United States v. Umar Chaudhry

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
• Decided: December 16, 2025
• Docket: 24-4471
• Status: Published

Opinion

USCA4 Appeal: 24-4471 Doc: 42 Filed: 12/16/2025 Pg: 1 of 36

PUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 24-4471

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

UMAR FAROOQ CHAUDHRY,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Alexandria. Leonie M. Brinkema, District Judge. (1:17-cr-00270-LMB-4)

Argued: September 11, 2025 Decided: December 16, 2025

Before KING, WYNN, and QUATTLEBAUM, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by published opinion. Judge Quattlebaum wrote the opinion, in which Judge King and Judge Wynn joined.

ARGUED: Geremy C. Kamens, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER, Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellant. Joseph Attias, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Washington, D.C., for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Erik S. Siebert, United States Attorney, John T. Gibbs, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellee. USCA4 Appeal: 24-4471 Doc: 42 Filed: 12/16/2025 Pg: 2 of 36

QUATTLEBAUM, Circuit Judge:

Umar Farooq Chaudhry traveled from the United States to Pakistan with hopes of

joining in jihad in Afghanistan. But after arriving in Pakistan, Chaudhry was arrested, tried

and convicted by Pakistani authorities of terrorism-related offenses. He then spent the next

decade in a Pakistani prison. After his release, he was extradited to the United States to

face similar charges. Chaudhry moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing that the United

States violated his Sixth Amendment speedy trial rights by not seeking his extradition

earlier. The district court rejected that argument. While Chaudhry then pled guilty, the

terms of his conditional plea allowed him to challenge the district court’s speedy trial

determination in this appeal. Because we find no Sixth Amendment violation, we affirm

his conviction.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Chaudhry Travels to Pakistan

Chaudhry was born in Pakistan in 1985 but moved to the United States with his

family when he was six years old. He is now a dual citizen of both the United States and

Pakistan. In 2009, he and four others—Ahmed Ameer Minni, Aman Hassan Yemer, Waqar

Hussain Khan and Ramy Said Zamzam1—intended to travel to Afghanistan to wage violent

jihad in opposition to U.S. and U.S.-allied forces.

1 At times, authorities referred to the group as the “Sargodha Five,” based on the town in which they were ultimately arrested. But, since they later became criminal co- defendants in the district court, we refer to them as “defendants.” Minni, Yemer, Khan and Zamzam are not parties to this appeal. 2 USCA4 Appeal: 24-4471 Doc: 42 Filed: 12/16/2025 Pg: 3 of 36

The defendants’ plan originated when an individual called “Saifullah” (which

translates to “Sword of Allah”) recruited Minni and Yemer over YouTube. J.A. 255. Minni

and Yemer then recruited the rest of the defendants and, with guidance from Saifullah,

developed a scheme to travel to Pakistan, with the hope of then crossing into Afghanistan.

Before they left the United States, the defendants created an 11-minute “final

message” video. J.A. 259. The video was in both English and Arabic and depicted graphics,

text, footage of U.S. soldiers in Iraq and photos of civilian casualties over background

music. While these images played, Zamzam narrated,

when Muslim lands are invaded, when Muslim children are terrorized, when Muslim women are raped, when our brothers and sisters are attacked and killed, . . . jihad becomes, by the consensus of the scholars . . . , an individual obligation . . . to defend his brothers and sisters and give them victory.

J.A. 259 (alterations in original). Zamzam showed the video to the other defendants at a

computer shop owned by Chaudhry’s family in Lorton, Virginia. The defendants saved the

video to a USB drive and gave it to another individual with the intent that the video

eventually be uploaded to YouTube.

After four months of planning, the defendants departed for Pakistan in November

2009. Once they arrived, Minni attempted to arrange a meeting with Saifullah but had

difficulty contacting him. As a result, the defendants took it upon themselves to find their

own way into Afghanistan. Khan and Chaudhry turned to a mosque in Hyderabad, Pakistan

that they knew to be associated with Jaish-e-Mohammed, a designated foreign terrorist

organization. Eventually, they met the emir of the mosque, who instructed them to go to

Lahore, Pakistan, where there was a headquarters for a camp of mujahideen. The next day,

3 USCA4 Appeal: 24-4471 Doc: 42 Filed: 12/16/2025 Pg: 4 of 36

the defendants traveled to the location given to them by the emir. This turned out to be a

mosque associated with Jamaat-ud-Dawa, a different Islamic organization. A Jamaat-ud-

Dawa representative explained that the defendants would need a reference before they

could be accepted. So, the defendants then journeyed to Sargodha, another city in Pakistan,

where they hoped one of Chaudhry’s relatives could supply the necessary endorsement.

Back in Virginia, the defendants’ families informed the Federal Bureau of

Investigation that the defendants were missing and handed the FBI the USB drive

containing the final message video. On December 9, 2009, after the defendants reached

Sargodha, Pakistani authorities arrested them in a house belonging to Chaudhry’s cousin.

At the time of their arrest, the defendants possessed handwritten notes referencing the

Hyderabad mosque, Jamaat-ud-Dawa and the initials “JeM”—which is short for Jaish-e-

Mohammed.

The FBI interviewed Chaudhry two days after his arrest while he was being detained

by law enforcement in Pakistan. He stated, “[W]e came for the sake of Islam to work with

the Muslims. . . . I am letting you know that I know about the video. We came here together

and the video speaks for us. Whatever the video says, I am for that.” Schwindt Aff. ¶ 19,

United States v. Chaudhry, No. 1:17-cr-00270-LMB-4 (E.D. Va. judgment entered Aug.

14, 2024), ECF 2. That same day, the FBI’s Legal Attaché informed Pakistan’s Minister

of Interior that the United States intended to bring charges against the defendants. But

extraditing the defendants from Pakistan to the United States to face those charges would

prove difficult.

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B. The Extradition Process

Before describing the events leading to Chaudhry’s extradition, we discuss the

extradition process generally and the history of extradition of criminal defendants to the

United States from Pakistan. Extradition is an official process of one country surrendering

an alleged criminal in response to a demand made by the executive of another country with

jurisdiction over the crime charged. See Extradition, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (12th ed.

2024). Unlike other, less formal methods of seeking the return of the alleged criminal from

another country, extradition requires a treaty. See Factor v. Laubenheimer, 290 U.S. 276,

287 (1933). Thus, the nature and extent of a country’s right to extradition is dependent

upon the treaty that created it. Id.

The relevant treaty here is that signed by the United States and the United Kingdom

back in 1931. See Extradition Treaty, U.K.-U.S., Dec. 22, 1931, T.S. No. 849. In 1942, the

United Kingdom extended the treaty to cover its colonial holdings in India, which includes

modern-day Pakistan. James J. Saulino, Article, Strategic Choices: Four Legal Models for

Counterterrorism in Pakistan, 2 HARV. NAT’L SEC. J. 247, 261 (2011). When Pakistan

gained independence in 1947, it agreed to remain bound by the treaty, and the treaty

continues to govern the extradition rights between the United States and Pakistan today.

See id.; U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, TREATIES IN FORCE: A LIST OF TREATIES AND OTHER

INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES IN FORCE ON JANUARY 1, 2020, at

345 (2020), https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/08/TIF-2020-Full-website-

view.pdf [https://perma.cc/S76S-7EKX].

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Notably, Article Four of the Extradition Treaty prohibits extradition of an alleged

criminal who is already facing trial or a prison sentence in Pakistan:

The extradition shall not take place if the person claimed has already been tried and discharged or punished, or is still under trial in the territories of the High Contracting Party applied to, for the crime or offence for which his extradition is demanded.

