United States v. Valentino Majak

486 F. App'x 664
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
DecidedOctober 17, 2012
Docket11-10386
StatusUnpublished

This text of 486 F. App'x 664 (United States v. Valentino Majak) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
United States v. Valentino Majak, 486 F. App'x 664 (9th Cir. 2012).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM **

Valentino Bol Majak appeals his convictions for possession of marijuana with intent to distribute, 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), (b)(l)(B)(vii), and fleeing from an immigration checkpoint, 18 U.S.C. § 758. He argues that the district court erred in admitting expert testimony to show that he knowingly possessed the marijuana.

Majak was apprehended after fleeing from a Border Patrol checkpoint at high speed; approximately 400 pounds of marijuana was found in the trunk of his car. Majak testified that he did not know how the marijuana got there and suggested that Border Patrol agents must have placed it there after his arrest. An expert in drug trafficking testified for the Government that drug traffickers do not typically use unknowing couriers to transport drugs.

We review a district court’s decision admitting drug-courier expert testimony for abuse of discretion. United States v. Sepulveda-Barraza, 645 F.3d 1066, 1070 (9th Cir.2011). The district court did not abuse its discretion in this case. Expert drug-courier testimony “is admissible when rele *665 vant, probative of a defendant’s knowledge, and not unfairly prejudicial.” Id. at 1072. The testimony here was relevant because Majak disavowed knowledge as to how the marijuana got into his trunk. Ma-jak’s suggestion that the Border Patrol agents may have placed the marijuana there did not render the expert testimony irrelevant. See United States v. Cordoba, 104 F.3d 225, 229 (9th Cir.1997) (noting that expert testimony about unknowing couriers is generally probative of the defendant’s knowledge of possession) (citing United States v. Castro, 972 F.2d 1107, 1111 (9th Cir.1992)).

AFFIRMED.

**

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.

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Related

United States v. Sepulveda-Barraza
645 F.3d 1066 (Ninth Circuit, 2011)
United States v. Roberto Nicolas Castro
972 F.2d 1107 (Ninth Circuit, 1992)
United States v. Cordoba
104 F.3d 225 (Ninth Circuit, 1997)

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Bluebook (online)
486 F. App'x 664, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/united-states-v-valentino-majak-ca9-2012.