents per square foot; glazed, encaustic, ceramic mosaic, vitrified, semivitrified, flint, spar, embossed, enameled, ornamental, hand painted, gold decorated, and all other earthenware tiles, valued at not exceeding forty cents per square foot, eight cents per square foot; exceeding forty cents per square foot, ten cents per square foot and twenty-five per centum ad valorem.

In the case of the American Shipping Co., G. A. 6906 (T. D. 29744), decided May 11, 1909, the Board of General Appraisers heard testimony concerning the application of the new tariff term “semi-vitrified,” and held upon the evidence then submitted that at the time of the enactment of the tariff act of 1897 there was no article which was definitely, uniformly, and generally known to the trade in the United States under the name of a “semivitrified” tile, and that the term “semivitrified” as applied to tiles was “indefinite, meaningless, and incapable of a uniform understanding.” The testimony which was taken in the foregoing case is incorporated in the present record.

Notwithstanding this decision of the board, Congress again enumerated “semivitrified” tiles for duty in the succeeding tariff revisions of 1909 and 1913. As has been stated, the present case arises under the tariff act of 1913.

In the decision now upon appeal the board cited its former decision, which held that the trade in this country knew of no article bearing the name of a “semivitrified tile,” and made the following comment thereon:

[79]*79This decision of the board was not appealed by the Government and has stood and still stands undisturbed as the only judicial construction of the language of the tile paragraph as embodied in the act of 1897 applicable to tiles of this character.. Within a few months after the publication of this decision, to wit, on August 5, 1909,. Congress revised the tariff act of 1897, and in all material respects, so far as this class-of merchandise is concerned, reenacted the provisions of 1897.
Again, in the revision of October 3, 1913, Congress reenacted the same language, in so far as this class of tiles is affected. It must be presumed that Congress had full knowledge of G. A. 6906, supra, and it is therefore a reasonable assumption that since-the revisions made no change in the language designed to provide for rates of duty on tiles, except as to rates, the omission so to do was deliberate and in effect an acceptance by Congress of the judicial construction given the language of the prior act by the-board.

Consistently with the foregoing views tbe board apparently rests its-present decision in chief part upon the finding that the term “semi-vitrified tiles ’’ in the act are without practical application, since there-are no articles known to commerce in this country which respond, thereto. The board also concludes that Congress had accepted the construction given the language of the prior act by the board, as-above set out, and- had used the same term- again in the acts of 1909- and 1913 with the same application or lack of application theretofore-imputed to it by the board.

We can not agree with the foregoing views. We think that th- use.by Congress of the term “semivitrified tile” in the tariff acts of 1909- and 1913, after the board’s decision against the term under the tariff act of 1897, does not imply that Congress had deliberately continued to use the term as one which was indefinite, meaningless, and incapable-of a uniform understanding, but rather that Congress thereby intended to indicate that notwithstanding the board’s decision the term in question aptly applied, at the time of the later enactments at least,, to certain kinds of tiles which were known to the trade of this country. The court should not impute to Congress the deliberate use of terms known and designed by it to be indefinite,meaningless, and incapable-pf a uniform understanding.. We may furthermore note the fact ¡.hat vitrified tiles were concededly well known in trade at the time of the several enactments in question, and that the word “semivitrified'’' appears in standard dictionaries bearing a definition consistent with its obvious etymology. In the absence of trade testimony to the contrary this dictionary definition of the word should be adopted as-likewise the trade definition thereof. The following authorities are-quoted:

Century Dictionary:

Semivitrified. — Half vitrified, or imperfectly vitrified; partially converted into-glass.

Webster’s Dictionary:'

Semivitrified. — Half or imperfectly vitrified; partially converted into glass.

[80]*80Standard Dictionary:

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