If the person claimed should be under examination or under punishment in the territories of the High Contracting Party applied to for any other crime or offence, his extradition shall be deferred until the conclusion of the trial and the full execution of any punishment awarded to him.

Extradition Treaty, art. IV.

To implement the treaty, Pakistan follows a lengthy formal extradition process.

Jeffrey Olson, then Associate Director of the United States Justice Department’s Office of

International Affairs (OIA), submitted a declaration in support of the government’s

opposition to Chaudhry’s motion to dismiss the indictment. He explained that the process

begins when a country routes an extradition request through the Pakistani Ministry of

Foreign Affairs to the Pakistani Ministry of Interior. The Ministry of Interior then forwards

the request to a magistrate, who reviews to determine whether the request complies with

Pakistani law and the applicable extradition treaty. If these requirements are met, the

Ministry of Interior advances the request to the cabinet of Pakistan’s federal government,

which ultimately decides whether or not to grant the request. A fugitive can also challenge

these proceedings by seeking judicial review in Pakistan’s courts and, if initially

unsuccessful, can seek appellate review and even petition the Pakistani Supreme Court.

Olson also explained that the United States has been down this road before with

little success. In recent years, the United States has directed many such requests at Pakistan,

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but Pakistan has often either lost or destroyed those documents. As a result, the United

States’ requests have been met with significant delays or, worse yet, silence. Even under

the best of circumstances, the process can take years, and Pakistan has been reluctant to

communicate with the United States on the status of its requests. Indeed, despite the

numerous requests, the United States has successfully extradited only two prisoners from

Pakistan, other than Chaudhry, in the last fifteen years: one in 2015 and one in 2021.

Still, while the formal extradition process has proven difficult, Olson added that

Pakistan has, at times, been willing to informally “deport” foreign nationals. J.A. 154. Like

the formal extradition process, deportation requires the approval of various Pakistani

government officials, but the deportation process can be faster than extradition. Thus,

because Chaudhry is an American citizen, the United States hoped and believed Pakistan

might consent to deporting him rather than requiring the formal extradition process.

C. Initial Efforts Seeking Chaudhry’s Return

Turning back to the defendants’ situation, on December 15, 2009—just a few days

after the defendants’ arrest—the United States’ Assistant Legal Attaché in Pakistan met

with the Director General of Pakistan’s National Crisis Management Center within the

Ministry of Interior. During the meeting, the Assistant Legal Attaché informed the Director

General that the United States was planning to charge the defendants and would seek their

return from Pakistan to the United States to do so. In response, the Director General

explained that, because the defendants had received a consular visit,2 Pakistan considered

2 There are notes in the record reflecting various consular visits in which officials from the United States Embassy checked in on Chaudhry’s health and wellbeing at various 7 USCA4 Appeal: 24-4471 Doc: 42 Filed: 12/16/2025 Pg: 8 of 36

their detention to be “formal” and would “want the [United States] to follow the formal

extradition process.” J.A. 114. But, when the Assistant Legal Attaché then asked whether

Pakistan would be willing to deport the defendants because they were United States

citizens, the Director General “advised that this was possible but harder now that the

intelligence agencies were involved.” J.A. 114. The Director General “further advised that

it may take a bit of time to arrange for their extradition/deportation/repatriation, and as

such the [United States] should initiate a formal request soon.” J.A. 114. He explained that

any decision on whether to “deport/repatriate” would be a political decision made by the

district police. J.A. 114. And he “advised that if the [United States] wished to smooth the

process of transferring the five to US custody, [the Ambassador] should discuss this matter

directly with [the Pakistani Minister of Interior] and immediately following this discussion,

the [United States] should issue its formal request.” J.A. 114–15.

On December 23, 2009, a special agent of the FBI filed a criminal complaint against

Chaudhry and the other defendants in the United States District Court for the Eastern

District of Virginia, accusing them of conspiring to provide material support to terrorists.

The district court issued an arrest warrant later that same day.3 The following day, the

United States moved for the district court to unseal the criminal complaint so that the

points during his imprisonment in Pakistan. The only notes in the record are from visits between 2017 and 2019. But there does not appear to be any dispute that Chaudhry received consular visits throughout his imprisonment in Pakistan. 3 This arrest warrant does not appear in either the joint appendix or the district court’s docket. But there does not seem to be any dispute that the district court issued an arrest warrant the day it issued its criminal complaint, as the issuance of the arrest warrant was mentioned in the government’s motion to unseal, which it filed the next day. 8 USCA4 Appeal: 24-4471 Doc: 42 Filed: 12/16/2025 Pg: 9 of 36

Justice Department could seek a Red Notice for the defendants from the International

Criminal Police Organization.4

That same day—December 24, 2009—the Legal Attaché notified the Pakistani

Ministry of Interior of the charges pending against the defendants in the district court and

provided the Ministry of Interior with copies of the defendants’ arrest warrants. The Legal

Attaché also stated that the United States government was seeking custody of the

defendants so that they could stand trial. She explained that her office could facilitate the

transfer of the defendants by air transport from Pakistan to the United States within 72

hours. That same day, Pakistan informed the Legal Attaché that its local court had ordered

that the defendants must be detained and could not be transferred to a foreign government.

On December 28, 2009, the Legal Attaché stated that a formal extradition request

from the United States “may carry more weight than simply providing the arrest warrants.”

J.A. 157. Consequently, OIA worked with the United States Attorney’s Office for the

Eastern District of Virginia and the United States Department of State to craft an official

request for Pakistan to return the defendants to the United States for prosecution. The

4 A Red Notice is a request for international law enforcement to arrest an individual pending extradition. Guan v. Barr, 925 F.3d 1022, 1029 n.2 (9th Cir. 2019). In essence, INTERPOL member countries can request that INTERPOL’s General Secretariat issue a Red Notice when there is a national arrest warrant out for an individual. Id. Thus, “[a]lthough a Red Notice is not an international arrest warrant, it is the closest instrument to an international arrest warrant in use today.” Id. (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). 9 USCA4 Appeal: 24-4471 Doc: 42 Filed: 12/16/2025 Pg: 10 of 36

United States Embassy in Islamabad presented this request—drafted as a diplomatic note—

to Pakistan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs.5

In the diplomatic note, the United States first acknowledged that all five defendants

are United States citizens and that Chaudhry is a dual United States-Pakistani citizen. After

explaining the charges pending against the defendants in the United States, the United

States recognized that Pakistan was also preparing to charge the defendants. However, the

note stated, “the United States believes that the transfer of the defendants now rather than

at the conclusion of any proceedings in Pakistan would serve both our Governments’

interests in this matter and in combating terrorism more broadly.” J.A. 409. It went on to

state that, “[w]ere the transfer of the defendants delayed pending lengthy proceedings in

Pakistan, or even their service of a sentence of imprisonment in Pakistan, the United States’

case may be weakened, and we may lose opportunities to identify and disrupt terrorist

networks operating in the United States.” J.A. 409. The note concluded by requesting that

Pakistan “consider suspending or otherwise deferring its criminal proceedings against the

defendants and deporting or expelling them as soon as possible to the United States.” J.A.

410. There is no record of the United States receiving a response to this note.

Over the next several months, the Legal Attaché worked with Pakistani officials to

gather more information on Pakistan’s prosecution and investigation of the defendants. In

early June 2010, the United States’ Ambassador to Pakistan met with the Pakistani Minister

5 The diplomatic note was first presented to Pakistan on January 8, 2010. Because of a typographical error, the note was later amended and presented again on January 15, 2010. In this opinion, we refer to the note as it read on January 15, 2010. 10 USCA4 Appeal: 24-4471 Doc: 42 Filed: 12/16/2025 Pg: 11 of 36

of Interior to reiterate the United States’ position that the defendants should be returned.

