NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION File Name: 26a0008n.06
Case No. 25-5141
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT FILED Jan 06, 2026 KELLY L. STEPHENS, Clerk ) UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ) Plaintiff-Appellee, ) ) ON APPEAL FROM THE v. ) UNITED STATES DISTRICT ) COURT FOR THE WESTERN UDELL CARROLL, III, ) DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE Defendant-Appellant. ) ) OPINION
Before: COLE, MATHIS, and HERMANDORFER, Circuit Judges.
COLE, Circuit Judge. A law enforcement officer stopped Udell Carroll, III, for speeding.
After Carroll admitted he possessed marijuana, officers searched his car and uncovered marijuana,
methamphetamine, and a firearm. Carroll, acting pro se, requested Criminal Justice Act (CJA)
funds to hire an investigator. The district court denied his request without holding a hearing on
the motion. Carroll appeals the denial, and in the alternative, argues the district court abused its
discretion by failing to hold an evidentiary hearing regarding his request. For the reasons below,
we affirm.
I.
On November 19, 2021, Carroll was traveling on Interstate 40. An agent of the West
Tennessee Violent Crimes and Drug Task Force, Andre Nash, stopped Carroll in Fayette County,
Tennessee, for speeding. Nash asked Carroll some questions, including whether he had anything
illegal in his car. In response, Carroll admitted that he had an eighth of marijuana, prompting Nash No. 25-5141, United States v. Carroll
and another officer to search the car. They discovered marijuana and methamphetamine. Officers
towed the car and through an inventory search, later uncovered a firearm in the trunk.
A grand jury indicted Carroll for possession of a firearm by a felon, in violation of
18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1); possession with the intent to distribute methamphetamine, in violation of
21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1); and possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug-trafficking crime, in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). The district court appointed counsel, who moved to suppress the
evidence discovered in Carroll’s car. Meanwhile, Carroll, acting pro se, filed a letter with the court
asserting that the video of the stop had been edited. The magistrate judge held a hearing on the
motion to suppress.
Soon after, Carroll moved to withdraw counsel and proceed pro se. Carroll also moved
pro se to suppress the evidence seized from the search of his car, to set aside or reopen the
suppression hearing, and for funding to hire an investigator under 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(e)(1). In his
various filings, Carroll asserted that the footage of the stop was altered to remove five minutes of
the encounter.
The district court granted Carroll’s motion to proceed pro se but denied his motion for
funding to hire an investigator because Carroll was represented by counsel at the time of filing.
As Carroll would be proceeding pro se moving forward, the district court instructed Carroll that
he could refile his motion so long as his effort to obtain investigative services was reasonable and
necessary. Carroll renewed his request for funding to hire an investigator, but the district court
again denied his request. He also requested a second suppression hearing on the body camera
footage, arguing that the government had not “turn[ed] over all unredacted footage[.]” (Letter, R.
68, PageID 290.)
-2- No. 25-5141, United States v. Carroll
In the meantime, the magistrate judge issued a report and recommendation, recommending
the district court deny the motion to suppress filed by counsel. The magistrate judge also addressed
Carroll’s pro se contention that the video had been altered, finding “there is no evidence to indicate
that the video has been altered.” (R. & R., R. 50, PageID 112 n.1.) Carroll objected to the report
and recommendation, arguing in part that five minutes of the stop were missing from the body
camera footage. The district court nonetheless adopted the report and recommendation and denied
the motion to suppress. Responding to Carroll’s claim that the body camera footage had been
altered, the district court noted that it had “reviewed the record, including the video, as well as
supporting testimony” and found “no evidence to indicate improper alteration.” (Order Adopting
R. & R., R. 71, PageID 305.)
The district court, on the government’s motion, dismissed the firearm-related charges, and
the case proceeded to trial on only the possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine count.
Following trial, a jury found Carroll guilty. Carroll again moved for investigative funding and to
exclude improper evidence. The district court denied both motions, reasoning that the motion for
investigative services sought to “relitigate the bodycam video’s admissibility” and “would not
contribute anything at Carroll’s sentencing.” (Order, R. 165, PageID 966, 967.) The district court
imposed a custodial sentence of 200 months. Carroll timely appeals.
