United States v. Valdez

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
• Decided: September 12, 2025
• Docket: 23-6482
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

23-6482 United States v. Valdez

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

SUMMARY ORDER RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.

At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the 12th day of September, two thousand twenty-four.

Present: GUIDO CALABRESI, MICHAEL H. PARK, ALISON J. NATHAN, Circuit Judges. __________________________________________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Appellee,

v. 23-6482

MICHAEL VALDEZ, AKA BIGGA,

Defendant-Appellant.*

__________________________________________

FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLANT: ANDREW H. FREIFELD, New York, NY.

* The Clerk of Court is respectfully directed to amend the caption accordingly. FOR APPELLEE: DAVID J. ROBLES (Sarah L. Kushner & Olga I. Zverovich, on the brief), for Damian Williams, United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York, New York, NY.

Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the Southern District of

New York (Oetken, J.).

UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND

DECREED that the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED, except as to the special

condition pertaining to adult pornography, and REMANDED with instructions to amend the

written judgment to strike that special condition.

Petitioner Michael Valdez pleaded guilty to sex trafficking a minor, in violation of 18

U.S.C. § 1591. He received a 156-month term of imprisonment, with five years of supervised

release. The oral sentencing imposed special conditions on Valdez’s supervised release,

including a prohibition against “deliberate contact with any child under 18 years of age unless

approved by the probation office, with the exception of your children.” App’x at 177. And the

written judgment added a special condition that prohibits Valdez from viewing adult pornography

without approval by a sex-offender treatment provider. Valdez now challenges both of these

special conditions. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural

history of the case, and the issues on appeal.

“A district court retains wide latitude in imposing conditions of supervised release, and we

therefore review a decision to impose a condition for abuse of discretion.” United States v.

MacMillen, 544 F.3d 71, 74 (2d Cir. 2008). “When the defendant does not object to the

conditions, however, we review only for plain error.” United States v. Green, 618 F.3d 120, 122

2 (2d Cir. 2010). “But plain error review is not always warranted in the sentencing context,” so

“we have employed a ‘relaxed’ form of plain error review in those rare cases in which the

defendant lacked sufficient prior notice that a particular condition of supervised release might be

imposed.” United States v. Matta, 777 F.3d 116, 121 (2d Cir. 2015).

“A sentencing court may impose special conditions that are reasonably related to ‘the

nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant’; ‘the

need for the sentence imposed to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct’; ‘the need to

protect the public from further crimes of the defendant’; and ‘the need to provide the defendant

with needed educational or vocational training, medical care, or other correctional treatment in the

most effective manner,’ and which ‘involve no greater deprivation of liberty than is reasonably

necessary’ for these purposes.” United States v. Betts, 886 F.3d 198, 202 (2d Cir. 2018) (citing

U.S.S.G. § 5D1.3(b)).

I. The Special Condition Restricting Contact with Minors

Valdez asks that we vacate the special condition restricting his contact with minors, arguing

that it lacks an adequate explanation, bears no reasonable relationship to the purpose of supervised

release, and is both overbroad and vague. He further contests the government’s argument that he

failed to object to this special condition at sentencing. But whether we review for abuse of

discretion or plain error, we find no defect in the district court’s decision.

In sentencing Valdez, the district court thoroughly reviewed the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)

factors. As to the nature of the offense, it emphasized that “[t]he criminal conduct here was

extremely serious,” and it detailed how Valdez—“the most culpable of those involved in this

case”— “beat up the victim, he threatened her, held her against her will, and terrorized her in ways

3 that were horrifying.” App’x at 174. As to Valdez’s criminal record, the district court noted

that his “history does include conduct involving sex with another minor and multiple orders of

protection, which are troubling facts.” Id. As to mitigating factors, it accounted for Valdez’s

“difficult upbringing,” the “harsh[]” conditions of his detainment, and “letters show[ing] that he

has family members and friends who care about him.” Id. at 174–75. And as to deterrence, the

district court found that the “seriousness of this conduct cannot be overstated,” that “[t]he purpose

of sentencing require[s] a very serious sentence,” and that Valdez’s “culpability . . . outweigh[s]

the fact that he pled guilty.” Id.