Then, on June 23, 2010, the Legal Attaché sent a letter to Pakistan’s Interior Secretary in

which the Legal Attaché similarly memorialized his position that the defendants should be

transferred to the custody of the United States.

On June 24, 2010, the defendants were convicted in a Pakistani court of conspiring

to commit terrorist acts in Pakistan. Each received a ten-year prison sentence. While the

defendants served their sentences over the next decade, the Legal Attaché periodically

checked in with Pakistani officials on the defendants’ status and with officials in the

Eastern District of Virginia on the status of the United States’ pending case against the

defendants. For example, in a March 4, 2013 letter to the Director General of Pakistan’s

Federal Investigation Agency, the Legal Attaché requested a meeting to discuss, among

other things, the United States’ “pending requests for extradition” of certain individuals in

Pakistan, including the defendants. J.A. 169. The defendants’ Red Notices also remained

in effect during this time.

D. Chaudhry’s Extradition to the United States

On November 16, 2017, a federal grand jury in the Eastern District of Virginia

indicted the defendants on four counts related to their attempted jihad.6 The district court

issued new arrest warrants for the defendants that same day.

6 Specifically, the grand jury charged the defendants in Count I with conspiracy to provide material support to terrorists, in Count II with attempting to provide material support to terrorists, in Count III with conspiracy to provide material support to a designated foreign terrorist organization and in Count IV with attempting to provide material support to a designated foreign terrorist organization. 11 USCA4 Appeal: 24-4471 Doc: 42 Filed: 12/16/2025 Pg: 12 of 36

In December 2019, Olson learned that Pakistan intended to release the defendants

on or around January 3, 2020. Shortly after learning this information, OIA requested that

the State Department and the United States Embassy in Islamabad confirm with the

Pakistani Ministry of Foreign Affairs that the defendants’ sentences would soon expire so

that the United States “could proceed with extradition or deportation.” J.A. 159. In

response, OIA learned from the Ministry of Interior that Chaudhry was actually scheduled

to be released on March 29, 2020.7

On June 22, 2020, the Pakistani Ministry of Foreign Affairs sent the United States

Embassy in Islamabad a diplomatic note stating that Pakistan would not consent to

Chaudhry’s deportation and would, instead, require a formal extradition request. OIA then

assisted the United States Attorney’s Office with preparing the extradition request. After

some COVID-19 related delays, the United States Embassy in Islamabad presented the

Pakistani Ministry of Foreign Affairs with the extradition request on November 12, 2020.

But Chaudhry had evidently already been released on June 9, 2020.8

For roughly the next year and a half, Chaudhry’s extradition request worked its way

through the approval process in Pakistan. As this happened, OIA continued to monitor the

process and was in regular contact with the Legal Attaché, but there was little new

information. After the Pakistani cabinet permitted the extradition request to proceed to

7 Because of outstanding fines, the other four defendants were scheduled to be released on October 3, 2020. 8 The record does not indicate why Chaudhry was released on June 9, 2020, instead of on March 29, 2020, or why the Pakistani Ministry of Foreign Affairs did not mention his release in the June 22, 2020 note. 12 USCA4 Appeal: 24-4471 Doc: 42 Filed: 12/16/2025 Pg: 13 of 36

judicial review, the request was to advance to the Pakistani Supreme Court. But those

proceedings could not begin until after Chaudhry was re-arrested. In May 2022, the Federal

Secretary for Pakistan’s Ministry of Interior informed the Legal Attaché that there were

arrest warrants out for Chaudhry in Pakistan.

On August 17, 2022, Chaudhry was re-arrested in Pakistan. After that, he spent the

next several months fighting extradition through several Pakistani court proceedings.

Eventually, he relented, and the presiding judge in Pakistan approved his extradition on

July 14, 2023—roughly eleven months after his arrest. The Pakistani cabinet then approved

Chaudhry’s extradition, and he was extradited from Pakistan and landed at Washington

Dulles International Airport on December 6, 2023.

E. Proceedings in the District Court

Chaudhry was arraigned in the district court on December 12, 2023. During the

arraignment, the district court asked the parties about scheduling a trial date and noted that

it had designated the case as complex. The district court specifically asked Chaudhry

whether he wished to insist on a trial within seventy days, as permitted by the Speedy Trial

Act. Chaudhry waived that right. After some additional questions, the district court

determined that Chaudhry had made a knowing and voluntary waiver, with full advice of

his court-appointed counsel, of his rights under the Speedy Trial Act.9

On January 11, 2024, Chaudhry moved to dismiss his indictment based on alleged

violations of his Sixth Amendment rights to a speedy trial. The district court denied

9 Chaudhry does not contend that there were any violations of the Speedy Trial Act. 13 USCA4 Appeal: 24-4471 Doc: 42 Filed: 12/16/2025 Pg: 14 of 36

Chaudhry’s motion from the bench during a hearing on April 4, 2024. And on June 5, 2024,

it issued a memorandum opinion to more fully explain its reasoning.

On May 2, 2024, Chaudhry and the government reached a conditional plea

agreement pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(a)(2). Chaudhry agreed to

plead guilty to one count of conspiracy to provide material support and resources to a

foreign terrorist organization—Jaish-e-Mohammed—in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2339B. In

exchange, the government agreed to recommend a sentence of time served, plus 20 years

of supervised release. The parties also agreed that Chaudhry could preserve his right to

pursue this appeal of the district court’s denial of his motion to dismiss the indictment.

After Chaudhry pled guilty, the district court accepted the parties’ sentencing

recommendation. This appeal followed.10

II. DISCUSSION

The Sixth Amendment provides that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused

shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial.” U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The Supreme

Court has stated that the bounds of this right are “impossible to determine with precision.”

Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 521 (1972). Consequently, it has instructed that “any

inquiry into a speedy trial claim necessitates a functional analysis of the right in the

particular context of the case.” Id. at 522. Such an analysis requires balancing four factors:

(1) the length of the delay, (2) the reason for the delay, (3) the defendant’s assertion of his

rights and (4) prejudice to the defendant. Id. at 530. No specific factor is “either a necessary

10 We have jurisdiction over this appeal from the district court’s final judgment pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 14 USCA4 Appeal: 24-4471 Doc: 42 Filed: 12/16/2025 Pg: 15 of 36

or sufficient condition to the finding of a deprivation of the right of speedy trial.” Id. at

533. To prevail, a defendant must establish that, on balance, the factors weigh in his favor.

United States v. Hall, 551 F.3d 257, 271 (4th Cir. 2009).

The district court found that the first factor weighed in Chaudhry’s favor but that

there was no Sixth Amendment violation because the remaining three factors weighed

against him. We review the district court’s factual findings on a motion to dismiss an

indictment for clear error and its legal conclusions de novo. United States v. Pair, 84 F.4th

577, 588 (4th Cir. 2023), cert. denied, 144 S. Ct. 2589 (2024). Ultimately, we agree with

the district court’s analysis and affirm Chaudhry’s conviction.