II.
Carroll argues the district court abused its discretion by denying his request for funding for
an investigator, or in the alternative, by failing to hold an evidentiary hearing on this claim. For
its part, the government argues the district court did not abuse its discretion, and even if there was
any error, it was harmless. Because we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion,
we need not review for harmless error.
-3- No. 25-5141, United States v. Carroll
We review both a district court’s denial of a request to authorize funds for investigatory
services and a district court’s decision not to conduct an evidentiary hearing for an abuse of
discretion. See, e.g., United States v. Gilmore, 282 F.3d 398, 406 (6th Cir. 2002) (denial of
18 U.S.C. § 3006A(e)(1) motion); Williams v. Bagley, 380 F.3d 932, 977 (6th Cir. 2004) (refusal
to conduct evidentiary hearing). A district court abuses its discretion by applying the incorrect
legal standard, misapplying the correct legal standard, or relying on clearly erroneous factual
findings. Bojicic v. DeWine, 145 F.4th 668, 670–71 (6th Cir. 2025).
A.
We first examine whether the district court abused its discretion by denying Carroll’s
18 U.S.C. § 3006A(e)(1) motion for funding. Carroll thrice sought funding for investigative
services. The district court denied all three requests. Carroll discusses only the second denial in
his argument. We limit our analysis accordingly.
In his second § 3006A(e)(1) motion, Carroll requested funds to enlist the help of an
investigator to obtain a timestamped dispatch radio log from the traffic stop, an unaltered
preliminary hearing transcript, and a chain of custody receipt for the body camera footage. He
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NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION File Name: 26a0008n.06
Case No. 25-5141
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT FILED Jan 06, 2026 KELLY L. STEPHENS, Clerk ) UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ) Plaintiff-Appellee, ) ) ON APPEAL FROM THE v. ) UNITED STATES DISTRICT ) COURT FOR THE WESTERN UDELL CARROLL, III, ) DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE Defendant-Appellant. ) ) OPINION
Before: COLE, MATHIS, and HERMANDORFER, Circuit Judges.
COLE, Circuit Judge. A law enforcement officer stopped Udell Carroll, III, for speeding.
After Carroll admitted he possessed marijuana, officers searched his car and uncovered marijuana,
methamphetamine, and a firearm. Carroll, acting pro se, requested Criminal Justice Act (CJA)
funds to hire an investigator. The district court denied his request without holding a hearing on
the motion. Carroll appeals the denial, and in the alternative, argues the district court abused its
discretion by failing to hold an evidentiary hearing regarding his request. For the reasons below,
we affirm.
I.
On November 19, 2021, Carroll was traveling on Interstate 40. An agent of the West
Tennessee Violent Crimes and Drug Task Force, Andre Nash, stopped Carroll in Fayette County,
Tennessee, for speeding. Nash asked Carroll some questions, including whether he had anything
illegal in his car. In response, Carroll admitted that he had an eighth of marijuana, prompting Nash No. 25-5141, United States v. Carroll
and another officer to search the car. They discovered marijuana and methamphetamine. Officers
towed the car and through an inventory search, later uncovered a firearm in the trunk.
A grand jury indicted Carroll for possession of a firearm by a felon, in violation of
18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1); possession with the intent to distribute methamphetamine, in violation of
21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1); and possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug-trafficking crime, in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). The district court appointed counsel, who moved to suppress the
evidence discovered in Carroll’s car. Meanwhile, Carroll, acting pro se, filed a letter with the court
asserting that the video of the stop had been edited. The magistrate judge held a hearing on the
motion to suppress.
Soon after, Carroll moved to withdraw counsel and proceed pro se. Carroll also moved
pro se to suppress the evidence seized from the search of his car, to set aside or reopen the
suppression hearing, and for funding to hire an investigator under 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(e)(1). In his
various filings, Carroll asserted that the footage of the stop was altered to remove five minutes of
the encounter.
