FISHER, District Judge:
This appeal challenges the district court’s authority to enter and enforce a protective order prohibiting disclosure of divestiture plans filed in compliance with a consent judgment in an antitrust case. We believe the court did have such authority and did not abuse its discretion in enforcing the order.
In 1954 the United States brought a civil antitrust suit against appellee United Fruit Company alleging violations of sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act.
The plethoric complaint alleged numerous offenses amounting to unlawful domination of the banana import industry and prayed for injunctive relief. Chief Judge Lynne of the Northern District of Alabama was specially designated in 1956 by Chief Judge Hutcheson of this Court to sit in the Eastern District of Louisiana to hear this case.
After extensive discovery and pretrial proceedings, the district court entered a final consent judgment on February 4, 1958, without taking testimony or other evidence. United was enjoined from a long list of antitrust violations and was ordered
inter alia
to create from its own assets a new competitive banana company having a specified banana importation capacity.
In addition, United was required to submit detailed plans for compliance with the decree by July 1, 1967.
Shortly after entry of judgment, the district court granted United’s motion for a protective order pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 30(b).
The order provided that third parties could not, without an express order of the court inspect or copy any document submitted and filed with the Clerk of the court by either party to the litigation.
The protective order was designed to insure by keeping secret intimately detailed information which another competitor could use devastatingly that the new company, once established, would function as a viable competitor.
The court approved United’s proposed plan for compliance on July 28, 1967. The plan required that within 30 days, United should begin organization of the new company and complete divestiture of specified assets; that within one year after approval of the plan, United should submit a detailed program for the initial organization, staffing, production, shipping, marketing and other arrangements; that within two years United should submit shipping arrangements, liquid assets and other essential accessory assets transferred or offered to the new company with the distribution of defendant’s capital stock; and that progress reports be submitted every 60 days
thereafter. United has now organized the new company which is named Sovereign Fruit Company.
On July 2, 1968, appellant Standard Fruit and Steamship Company filed a motion requesting the Court to permit it “to inspect and copy the progress reports and programs submitted * * * pursuant to the plan, as well as other portions of the record.” Standard is the second largest banana importer in this country, and Standard’s purpose was admittedly one of self interest to obtain advance information about the proposed competitive plans, practices and policies of Sovereign. After oral argument, the Court entered an order denying appellant’s motion on the grounds that to reveal the confidential information on file would give Standard a competitive advantage deleterious to the public purposes of the Final Judgment;
viz.,
establishment and survival of a new competitor.
Standard brought this appeal alleging the district court was without authority to enter the protective order, but if it did have such authority, the court abused its discretion in not permitting Standard to inspect the documents on file.
Initially, we are confronted with whether this Court has jurisdiction. United’s brief suggests lack of jurisdiction on two bases. The first involves Section 2 of the
Expediting
Act
which provides that eases under the Sherman Act brought by the United States are appealable only to the Supreme Court. The second is United’s allegation that there is no final order here from which an appeal can be taken because the Court denied Standard’s motion without prejudice to renew it at a later time. The first question was answered by the Supreme Court in Standard Fruit & Steamship Co. v. United Fruit Co., 393 U.S. 406, 89 S.Ct. 684, 21 L.Ed.2d 634, January 21, 1969. Standard had in fact filed appeals to both this court and the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal before it citing, Shenandoah Valley Broadcasting, Inc. v. ASCAP, 375 U.S. 39, 84 S.Ct. 8, 11 L.Ed.2d 8, which indicates an appeal to the Court of Appeals under 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1291
is permissible when the order appealed from disposes of a controversy outside the mainstream of litigation in the government’s case. Clearly, Standard’s motion to inspect was of an ancillary nature, and this Court therefore has jurisdiction. Cf. also Olympic Refining Co. v. Carter, 332 F.2d 260 (9th Cir. 1964). With respect to whether there is a sufficiently final order from which an appeal can be taken, we think the order here sufficiently final if it denied the relief sought irrespective of the fact that the order denied the motion without prejudice to renew it at a later time.