A. Length of Delay

We begin with the length of delay. Length of delay is not only the first Barker factor

but also a threshold inquiry.11 Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647, 651–52 (1992). That

is, before a defendant can advance to the other factors, he must allege that the time between

his accusation and trial was “presumptively prejudicial.” Id. (quoting Barker, 407 U.S. at

530–31). The Supreme Court has suggested that, depending on the nature of the charges, a

delay becomes presumptively prejudicial for purposes of the first factor when it approaches

one year. See id. at 651–52 & n.1; accord Hall, 551 F.3d at 271. Of course, before we can

determine the length of the delay, we must start by identifying the point in time from which

11 We understand this seems a bit inconsistent. How can the length of delay be a threshold “triggering mechanism”—without which a speedy trial claim fails—and one of four factors if none of the factors are “either a necessary or sufficient condition to the finding of a deprivation of the right of speedy trial”? Barker, 407 U.S. at 530, 533. But that is what Barker says. 15 USCA4 Appeal: 24-4471 Doc: 42 Filed: 12/16/2025 Pg: 16 of 36

the delay is to be measured—or, in other words, when Chaudhry’s speedy trial rights

attached. See United States v. MacDonald, 456 U.S. 1, 6 (1982); Hall, 551 F.3d at 271.

In MacDonald, the Supreme Court instructed that a defendant’s rights under the

Speedy Trial Clause attach once he “is indicted, arrested, or otherwise officially accused.”

456 U.S. at 6. Thus, “[a]lthough delay prior to arrest or indictment may give rise to a due

process claim under the Fifth Amendment, or to a claim under any applicable statutes of

limitations, no Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial arises until charges are pending.”

Id. at 7 (citation omitted). Consequently, a defendant’s arrest or indictment is normally the

triggering event for a defendant’s constitutional rights to a speedy trial. See, e.g., United

States v. Villa, 70 F.4th 704, 714 (4th Cir. 2023); Hall, 551 F.3d at 271; see also United

States v. Uribe-Rios, 558 F.3d 347, 358 n.8 (4th Cir. 2009). However, in United States v.

Thomas, 55 F.3d 144, 149 (4th Cir. 1995), and again in United States v. Woolfolk, 399 F.3d

590, 597 (4th Cir. 2005), we held that the combination of a federal detainer, arrest warrant

and criminal complaint can trigger a defendant’s Sixth Amendment speedy trial rights,

even before the defendant faces a federal indictment or is in federal custody.

Our holdings in Thomas and Woolfolk thus raise an interesting question—do we

measure the length of delay from Chaudhry’s criminal complaint, Red Notice and arrest

warrant in 2009, or do we measure that delay from Chaudhry’s subsequent indictment in

2017? The district court acknowledged this issue, and the possible tension between our

decision in Thomas and Supreme Court precedent. But it ultimately determined it was

unnecessary to resolve the issue in this case. That’s because, according to the district court,

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the first factor favors Chaudhry whether the length of delay is measured from 2009 or from

2017.

Chaudhry agrees with the district court’s assessment that the first factor weighs in

his favor. Yet he urges us to look more closely into when his rights were triggered—and

ultimately to find that his rights were triggered by his 2009 criminal complaint, Red Notice

and arrest warrant. As he points out, the Supreme Court has indicated that the length of

delay may be relevant to our determinations on the other factors because the presumption

of prejudice attributable to government delay “compounds over time.” Doggett, 505 U.S.

at 657.

We agree with the district court that it is not necessary to resolve this issue here.

Instead, we assume, consistent with our decision in Thomas, that Chaudhry’s rights were

triggered with the arrest warrant, Red Notice and criminal complaint in 2009. See 55 F.3d

at 149. Thus, as the district court determined, the delay far exceeded a year and was,

therefore, presumptively prejudicial.12 See Doggett, 505 U.S. at 651–52 & n.1; Hall, 551

F.3d at 271. Consequently, the first factor weighs in Chaudhry’s favor, and Chaudhry has

made the threshold showing necessary to proceed to the remaining three factors. See

Doggett, 505 U.S. at 651–52 & n.1.

12 For the same reason, the delay would still have been presumptively prejudicial for purposes of this factor even if Chaudhry’s rights did not attach until his 2017 indictment. See Doggett, 505 U.S. at 651–52 & n.1; Hall, 551 F.3d at 271. Consequently, the first factor comes out the same either way. Chaudhry later argues that the specific length of delay is relevant to the analysis of the fourth factor—whether he suffered prejudice. However, under the facts of this case, we find that the prejudice factor weighs against him whether the delay is measured from 2009 or 2017 for reasons we will explain below. 17 USCA4 Appeal: 24-4471 Doc: 42 Filed: 12/16/2025 Pg: 18 of 36

B. Reason for the Delay

The heart of this case comes down to the second Barker factor—the reason for

delay. “On this factor, a reviewing court must carefully examine several issues, specifically

focusing on the intent of the prosecution.” Hall, 551 F.3d at 272. We must characterize the

reason for delay as either improper, neutral or valid. Id. On one end of this spectrum, it is

improper for the government to deliberately delay trial to frustrate the defense, and we

weigh those delays heavily against the government. Barker, 407 U.S. at 531. In the middle,

we weigh neutral reasons—which include the government’s negligence—against the

government but to a lesser degree than improper delays. Id. Finally, at the other end of the

spectrum, the government may present valid reasons to justify the delay. Id. These reasons,

if applicable, weigh in the government’s favor. Id. As already noted, the district court found

that the government presented valid reasons for the delay.

The parties disagree on how our standard of review operates when considering this

factor. The government argues that we review the district court’s conclusions on

reasonableness for clear error. In response, Chaudhry argues that the district court’s

reasonableness determination involves the legal import of undisputed facts, which he

contends we must review de novo. But we need not decide that question today because,

even if we assume Chaudhry is right, we conclude the government acted reasonably.13

13 To emphasize, we do not resolve the standard of review issue in this decision. Even so, a summary of how we have discussed it in the past, as well as related decisions from the Supreme Court and other circuits, may be helpful. At times, we have stated that we review a district court’s decision on all four Baker factors de novo. E.g., United States v. Robinson, 55 F.4th 390, 399 (4th Cir. 2022); see also Hall, 551 F.3d at 269–73 (reviewing a defendant’s Sixth Amendment speedy trial claim, among other issues, and 18 USCA4 Appeal: 24-4471 Doc: 42 Filed: 12/16/2025 Pg: 19 of 36

Challenging the district court’s determination, Chaudhry argues that the

government’s decade-long delay in requesting his extradition from Pakistan was either

deliberate or negligent and should weigh against the government. In essence, he asserts

three reasons for this conclusion. First, he argues that Pakistan’s prosecution of him is not,

by itself, a valid reason for delaying the United States’ prosecution because the United

States did not make a diligent, good-faith effort to seek his return for trial. While Chaudhry

concedes that another sovereign’s prosecution is often a valid reason for delay, he points

stating, “[w]e review de novo a properly preserved constitutional claim”). At other times, when reviewing a district court’s decision on a motion to dismiss an indictment on Sixth Amendment speedy trial grounds, we have reviewed legal conclusions de novo and questions of fact for clear error. E.g., Pair, 84 F.4th at 588; see also Woolfolk, 399 F.3d at 594, 597–98 (stating that “[w]e review the district court’s factual findings on a motion to dismiss an indictment for clear error, but we review its legal conclusion de novo” when reviewing a district court’s decision based on the Speedy Trial Act and then applying that same standard of review to its decision on the Sixth Amendment). For its part, the Supreme Court has instructed that, specifically when assessing the government’s reasonableness in this Sixth Amendment context, we are to give “considerable deference” to the district court’s determinations on negligence. Doggett, 505 U.S. at 652. And though we have never taken a position on what this “considerable deference” requires, every one of our sister circuits to have considered the issue have interpreted “considerable deference” as something akin to clear error review. See United States v. Cabral, 979 F.3d 150, 163 (2d Cir. 2020) (citing Doggett, 505 U.S. at 652, and reviewing the district court’s negligence determination for clear error); United States v. Scully, 951 F.3d 656, 670 (5th Cir. 2020) (same); United States v. Villarreal, 613 F.3d 1344, 1351 n.4 (11th Cir. 2010) (“We have articulated our standard for reviewing a district court’s findings about whether the government acted diligently variously as review for ‘clear error’ and review ‘with considerable deference.’ Under either articulation of the standard of review, the result in this case would be the same.” (citations omitted)); see also United States v. Heshelman, 521 F. App’x 501, 512 (6th Cir. 2013) (Clay, J., concurring) (“Considerable deference is not, however, a standard we frequently apply in connection with appellate review, but it would appear that in this context, considerable deference equates to clear error review, which is familiar.”); United States v. Velazquez, 749 F.3d 161, 187 n.1 (3d Cir. 2014) (Jordan, J., dissenting) (“There is a persuasive argument that the ‘considerable deference’ standard for the reasonable diligence determination is simply another way of saying ‘clearly erroneous review.’”). 19 USCA4 Appeal: 24-4471 Doc: 42 Filed: 12/16/2025 Pg: 20 of 36