The district court granted Carroll’s motion to proceed pro se but denied his motion for
funding to hire an investigator because Carroll was represented by counsel at the time of filing.
As Carroll would be proceeding pro se moving forward, the district court instructed Carroll that
he could refile his motion so long as his effort to obtain investigative services was reasonable and
necessary. Carroll renewed his request for funding to hire an investigator, but the district court
again denied his request. He also requested a second suppression hearing on the body camera
footage, arguing that the government had not “turn[ed] over all unredacted footage[.]” (Letter, R.
68, PageID 290.)
-2- No. 25-5141, United States v. Carroll
In the meantime, the magistrate judge issued a report and recommendation, recommending
the district court deny the motion to suppress filed by counsel. The magistrate judge also addressed
Carroll’s pro se contention that the video had been altered, finding “there is no evidence to indicate
that the video has been altered.” (R. & R., R. 50, PageID 112 n.1.) Carroll objected to the report
and recommendation, arguing in part that five minutes of the stop were missing from the body
camera footage. The district court nonetheless adopted the report and recommendation and denied
the motion to suppress. Responding to Carroll’s claim that the body camera footage had been
altered, the district court noted that it had “reviewed the record, including the video, as well as
supporting testimony” and found “no evidence to indicate improper alteration.” (Order Adopting
R. & R., R. 71, PageID 305.)
The district court, on the government’s motion, dismissed the firearm-related charges, and
the case proceeded to trial on only the possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine count.
Following trial, a jury found Carroll guilty. Carroll again moved for investigative funding and to
exclude improper evidence. The district court denied both motions, reasoning that the motion for
investigative services sought to “relitigate the bodycam video’s admissibility” and “would not
contribute anything at Carroll’s sentencing.” (Order, R. 165, PageID 966, 967.) The district court
imposed a custodial sentence of 200 months. Carroll timely appeals.
II.
Carroll argues the district court abused its discretion by denying his request for funding for
an investigator, or in the alternative, by failing to hold an evidentiary hearing on this claim. For
its part, the government argues the district court did not abuse its discretion, and even if there was
any error, it was harmless. Because we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion,
we need not review for harmless error.
-3- No. 25-5141, United States v. Carroll
We review both a district court’s denial of a request to authorize funds for investigatory
services and a district court’s decision not to conduct an evidentiary hearing for an abuse of
discretion. See, e.g., United States v. Gilmore, 282 F.3d 398, 406 (6th Cir. 2002) (denial of
18 U.S.C. § 3006A(e)(1) motion); Williams v. Bagley, 380 F.3d 932, 977 (6th Cir. 2004) (refusal
to conduct evidentiary hearing). A district court abuses its discretion by applying the incorrect
legal standard, misapplying the correct legal standard, or relying on clearly erroneous factual
findings. Bojicic v. DeWine, 145 F.4th 668, 670–71 (6th Cir. 2025).
A.
We first examine whether the district court abused its discretion by denying Carroll’s
18 U.S.C. § 3006A(e)(1) motion for funding. Carroll thrice sought funding for investigative
services. The district court denied all three requests. Carroll discusses only the second denial in
his argument. We limit our analysis accordingly.
In his second § 3006A(e)(1) motion, Carroll requested funds to enlist the help of an
investigator to obtain a timestamped dispatch radio log from the traffic stop, an unaltered
preliminary hearing transcript, and a chain of custody receipt for the body camera footage. He
also requested the investigator follow up on “the inconsistencies with the video evidence[.]” (Mot.
for Expert Funding, R. 61, PageID 262.) He sought these funds under the CJA, which permits an
indigent defendant to petition a court for federal funds to obtain investigative, expert, or other
necessary services. 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(e)(1).
A district court may authorize payment of such funds if a defendant demonstrates “that (1)
such services are necessary to mount a plausible defense, and (2) without such authorization, the
defendant’s case would be prejudiced.” Gilmore, 282 F.3d at 406. A district court, however, need
-4- No. 25-5141, United States v. Carroll
not grant a § 3006A(e)(1) motion “on the off chance that the requested services might turn up
something.” Id.
