United States v. Union Pacific Railroad

249 U.S. 354, 39 S. Ct. 294, 63 L. Ed. 643, 1919 U.S. LEXIS 2133
Supreme Court of the United States·Decided March 31, 1919·No. 199·Published·Cited by 21 cases

Opinion

Mr. Justice Brandeis

delivered the opinion of the court.

Most of the acts of Congress which granted lands in .aid of railroads provide that they shall be “free from toll or other charge upon the transportation of any property or troops of the United States.” 1 This clause was *355 construed in Lake Superior & Mississippi R. R. Co. v. United States, 93 U. S. 442, as conferring only, the free use of the roadbed as a highway. Since then, under appropriate legislation, payment has come to be made by the Government for the transportation of property and troops at rates equal to fifty per cent, of those charged private parties. The Union Pacific, having entered into an agreement to that effect, claimed payment at the full rate for certain persons carried as passengers upon the request of the Government. The Auditor of the War Department refused to allow payment for these passengers at more than half-fares, on the ground that they were within the provision, for transporting “troops of the United States”; and his ruling was sustained by the Comptroller of the Treasury. (21 Decisions of the Comptroller, 651.) Thereupon this suit was brought in the Court of Claims for the amount- disallowed; and judgment was rendered for the railroad. 52 Ct. Clms. 226. The case is here on appeal. The questions presented are *356 whether any of the following classes.of persons are to be deemed “troops of the United States” within the provision of the land-grant acts:

1. Discharged soldiers; that is, former enlisted men of the Army en route to their homes after discharge.

2. Discharged military prisoners; that is, discharged enlisted men en route to their homes or elsewhere after serving sentence as military prisoners.

3. Rejected applicants for enlistment in the Army; that is, men who having passed the required tests at the recruiting stations and having been forwarded to the recruiting depots for final examination and enlistment, were there rejected and were being returned to the recruiting stations from which they came.

4. Accepted applicants for enlistment in the Army; that is, applicants examined at general recruiting stations, found mentally, morally, and physically fit for service, and being forwarded to recruiting depots for final examination and enlistment.

5. Retired soldiers; that is, enlisted men of the Army en route to them homes after retirement.

6. Furloughed soldiers; that is, enlisted men of the Army on furlough en route back to their proper stations.

None of these persons travelled as part of a moving army, troop, or body of soldiers. That is, they travelled separately as individuals, and (with few • exceptions) each on a different day and to widely scattered destinations. Under recent acts of Congress and Army Regulations, 1 the transportation of persons of some of these classes is paid for by the Government.

In defining the transportation rights secured to the United States, these land-grant acts draw a broad distinction between freight and passengers. All “property” *357 of the Government, whatever its character and intended use, is to be carried “free of toll or other charge;” but of the many persons in its service, only “troops.” The history of the legislation shows that both the broad term, “any property,” and the.narrower one, “troops,” was adopted deliberately. The earliest land-grant act in which the provision appears is that of September 20, 1850, c. 61, § 4, 9 Stat. 466, 467, under which the Illinois Central was constructed. The bill as introduced 1 provided for the free transportation of "troops and munitions of war.” It was amended so as to read “any property or troops.” There had been an earlier act granting land to the State of Illinois for the construction of a canal (Act of March 30, 1822, c. 14, 3 Stat. 659) which was amended (Act of March 2, 1833, c. 87, 4 Stat. 662) so as to permit, on the same terms, the use and disposition of the land for railroads. That act provided for the free transportation of “any property of the United States, or persons in their service.”

In 1850 the word “troops” had (and it has ever since had) an established meaning: — namely, “soldiers collectively, — a body of soldiers.” Thus the Army Appropriation Act of that year (Act of September 28, 1850, c. 78, § 1, 9 Stat. 504, 506) provides for the “transportation of the army,- including the baggage of the troops when moving either by land or water” and for “mileage, or the allowance made to officers for the transportation of themselves and baggage when travelling on duty without troops.” The contemporary legislation draws a clear distinction also between troops, that is, those then having the status of soldiers, and those who once had been in, or were seeking to enter, the military service. Thus the Army Appropriation Act of March 2, 1847, c. 35, 9 Stat. 149, 151 (which provides in substantially the *358 same terms as that of 1850 for the transportation of' troops) makes specific provision for “forwarding destitute soldiers to their homes,” for the “comfort of discharged soldiers,” and for “expenses of recruiting,” which include the cost of transportation. See Army Regulations, 1857, § 1321. And the Resolution of March 3, 1847, [No. 7], 9 Stat. 206, authorizes the refund of moneys expended by the States and individuals “in organizing, subsisting, and transporting volunteers previous to their being mustered and received into the service of the tlnited States for the present war, and for subsisting troops in the service of the United States.” In view of the established meaning of the term “troops” as used by Congress the duty of the court is merely to apply the provisions of the act to the several classes of persons described above.

First. The first three classes, namely, discharged military prisoners, discharged enlisted men, and rejected applicants for enlistment, are clearly not “troops of the United States.” Their status is that of the civilian. They form no part of the military establishment. They may go where they please and do what they please, subject to no more interference by the military authorities of the Government, than if they had never been, or had never, sought to be, connected with the Army. They' were travelling for their own personal ends. Congress recognizes the distinction between those forming part of the Army and those who do not, because they are recruits or have been discharged; and it makes special provision for their transportation. 1 Such had formerly been also the opinion of the Comptroller of the Treasury. Compare Digest, Second Comptroller’s Decisions, vol. 4, §§ 354 and 355.

*359 Second.

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United States v. Union Pacific Railroad, 249 U.S. 354, 39 S. Ct. 294, 63 L. Ed. 643, 1919 U.S. LEXIS 2133 (1919).

249 U.S. 354 (United States v. Union Pacific Railroad) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.

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