out that the government did not seek extradition until after he served his sentence. He

argues it should have done so at the conclusion of the Pakistani prosecution. He further

argues that the Pakistani prosecution was “fraudulent” and “illegitima[te],” which

undermines the United States’ claim that there was a justifiable excuse for delay. Op. Br.

at 24. Second, Chaudhry argues that the United States’ repeated requests that Pakistan

deport him, rather than extradite him, were futile because of his Pakistani citizenship. Thus,

he contends that these efforts do not show that the United States made a good-faith effort

in securing his return. Finally, he argues that, despite Article Four of the Extradition Treaty

and the Pakistani court order, the United States could have requested extradition prior to

the end of his sentence, and its failure to do so means the government did not make diligent,

good-faith efforts to return him for trial.

We do not find these arguments persuasive. To explain why, we first address the

standard of reasonableness before considering whether the government’s actions met that

standard.

1. Standard of Government Reasonableness

In general, waiting for another sovereign to finish prosecuting a defendant is a valid

reason for delay. United States v. Grimmond, 137 F.3d 823, 828 (4th Cir. 1998); see also

Thomas, 55 F.3d at 150 (finding that allowing the defendant to be prosecuted in state court

without interference by the federal government was “an obvious additional reason for the

delay”). Still, Chaudhry is correct that another sovereign’s imprisonment of a defendant is

not alone sufficient to justify a delay in bringing the defendant to trial on pending charges.

See Smith v. Hooey, 393 U.S. 374, 382–83 (1969). Indeed, even in such circumstances, the

20 USCA4 Appeal: 24-4471 Doc: 42 Filed: 12/16/2025 Pg: 21 of 36

government has “a constitutional duty to make a diligent, good-faith effort” to secure the

defendant’s appearance in court for trial. Id. at 383.

While all appear to agree that the government can usually demonstrate that it has

met this burden by pursuing formal extradition, a formal extradition request is not required

to show diligent, good-faith efforts to secure a defendant’s return for trial. See, e.g., United

States v. Diacolios, 837 F.2d 79, 83 (2d Cir. 1988) (“Indeed, we are aware of no case that

holds that a formal request for extradition must be made before due diligence can be found

to have existed.”); see also United States v. Walton, 814 F.2d 376, 379 (7th Cir. 1987) (“No

case law holds . . . that a formal request for extradition must be made before due diligence

can be found to have existed for purposes of the Speedy Trial Act.”). For instance, the

government need not pursue formal extradition to demonstrate diligence when such an

effort would have been futile. Diacolios, 837 F.2d at 83–84. Likewise, the government is

not negligent simply because it could have pursued more aggressive means of securing a

defendant’s return. See United States v. Valencia-Quintana, 136 F. App’x 707, 709–10 (5th

Cir. 2005). Thus, the government may demonstrate it acted with reasonable diligence in

pursuing a defendant’s return through other efforts short of a formal extradition request.

See id.; see also Walton, 814 F.2d at 379–80 (finding that the government exercised due

diligence for Speedy Trial Act purposes by requesting the defendant’s return to the United

States through a series of informal exchanges).

2. Whether an Extradition Request Would Have Been Futile

Here, the government argues that it believed making a formal extradition request

before the completion of Chaudhry’s prison sentence would have been futile. The district

21 USCA4 Appeal: 24-4471 Doc: 42 Filed: 12/16/2025 Pg: 22 of 36

court found that determination to be reasonable. We find no error in the district court’s

conclusion.

Two considerations, in particular, lead us to accept the government’s futility

argument. First, Article Four of the Extradition Treaty indicates that an “extradition shall

not take place” if the person subject to the extradition request is currently facing trial for a

crime and that “extradition shall be deferred until the conclusion of the trial and the full

execution of any punishment awarded to him.” Extradition Treaty, art. IV (emphasis

added). The use of the word “shall” indicates a mandatory, rather than discretionary,

prohibition on the extradition of a prisoner before the completion of his sentence. See

Kingdomware Techs., Inc. v. United States, 579 U.S. 162, 171 (2016) (“Unlike the word

‘may,’ which implies discretion, the word ‘shall’ usually connotes a requirement.”); cf.

United States v. Pomeroy, 822 F.2d 718, 721–22 & n.7 (8th Cir. 1987).14 Thus, the plain

language of this treaty indicates that Pakistan would not have extradited Chaudhry prior to

the completion of his sentence.

14 In Pomeroy, the Eighth Circuit determined that the government violated a defendant’s speedy trial rights in failing to seek extradition. 822 F.2d at 721–22 & n.7. In contrast to the extradition treaty at issue in this case, the extradition treaty with Canada there used the word “may”:

When the person whose extradition is requested is being proceeded against or is serving a sentence in the territory of the requested State for an offense other than that for which extradition has been requested, his surrender may be deferred until the conclusion of the proceedings and the full execution of any punishment he may be or may have been awarded.

Id. at 721 n.7 (emphasis added) (citation omitted). 22 USCA4 Appeal: 24-4471 Doc: 42 Filed: 12/16/2025 Pg: 23 of 36

Chaudhry argues that, despite the treaty’s apparent mandatory language, Pakistan

still could have waived Article Four and extradited him prior to the completion of his

sentence. He notes that the United States declined to enforce a similar provision in its

extradition treaty with South Africa in Beukes v. Pizzi, 888 F. Supp. 465, 469 (E.D.N.Y.

1995). But we disagree that Beukes applies here. In Beukes, South Africa sought the

extradition of an individual who was, at the time, incarcerated by the United States Bureau

of Prisons. 888 F. Supp. at 467. The prisoner fought extradition, pointing to a provision in

the United States-South Africa extradition treaty, which stated a prisoner’s “extradition

shall be deferred until . . . the full execution of any punishment awarded to him.” Id. at 469

(alteration in original) (citation omitted). The court rejected the prisoner’s argument and

stated that only the United States had standing to enforce this prohibition in its extradition

treaty. Id. Thus, while the United States declined to enforce a similar provision in an

extradition treaty in Beukes, the issue there was who had standing to enforce an extradition

treaty, not whether the provision in the extradition treaty was mandatory or discretionary.

Besides, whether the United States previously declined to enforce such a provision in a

treaty with South Africa has no bearing on whether the United States correctly estimated

that Pakistan would seek to enforce a similar provision in its treaty with the United States.