Valdez claims that the district court erred by not repeating its justifications for each special

condition. But district courts need not “undertake a separate recitation of the basis for each part

of the sentence imposed.” United States v. Williams, 998 F.3d 538, 541 (2d Cir. 2021). “All

that we require is that the district court ‘identify the consideration or considerations driving the

selection of the sentence,’” as we “generally understand that explanation to apply to the sentence

as a whole.” United States v. Walter, 848 F. App’x 479, 480 (2d Cir. 2021) (quoting United

States v. Rosa, 957 F.3d 113, 118 (2d Cir. 2020)). Here, the district court did just that.

Moreover, it is “self-evident,” Betts, 886 F.3d at 202 (cleaned up), that the special condition serves

to deter Valdez from continuing to “terrorize[]” minors, App’x at 174.

Valdez’s overbreadth and vagueness challenges fare no better. The special condition

prohibits only deliberate contact with minors, not any possible interaction. We recently upheld

the imposition of more restrictive special conditions that “prohibit[ed] [the defendant] from having

‘direct contact with any child he knows or reasonably should know to be under the age of 18

without the permission of the probation officer’ and require[d] him to report within 24 hours any

4 such contact he does have,” and “prohibit[ed] [defendant] from going to or remaining at ‘any place

where he knows children under the age of 18 are likely to congregate, including parks, schools,

playgrounds, and childcare facilities without the permission of the probation officer.’” United

States v. Bullock, No. 23-7341, 2025 WL 2423493, at *9 (2d Cir. Aug. 22, 2025) (cleaned up).

And here the district court modified the scope of the special condition in an effort to avoid

unnecessary interference with Valdez’s rights. Not only did the district court allow Valdez to

have contact with his children, but it also removed the bulk of the PSR’s other recommendations

for the condition. One such recommendation banned “loiter[ing] within 100 feet of places

regularly frequented by children under the age of 18, such as schoolyards, playgrounds, and

arcades.” Appellant’s Br. at 10. Another forbade “view[ing] and/or access[ing] any web profile

of users under the age of 18,” including “social networking websites, community portals, chat

rooms or other online environment (audio/visual/messaging), etc. which allows for real time

interaction with other users, without prior approval from your probation officer.” Id. The

district court thus narrowly tailored the limits on Valdez’s contact with minors.

Finally, Valdez’s reliance on United States v. Bleau, 930 F.3d 35 (2d Cir. 2019), is

misplaced. In that case, we vacated a special condition “that broadly prohibit[ed] . . . direct

contact with minors without first obtaining permission from [a] probation officer.” Id. at 38.

But that was because the district court did not “adequately explain” its reasoning and because the

defendant “was not alleged to have engaged in, or attempted to engage in, inappropriate contact

with minors.” Id. at 43. Here, the district court carefully weighed the relevant factors and

explained how they impacted Valdez’s sentence. Moreover, unlike the defendant in Bleau, who

was convicted of receiving and possessing child pornography, Valdez engaged in “brutal” conduct

5 with the sixteen-year-old victim—sleeping with her, prostituting her, beating her, posting nude

photographs of her—and has a prior conviction for endangering the welfare of another minor with

whom he had sex. App’x at 175. As Bleau recognized, “there may be reasonable arguments to

support the imposition of this special condition” in other cases. 930 F.3d at 43. This is such a

case.

In sum, the district court did not abuse its discretion—let alone plainly err—in imposing

this special condition.

II. The Special Condition Prohibiting Adult Pornography

“It is well settled, as a general proposition, that in the event of variation between an oral

pronouncement of sentence and a subsequent written judgment, the oral pronouncement controls,”

and “any burdensome punishments or restrictions added in the written judgment must be

removed.” United States v. Rosario, 386 F.3d 166, 168 (2d Cir. 2004). When such variation

exists, “the typical rule is that unpronounced conditions must be stricken from the judgment upon

remand.” United States v. Rosado, 109 F.4th 120, 126 (2d Cir. 2024).

Here, the written judgment included a supervised release condition prohibiting viewing or

downloading adult pornography. But the district court did not orally pronounce any such

condition. In light of that discrepancy, “the proper remedy is to remand for amendment of the

written judgment.” United States v. Peguero, 34 F.4th 143, 165 (2d Cir. 2022) (cleaned up).

* * *

We have considered all of Valdez’s remaining arguments and find them to be without

merit. For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED, except as to

6 the special condition pertaining to adult pornography, and REMANDED for amended judgment

as to that special condition.

FOR THE COURT: Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk of Court