The district court denied Carroll’s request, concluding that he failed to “demonstrate[] that
funding for an investigator is necessary to mount a plausible defense, or that his case will be
prejudiced without such authorization.” (Order, R. 70, PageID 295.) The court added that Carroll
failed to describe “in any detail” how the requested materials would impact his ability to defend
himself and advanced only general speculations about inconsistencies in the case. (Id.) We agree.
Carroll failed to sufficiently explain how the investigative services would benefit his
defense. In his motion, Carroll asserted that the records were “pertinent to [his] defense[,]” that
he had “grave concerns with the integrity of [his] case[,]” and that “[t]here are numerous
inconsistencies in this matter.” (Mot. for Expert Funding, R. 61, PageID 262–64.) He contended
that the evidence was “necessary to support his theory of defense.” (Id. at PageID 264.) But he
failed to identify the alleged inconsistencies or state what the log and chain of custody may show
and how they could impact his ability to defend himself.
On appeal, Carroll argues the footage would have changed the outcome of the suppression
decision and undermined Nash’s credibility during cross-examination at trial. He claims the
missing footage would show that at the beginning of the stop, Nash told him “that he had ‘cleared’
the rental car before approaching him, that [Nash] needed to ‘run’ [Carroll’s] name and then he
would be free to leave, and then informed Carroll that he checked out with no warrants, but that
[Nash] needed more information on the vehicle.” (Appellant Br. 15 (quoting Letter, R. 68, PageID
290).)
Carroll, however, did not raise the missing footage in his second motion for investigative
services, nor did he identify that the requested services could change the suppression outcome or
-5- No. 25-5141, United States v. Carroll
assist in cross-examination. Rather, he made these arguments in a letter to the court nearly two
months after moving for investigative funding. Nowhere in the letter did Carroll mention his need
for investigative services; instead, he seemingly requested a second suppression hearing “to vet
out the truth.” (Letter, R. 68, PageID 290.) We thus cannot conclude that the district court abused
its discretion by denying a motion that “consisted of only general averments that he required
[investigative services] to aid in his defense and did not specify what he expected the [investigator]
to find.” See United States v. Darwich, 574 F. App’x 582, 594–95 (6th Cir. 2014).
B.
We next consider Carroll’s claim that the district court abused its discretion by failing to
hold an evidentiary hearing on his § 3006A(e)(1) motion. Section 3006A(e)(1) provides: “Upon
finding, after appropriate inquiry in an ex parte proceeding, that the services are necessary and that
the person is financially unable to obtain them, the court . . . shall authorize counsel to obtain the
services.” 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(e)(1). It appears to remain an open question in this court whether
a hearing is statutorily required under § 3006A(e)(1). See United States v. Robinson, 95 F.3d 1153,
1996 WL 490379, at *11 (6th Cir. 1996) (per curiam) (unpublished table decision). But Carroll
does not raise this issue, so we need not consider it now.
Rather, citing United States v. Shields, 850 F. App’x 406, 409–10 (6th Cir. 2021), Carroll
contends that when a defendant puts forth a nonfrivolous claim, a district court should hold an
evidentiary hearing to resolve any factual disputes. But Shields involved a double jeopardy claim
and applied this court’s “general rule” requiring evidentiary hearings when a defendant asserts a
nonfrivolous claim of double jeopardy. Id. (quoting In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 797 F.2d 1377,
1385 (6th Cir. 1986)). This court, however, has not held that denial of a § 3006A(e)(1) motion
requires such a hearing.
-6- No. 25-5141, United States v. Carroll
Even if we were to apply this rule in the § 3006A(e)(1) context, we would nonetheless
conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying a hearing here. A defendant
is generally not entitled to an evidentiary hearing without “mak[ing] at least some initial showing
of contested facts[.]” United States v. Giacalone, 853 F.2d 470, 483 (6th Cir. 1988). As discussed
above, Carroll did not make any such showing in his § 3006A(e)(1) motion.
We accordingly conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to
hold an evidentiary hearing on Carroll’s § 3006A(e)(1) motion.
III.
For these reasons, we affirm.
-7-