Second, the history of the United States’ extradition requests to Pakistan also

supports the government’s futility argument. In nearly every instance the United States

made extradition requests to Pakistan in the past, those requests were not timely addressed,

were lost or destroyed or were ignored by the Pakistani government. Over the past fifteen

years, despite the United States making many requests to Pakistan, only three fugitives

23 USCA4 Appeal: 24-4471 Doc: 42 Filed: 12/16/2025 Pg: 24 of 36

have successfully been extradited from Pakistan, including Chaudhry after he consented to

extradition.15 Additionally, it was especially doubtful that Pakistan would have consented

to extradite Chaudhry prior to the expiration of his sentence given that a local court had

issued an order prohibiting his transfer to a foreign government, which remained in effect

through the expiration of Chaudhry’s prison sentence.

Considering this evidence, we find no error in the district court’s futility

determination.

3. Whether the Government Made Reasonably Diligent, Good Faith Efforts

In addition to finding that a formal extradition request likely would have been futile,

the district court found that the government made a reasonably diligent, good-faith effort

to secure Chaudhry’s return to the United States. Once again, we find no error in that

First, the Legal Attaché promptly informed Pakistan that the United States intended

to bring charges against Chaudhry just a few days after his arrest. Then, just a few days

after that, the Assistant Legal Attaché had a meeting with the Director General of

Pakistan’s National Crisis Management Center in which the Assistant Legal Attaché

requested Pakistan’s assistance in ensuring a quick and smooth transfer of Chaudhry to the

United States to face charges. It is true that, during that meeting, the Director General

15 During its hearing on Chaudhry’s motion, the district court asked if Pakistan had ever previously extradited an individual who was serving a sentence in a Pakistani prison. The government was unaware of that happening but could not say for certain whether either of the previous extraditions from Pakistan mentioned in Olson’s declaration involved prisoners serving sentences in Pakistani prisons at the time of extradition. 24 USCA4 Appeal: 24-4471 Doc: 42 Filed: 12/16/2025 Pg: 25 of 36

initially stated that Pakistan wanted the United States to request Chaudhry’s formal

extradition. However, when the Assistant Legal Attaché asked whether Pakistan would be

willing to deport Chaudhry and the other defendants, the Director General expressly stated

that deportation “was possible.” J.A. 114.

The fact that the Director General overtly indicated Pakistan’s potential willingness

to deport Chaudhry undermines Chaudhry’s position. Chaudhry argues that the

government was negligent in believing Pakistan would be willing to deport him rather than

extradite him because it would violate international and Pakistani law for Pakistan to deport

one of its own citizens. We disagree. We do not fault the United States for believing

Pakistan might deport Chaudhry at this point when Pakistani officials stated as much.

Chaudhry is effectively arguing that the United States was negligent for believing a foreign

government’s statements about its interpretation of its own laws. Certainly, there may be

instances when the United States should be suspicious of claims made in high-stakes

international negotiations and diplomacy. But Chaudhry misinterprets the government’s

burden. As we have stated, the government is not required to pursue every option available

to it to show it acted with reasonable diligence. See Valencia-Quintana, 136 F. App’x at

709–10; see also Walton, 814 F.2d at 379–80. Thus, despite the Director General stating

that Pakistan might prefer for the United States to pursue formal extradition, the United

States’ determination that deportation was possible, and perhaps even preferable, as of this

December 15, 2009 meeting was reasonable.

What’s more, the United States continued to make reasonable efforts to secure

Chaudhry’s return after that. The day after filing the criminal complaint against Chaudhry

25 USCA4 Appeal: 24-4471 Doc: 42 Filed: 12/16/2025 Pg: 26 of 36

in the district court, the United States moved for the court to unseal that criminal complaint

so that it could seek a Red Notice. Cf. United States v. Heshelman, 521 F. App’x 501, 506,

509–10 (6th Cir. 2013) (finding that the government did not make a diligent, good-faith

effort when it failed to seek a Red Notice). Also, that same day, the Legal Attaché informed

Pakistani officials about the charges against Chaudhry. She stated that the United States

was seeking Pakistan’s cooperation in returning Chaudhry to the United States. The United

States then formally requested Chaudhry’s deportation via the diplomatic note it

transmitted through its Embassy in Islamabad in January 2010.

Over the next several months, the United States made numerous efforts to reiterate

its concerns to Pakistani officials. Even after Chaudhry was convicted in Pakistan, the

Legal Attaché periodically checked in with Pakistani officials for status updates while

Chaudhry served his ten-year prison sentence. Finally, when Pakistan did state, for the first

time, that it would require the United States to pursue formal extradition on June 22, 2022,

the United States submitted a formal extradition request on November 12, 2022.

Challenging this evidence, Chaudhry relies on two out-of-circuit decisions—

Pomeroy and Heshelman—that held the government did not put forth reasonably diligent

efforts to secure the defendants’ return from abroad. But in those cases, the government

made virtually no effort, whether through formal extradition or otherwise, to return the

defendants to the United States for prosecution. Instead, in Pomeroy, the government held

the defendant’s extradition request “in abeyance” until the completion of his sentence in

Canada. 822 F.2d at 719. Similarly, in Heshelman, the United States sought neither

extradition nor a Red Notice, specifically out of hopes that the defendant would voluntarily

26 USCA4 Appeal: 24-4471 Doc: 42 Filed: 12/16/2025 Pg: 27 of 36

return to the United States. 521 F. App’x at 506, 508–09. In contrast, the government made

extensive efforts to repatriate Chaudhry.

Putting all this together, we affirm the district court’s determination that the United

States made reasonably diligent, good faith efforts to secure Chaudhry’s extradition to the

United States.

4. Chaudhry’s Pakistani Conviction

Finally, Chaudhry argues that his conviction in Pakistan was “fraudulent” and

“illegitima[te]” and contends that this undermines the government’s claim that the

Pakistani prosecution was an acceptable reason for delay. Op. Br. at 24. He contends that

he was convicted in Pakistan of planning attacks on Pakistani targets and that this

conviction was secured using falsified evidence manufactured by the Pakistani

government. He argues that it defies logic to justify the delay in seeking extradition based

on a “fraudulent” prison sentence when the government cannot produce evidence to

support the legitimacy of that sentence. Reply Br. at 10–11. The district court rejected this

argument, finding any alleged illegitimacy did not weigh against the government. We

agree.

Chaudhry’s argument on the alleged illegitimacy of the Pakistani prosecution is

confusing. First, the charges Chaudhry was convicted of in Pakistan—conspiring to

commit acts of terrorism in Pakistan and providing financial support to a terrorist

organization in Pakistan—appear to be similar to those he pled guilty to in the United

States. After all, Chaudhry stipulated that he approached Jaish-e-Mohammed in Pakistan

about his plans to engage in jihad, and he pled guilty in the United States to conspiring to

27 USCA4 Appeal: 24-4471 Doc: 42 Filed: 12/16/2025 Pg: 28 of 36

provide material support to that organization.16 If similar charges in Pakistan were, as

Chaudhry argues, illegitimate, is he saying the United States’ charges were defective as

well?

Second, even if Chaudhry were correct that his Pakistani prosecution was

illegitimate, we are not sure how this would help him here. If Pakistan went to the trouble

of fabricating evidence against Chaudhry to support a conviction, we see no reason why it

would then consent to extraditing him prior to the completion of the prison sentence

stemming from that conviction. If anything, this would seem to further demonstrate why it

would have been futile for the United States to request Chaudhry’s extradition prior to the

completion of his Pakistani prison sentence.

For these reasons, we agree with the district court that the government neither

deliberately delayed Chaudhry’s prosecution nor was it negligent in failing to seek

Chaudhry’s extradition before it did. As such, Chaudhry’s prosecution and subsequent

prison sentence in Pakistan justify the delay in proceedings against him in the United

States, and we agree with the district court’s analysis of this factor.