Appellant’s primary argument that the district court lacked authority to enter the protective order is based on the
Publicity in Taking Evidence
Act
perti
nent to antitrust cases which requires generally that depositions and hearings be open to the public as freely as trials in open court. The district court concluded that the statute was limited by its terms to depositions and that if Congress had intended such a broad public policy as contended for by Standard, it would have so stated.
We agree that Congress did not intend to preclude entry of protective orders where necessary to effectuate a court’s judgment. To the contrary, we find ample authority justifying the court’s action. First, we note the well developed concept that the courts possess inherent equitable powers over their own process to prevent abuses.
Second, we quote with approval the rule stated in 4 Moore’s Federal Practice, 2d Ed., pp. 2519-2520.
“There is no true privilege against discovery of trade secrets or other ‘confidential’ business information, but the courts nevertheless will exercise their discretion to avoid unnecessary disclosure of such information, particularly where the action is between competitors.”
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FISHER, District Judge:
This appeal challenges the district court’s authority to enter and enforce a protective order prohibiting disclosure of divestiture plans filed in compliance with a consent judgment in an antitrust case. We believe the court did have such authority and did not abuse its discretion in enforcing the order.
In 1954 the United States brought a civil antitrust suit against appellee United Fruit Company alleging violations of sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act.
The plethoric complaint alleged numerous offenses amounting to unlawful domination of the banana import industry and prayed for injunctive relief. Chief Judge Lynne of the Northern District of Alabama was specially designated in 1956 by Chief Judge Hutcheson of this Court to sit in the Eastern District of Louisiana to hear this case.
After extensive discovery and pretrial proceedings, the district court entered a final consent judgment on February 4, 1958, without taking testimony or other evidence. United was enjoined from a long list of antitrust violations and was ordered
inter alia
to create from its own assets a new competitive banana company having a specified banana importation capacity.
In addition, United was required to submit detailed plans for compliance with the decree by July 1, 1967.
Shortly after entry of judgment, the district court granted United’s motion for a protective order pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 30(b).
The order provided that third parties could not, without an express order of the court inspect or copy any document submitted and filed with the Clerk of the court by either party to the litigation.
The protective order was designed to insure by keeping secret intimately detailed information which another competitor could use devastatingly that the new company, once established, would function as a viable competitor.
The court approved United’s proposed plan for compliance on July 28, 1967. The plan required that within 30 days, United should begin organization of the new company and complete divestiture of specified assets; that within one year after approval of the plan, United should submit a detailed program for the initial organization, staffing, production, shipping, marketing and other arrangements; that within two years United should submit shipping arrangements, liquid assets and other essential accessory assets transferred or offered to the new company with the distribution of defendant’s capital stock; and that progress reports be submitted every 60 days
thereafter. United has now organized the new company which is named Sovereign Fruit Company.
On July 2, 1968, appellant Standard Fruit and Steamship Company filed a motion requesting the Court to permit it “to inspect and copy the progress reports and programs submitted * * * pursuant to the plan, as well as other portions of the record.” Standard is the second largest banana importer in this country, and Standard’s purpose was admittedly one of self interest to obtain advance information about the proposed competitive plans, practices and policies of Sovereign. After oral argument, the Court entered an order denying appellant’s motion on the grounds that to reveal the confidential information on file would give Standard a competitive advantage deleterious to the public purposes of the Final Judgment;
viz.,
establishment and survival of a new competitor.
Standard brought this appeal alleging the district court was without authority to enter the protective order, but if it did have such authority, the court abused its discretion in not permitting Standard to inspect the documents on file.