C. Chaudhry’s Assertion of His Rights

The third factor we must consider in assessing Chaudhry’s Sixth Amendment

challenge is the “timeliness and vigor” of Chaudhry’s assertion of his speedy trial rights.

See Hall, 551 F.3d at 271. In general, “[f]ailure to assert the right to a speedy trial, and

16 We also note that Chaudhry’s claim that the Pakistani prosecution was fraudulent is based mostly on news articles describing the charges against him and on speculative statements from his father’s declaration. 28 USCA4 Appeal: 24-4471 Doc: 42 Filed: 12/16/2025 Pg: 29 of 36

even the explicit waiver of that right, is not dispositive of a Sixth Amendment speedy-trial

claim.” Thomas, 55 F.3d at 150. Instead, this is one factor we consider based on the

circumstances of each individual case. Barker, 407 U.S. at 528. While a defendant bears

some responsibility in asserting his right to a speedy trial, the government ultimately faces

the burden of proving that a defendant’s waiver of that right was knowingly and voluntarily

made. Id. at 528–29.

In assessing this factor, we first consider the period between Chaudhry’s 2009

criminal complaint, when we assume Chaudhry’s speedy trial rights attached, and his

release from Pakistani prison on June 9, 2020. Chaudhry contends that, while imprisoned,

he did not know about the charges pending against him in the United States, and the

government does not challenge that assertion.17 We cannot fault Chaudhry for failing to

assert his speedy trial rights during this period when he did not know about the charges

pending against him. See Doggett, 505 U.S. at 653; see also United States v. Velazquez,

749 F.3d 161, 182–83 (3d Cir. 2014) (“Although the Doggett Court did not explicitly

announce that the defendant’s awareness of the indictment—rather than knowledge of

earlier events, such as an investigation or an arrest warrant—was the critical measuring

point, such a rule is consistent with longstanding principles governing a defendant’s speedy

trial rights.”).

The next relevant period is that between Chaudhry’s June 9, 2020 release from

Pakistani prison and his extradition to the United States on December 6, 2023. While it is

17 Chaudhry apparently did, however, ask if there were pending charges against him in the United States during a February 1, 2018 consular visit. 29 USCA4 Appeal: 24-4471 Doc: 42 Filed: 12/16/2025 Pg: 30 of 36

unclear when Chaudhry first learned of the charges pending against him in the United

States, his court-appointed defense counsel in the United States asserted that Chaudhry

intended to fight extradition from Pakistan as early as August 17, 2020, not long after he

was released from Pakistani prison. The United States presented Pakistan with a formal

extradition request on November 12, 2020, but Chaudhry was not re-arrested by Pakistani

authorities until August 17, 2022. He then spent roughly the next eleven months fighting

extradition in Pakistani courts. Thus, rather than asserting his right to a speedy trial,

Chaudhry did exactly the opposite—he sought to delay his return to the United States for

trial, possibly with plans to never return. As such, we find that Chaudhry was not diligent

in pursuing his speedy trial rights during this period. See In re Bramson, 107 F.3d 865 (4th

Cir. 1997) (unpublished table decision) (finding that the defendant was responsible for

delays in trial when the only reason for delay was the defendant fighting extradition);

United States v. Reumayr, 530 F. Supp. 2d 1200, 1206 n.6 (D.N.M. 2007) (“Courts have

recognized that a defendant resisting extradition, or otherwise avoiding attempts to bring

him to this country, is attempting to avoid going to trial at all in the United States. This is

the opposite of insisting on a speedy trial.”)

And finally, we consider the time after Chaudhry’s return to the United States on

December 6, 2023. Chaudhry was arraigned on December 12, 2023, and moved to dismiss

on Sixth Amendment speedy trial right grounds shortly thereafter on January 11, 2024.

From this, Chaudhry argues that he promptly asserted his rights to a speedy trial. Also,

while Chaudhry acknowledges that he consented to a single extension of Speedy Trial Act

deadlines, he argues that this should not be weighed against him because his Speedy Trial

30 USCA4 Appeal: 24-4471 Doc: 42 Filed: 12/16/2025 Pg: 31 of 36

Act rights are distinct from his rights under the Sixth Amendment. We agree that Chaudhry

was relatively prompt in asserting his Sixth Amendment speedy trial rights after his

arraignment and that consenting to a continuance on a single occasion does not doom a

defendant’s speedy trial claim. Cf. Barker, 407 U.S. at 534 (finding the defendant had not

diligently asserted his right by failing to object to 11 continuances). Chaudhry is also

correct that his rights under the Speedy Trial Act and the Sixth Amendment are distinct.

United States v. Gonzalez, 671 F.2d 441, 442 (11th Cir. 1982). But these rights are also

“obviously related.” Id. Thus, we find that Chaudhry’s waiver of his Speedy Trial Act

deadline does weigh against him, though not as much as a defendant who fails to object to

more than one continuance. See Barker, 407 U.S. at 534; Pair, 84 F.4th at 590 (weighing

the third Barker factor against a defendant who initially failed to object to trial

continuances).

On balance, while we do not fault Chaudhry for failing to assert his speedy trial

rights before learning of the charges against him, his subsequent conduct shows he was not

diligent in pursuing his rights. Indeed, Chaudhry tried to avoid trial from the moment he

learned of the charges pending against him.18 For this reason, we see no error in the district

court’s conclusion that this factor weighs against finding a Sixth Amendment violation.

18 Chaudhry insists that his speedy trial claim is focused only on the period during which he was imprisoned in Pakistan and that his subsequent conduct cannot be used to show he waived a challenge to the government’s negligence during that period. We take Chaudhry’s point that, had the government been negligent for his decade-long imprisonment, that might outweigh the much shorter period in which he failed to diligently assert his rights. See Velazquez, 749 F.3d at 181 n.19 (noting that a long period of government negligence outweighed a shorter period of government diligence for speedy 31 USCA4 Appeal: 24-4471 Doc: 42 Filed: 12/16/2025 Pg: 32 of 36

D. Prejudice

Finally, we turn to whether Chaudhry was prejudiced. “Prejudice, ‘while

not . . . essential to the establishment of a violation of the right, is a prime issue and a

critical factor.’” United States v. Lozano, 962 F.3d 773, 781 (4th Cir. 2020) (quoting Ricon

v. Garrison, 517 F.2d 628, 634 (4th Cir. 1975)). Courts must assess this factor based on

the interests the speedy trial right is designed to protect, including,

(i) to prevent oppressive pretrial incarceration; (ii) to minimize anxiety and concern of the accused; and (iii) to limit the possibility that the defense will be impaired. Of these, the most serious is the last, because the inability of a defendant adequately to prepare his case skews the fairness of the entire system.

Barker, 407 U.S. at 532. Thus, when a witness dies or disappears, prejudice to the defense

could be obvious because the defendant could not accurately remember the events. Id.

“Loss of memory, however, is not always reflected in the record because what has been

forgotten can rarely be shown.” Id.

The district court determined that this factor weighed against finding a Sixth

Amendment violation because Chaudhry made only vague assertions of harm, which are

insufficient to show actual prejudice. Chaudhry argues that this was in error. He contends

that we should reverse both because the district court failed to consider that he was

presumptively prejudiced and because he made a showing of actual prejudice.

Starting with Chaudhry’s argument on presumptive prejudice, the Supreme Court

has suggested that long periods of delay caused by the government’s negligence may cause

trial purposes). But, because the government was reasonably diligent in seeking to bring Chaudhry to trial while he was in a Pakistani prison, we disagree with his conclusion. 32 USCA4 Appeal: 24-4471 Doc: 42 Filed: 12/16/2025 Pg: 33 of 36

a presumption of prejudice and thereby relieve the defendant of needing to make a showing

of actual prejudice. Doggett, 505 U.S. at 658; accord United States v. Lloyd, 645 F. App’x

273, 278 (4th Cir. 2016) (“Negligence over a sufficiently long period can establish a

general presumption that the defendant’s ability to present a defense is impaired, meaning

that a defendant can prevail on his claim despite not having shown specific prejudice.”

(quoting Velazquez, 749 F.3d at 175)). Nevertheless, because the delay in this case was not

caused by government negligence, Chaudhry must show actual prejudice to carry his

burden on this factor.19 See Doggett, 505 U.S. at 656; United States v. Erenas-Luna, 560

F.3d 772, 778–79 (8th Cir. 2009). The district court, therefore, did not err by failing to

consider presumptive prejudice.

19 Recall from our discussion of the first factor that when we considered the length of delay, presumptive prejudice meant a delay was sufficiently long to trigger the rest of the Barker inquiry. Doggett, 505 U.S. at 652 n.1. Some courts have also interpreted the Supreme Court’s decision in Doggett to mean a defendant can be presumptively prejudiced for purposes of the fourth factor. See, e.g., United States v. Duran-Gomez, 984 F.3d 366, 379–80 (5th Cir. 2020); Velazquez, 749 F.3d at 184–86; United States v. Erenas-Luna, 560 F.3d 772, 778–79 (8th Cir. 2009). But, confusingly, in such cases the term “presumptive prejudice” has a different meaning when analyzing the fourth Barker factor than it does when analyzing the first Barker factor. United States v. Muhtorov, 20 F.4th 558, 653 n.81 (10th Cir. 2021). When analyzing the fourth factor, these courts presume prejudice when they find that the first three Barker factors weigh heavily against the government. E.g., Duran-Gomez, 984 F.3d at 379. Thus, the reason Chaudhry is so adamant that we credit his rights as attaching in 2009 instead of 2017 is because he believes it shows a long period during which the government was negligent—meaning he was presumptively prejudiced for purposes of the fourth factor. We are unaware of any reported case in which we have examined whether Doggett endorses this sort of burden shifting exercise on the fourth factor. But we need not opine on that today. Even if that is the case, presumptive prejudice, for purposes of the fourth factor, would require a long period of government negligence. See Doggett, 505 U.S. at 656; Erenas-Luna, 560 F.3d at 778–80. And because we find the government acted reasonably, Chaudhry was not presumptively prejudiced for purposes of this factor, making it unnecessary for us to further examine the specific length of delay. 33 USCA4 Appeal: 24-4471 Doc: 42 Filed: 12/16/2025 Pg: 34 of 36

Chaudhry next argues that he suffered actual prejudice for three reasons. First, he

contends that, because of the delay, he lost the opportunity to serve his U.S. and Pakistani

sentences concurrently. But Chaudhry has not provided any reason to suspect that he could

have served his sentences concurrently. See Lozano, 962 F.3d at 781 (“Lozano’s contention

that the delay cost him the opportunity to serve a concurrent sentence . . . is unavailing, as

the record doesn’t show a credible possibility that he would have received a concurrent

sentence . . . .”); see also Uribe-Rios, 558 F.3d at 358 (“[B]ecause there is no right to serve

state and federal sentences concurrently, an appellant’s lost chance of doing so cannot be

used to establish prejudice for the purposes of challenging pre-indictment delay.”). Beyond

that, Chaudhry received a time-served sentence predicated, in part, on the fact that he had

already served ten years in a Pakistani prison. Chaudhry has not been prejudiced by not

receiving a concurrent custodial sentence in the United States and Pakistan when he served

no custodial sentence in the United States.

Second, Chaudhry argues that he was forced to suffer inhumane prison conditions

in Pakistan. Yet his suffering those prison conditions cannot be attributed to the United

States and was not caused by the delay.20 See Grimmond, 137 F.3d at 830 (“When, as here,

20 Though Chaudhry does not specifically address the issue in his opening brief, the government argues in its response brief that Chaudhry cannot assert prejudice from the anxiety caused by the pending charges before he became aware of the charges in August 2020. In reply, Chaudhry retorts that he was prejudiced by the anxiety caused by speculating that charges might be brought against him in the United States. We agree with the government. We have previously held that a defendant who does not know about pending charges cannot argue he was prejudiced about anxiety suffered as a result of those charges. See Lozano, 962 F.3d at 781; Lloyd, 645 F. App’x at 278 n.5. Thus, even if Chaudhry had made this argument initially, it would not be a reason to determine he suffered actual prejudice. 34 USCA4 Appeal: 24-4471 Doc: 42 Filed: 12/16/2025 Pg: 35 of 36

a defendant is lawfully incarcerated for reasons not related to the pending charges and

makes no credible showing that either his present or potential sentence will be substantially

affected by the delay, we hold that there is simply no way the pretrial incarceration can be

deemed oppressive.” (citation omitted)); United States v. Ghailani, 733 F.3d 29, 50–51 (2d

Cir. 2013) (finding the conditions of detention for a defendant detained by the CIA before

trial were not relevant to his Sixth Amendment claim because he “would have been

detained by the CIA for the purpose of obtaining information whether or not he was

awaiting trial, and the conditions of his detention were a product of the CIA’s investigation,

not incarceration as a prelude to trial”); see also United States v. Woodley, 484 F. App’x

310, 319–20 (11th Cir. 2012) (“Woodley’s conclusory assertions of unsanitary prison

conditions and inability to access a law library, without more, are insufficient to establish

actual prejudice.”).

Third, Chaudhry argues that the delay impaired his ability to mount a defense

because, during those ten years, one of his co-defendants, Yemer, suffered a severe mental

breakdown and could no longer serve as a witness. It is true that the Supreme Court has

stressed that impairments in a defendant’s ability to assert a defense due to witness death

or memory loss is a “serious” concern. See Barker, 407 U.S. at 532. But Chaudhry has not

identified what Yemer would have testified on or even if that testimony would have been

exculpatory. Without any additional information, Chaudhry’s vague and speculatory

assertions of harm are insufficient to demonstrate actual prejudice. See United States v.

Lewis, 116 F.4th 1144, 1167 (10th Cir. 2024) (“Even where a defense witness has died,

this court has still declined to find prejudice because the defendant could not ‘state[] with

35 USCA4 Appeal: 24-4471 Doc: 42 Filed: 12/16/2025 Pg: 36 of 36

particularity . . . what exculpatory testimony would have been offered.’” (alterations in

original) (quoting United States v. Tranakos, 911 F.2d 1422, 1429 (10th Cir. 1990))), cert.

denied, 145 S. Ct. 1110 (2025); United States v. Bass, 460 F.3d 830, 838 (6th Cir. 2006)

(finding that a defendant’s assertions of prejudice were “vague and unsupported” when the

defendant “d[id] not state what testimony any missing witnesses could have provided,

which witnesses’ memories were affected, or how his own memory problems affected his

defense”); United States v. Koller, 956 F.2d 1408, 1414 (7th Cir. 1992) (“[The defendant’s]

general allegation that his witnesses’ memories faded during the delay does not rise to the

level of specificity required to show actual prejudice.”).

Consequently, because we find that Chaudhry was neither presumptively nor

actually prejudiced in this case, we affirm the district court’s finding that the fourth Barker

factor weighs against Chaudhry.

III. CONCLUSION

In sum, the length of the delay weighs in favor of finding that Chaudhry’s Sixth

Amendment speedy trial rights were violated. Even so, because of the extent to which the

remaining three Barker factors weigh against that finding, the judgment of the district court

is,

AFFIRMED.