Initially, we are confronted with whether this Court has jurisdiction. United’s brief suggests lack of jurisdiction on two bases. The first involves Section 2 of the
Expediting
Act
which provides that eases under the Sherman Act brought by the United States are appealable only to the Supreme Court. The second is United’s allegation that there is no final order here from which an appeal can be taken because the Court denied Standard’s motion without prejudice to renew it at a later time. The first question was answered by the Supreme Court in Standard Fruit & Steamship Co. v. United Fruit Co., 393 U.S. 406, 89 S.Ct. 684, 21 L.Ed.2d 634, January 21, 1969. Standard had in fact filed appeals to both this court and the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal before it citing, Shenandoah Valley Broadcasting, Inc. v. ASCAP, 375 U.S. 39, 84 S.Ct. 8, 11 L.Ed.2d 8, which indicates an appeal to the Court of Appeals under 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1291
is permissible when the order appealed from disposes of a controversy outside the mainstream of litigation in the government’s case. Clearly, Standard’s motion to inspect was of an ancillary nature, and this Court therefore has jurisdiction. Cf. also Olympic Refining Co. v. Carter, 332 F.2d 260 (9th Cir. 1964). With respect to whether there is a sufficiently final order from which an appeal can be taken, we think the order here sufficiently final if it denied the relief sought irrespective of the fact that the order denied the motion without prejudice to renew it at a later time.
Appellant’s primary argument that the district court lacked authority to enter the protective order is based on the
Publicity in Taking Evidence
Act
perti
nent to antitrust cases which requires generally that depositions and hearings be open to the public as freely as trials in open court. The district court concluded that the statute was limited by its terms to depositions and that if Congress had intended such a broad public policy as contended for by Standard, it would have so stated.
We agree that Congress did not intend to preclude entry of protective orders where necessary to effectuate a court’s judgment. To the contrary, we find ample authority justifying the court’s action. First, we note the well developed concept that the courts possess inherent equitable powers over their own process to prevent abuses.
Second, we quote with approval the rule stated in 4 Moore’s Federal Practice, 2d Ed., pp. 2519-2520.
“There is no true privilege against discovery of trade secrets or other ‘confidential’ business information, but the courts nevertheless will exercise their discretion to avoid unnecessary disclosure of such information, particularly where the action is between competitors.”
This Court has espoused this rule in another case involving competitors wherein Chief Judge Lynne had entered a protective order, cf. A. H. Robins Co. v. Fadely, 299 F.2d 557 (5th Cir. 1962). We stated there:
“The provisions of Rule 30(b) control: * * * for good cause shown, the court in which the action is pending may make an order * * * that secret processes, developments, or research need not be disclosed, or that the parties shall * * * file specified documents or information enclosed in sealed envelopes to be opened as directed by the court.”
Finally, we observe that the district courts have often exercised their discretionary power in civil antitrust cases by issuing protective orders sealing all or part of the record.
We therefore conclude that the district court unquestionably had authority to enter an order prohibiting revelation of the confidential information on file in this case.
With respect to whether the district court abused its discretion in not allowing Standard to inspect details concerning Sovereign’s organization, a different question might have been presented had Standard sought the information as being relevant for use in another pending proceeding. The Supreme Court in Ex Parte Uppercu
has decreed that so long as the object of the motion physically exists, anyone needing it as evidence at a trial has a right to call for it, unless some exception is shown to the general rule. We think the district court may have had this in mind when it denied the motion without prejudice. However, the sole argument advanced by Standard in this case was that Standard was placed at an unfair disadvantage if United, the “guilty” company, was permitted to know the intimate details of Sovereign’s assets, programs, costs and markets while Standard, the smaller competitor, was not permitted such information. Moreover, Standard argued that if anyone should have the information, it should be The smaller competitors rather than the dominant one.
The district court recognized the anomaly of creating a new competitive company completely organized, managed and controlled by the “guilty” dominant company. However, essential to the judgment was the creation of an eventually autonomous competitor. The court concluded that the new company would have a much less chance of survival if all its competitors knew the details of its structure rather than United, alone, whose knowledge was not by choice and whose interest in seeing the new company survive was obvious and direct.
Once having concluded that the district court had authority to enter the protective order, we readily defer to its judgment in deciding whether to enforce it. Because of Judge Lynne’s detailed knowledge of the record and complexities and peculiarities of the banana industry gleaned from his more than twelve years of conscientious supervision of this case, he was particularly well qualified to determine whether disclosure would impose disadvantages inimical to the purposes of the Final Judgment. Moreover, we think it obvious that the discretion of the district court was in fact exercised wisely given the likely effects which misuse of the detailed and sensitive information could have.
Accordingly, we find no error in the court’s enforcement of the order.
Affirmed.