United States v. Tyquell Alexander
Opinion
In the
United States Court of Appeals For the Seventh Circuit
No. 22-2802 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
TYQUELL ALEXANDER, Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.
No. 21 CR 190 — John J. Tharp, Jr., Judge.
ARGUED JULY 12, 2023 — DECIDED AUGUST 11, 2023
Before SYKES, Chief Judge, and ROVNER and WOOD, Circuit Judges.
ROVNER, Circuit Judge. ȱĜȱĴȱ¢ȱ¡Ȭ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ǰȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ scene, apprehended and frisked him, and found the gun ȱȱȱ ǯȱ¡ǰȱ ȱ ȱcharged with ȱȱęȱȱȱǰȱŗŞȱǯǯǯȱȗ 922(g)(1), moved ȱ ȱ ȱ ęȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ cause. The district court denied the motion. Because the 2 No. 22-2802
Ĝȱ ȱ¡ȱ ȱȱȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ suspiciousl¢ȱ ȱ¢ȱȱȱȱǰȱ ȱĜǯȱ Late one night in October 2020, ShotSpotter devices 1 alerted the Chicago Police Department to possible gunshots ȱȱŚŚŖŖȱȱȱȱȱ ¢, on Chicago’s west side. Police officers began ȱ ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ Ȭ mote-controlled surveillance cameras called Police Observation Devices. These camerasǰȱ ȱȱȱ¢ȱȬ sitioned in high-crime locations, enabled police to watch a large group congregating on that block. The monitoring officers saw ȱȱȱȱȱȱ¡ǯȱ¡ȱȱthe gun ¢ȱȱ¡¢ȱȱȱȱȱ it in his front waistband. The officers who saw the hand-off ȱȱȱǯȱȱ¢ȱǰȱ¡ȱȱȱ opposite direction. He then stepped behind a man standing alongside him and moved toward a metal fence that blocked ȱȱ ¢ȱȱȱ. He pushed against the fence but ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ he officers, who handcuffed and frisked him. One officer felt an L-shaped object in ¡Ȃȱ ȱȱȱȱȱǯȱȱȬ ȱȱ¡ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ the police station.
¡ȱ ȱȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȬ ȱȱȱȱ¢ǯȱŗŞȱǯǯǯȱȗ 922(g)(1). He moved to ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ǰȱ
1 ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ȱ
noises suggestive of gunshots. “The Chicago Police Department’s Use of ȱ ¢ǰȄȱ THE CITY OF CHICAGO OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL, at 4 (Aug. 24, 2021), https://igchicago.org/wp-content/uploads /2021/08/Chicago-Police-Departments-Use-of-ShotSpotter-Technol- ¢ǯ (archived at https://perma.cc/XG4C-WMKC).
No. 22-2802 3
arguing that the officers’ knowledge that he possessed a gun before their arrival did not establish probable cause that he committed or was committing a crime. The government re- ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ¢ȱ stop was reasonable suspicion—a standard that justified stopping and frisking ¡ȱȱȱ ShotSpotter alert, his open possession of a gun, and his evasive actions when the officers arrived.
ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ¡Ȃȱ ǯȱ ǰȱ ȱ ȱȱȱȱȱ¡Ȃȱ£—whether ȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ¢ȱ ȱȱ¢ȱȱ—and settled upon ȱȱȱȱȱ ȱ ȱ¢ȱȱ¡Ȭ ander that he possessed a gun. The judge then determined ȱȱȱ¡ǰȱȱbecause ȱ¡Ȃȱe possession of a gun, but for two other reasons. First, the officers saw that ¡ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ Ȭ ȱ¢ȱǰȱŝŘŖȱILCS 5/24-1(a)(10)(iv), when he carried an unconcealed ȱȱȱȱ ǯȱǰȱ¡Ȭ ander tried to ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ scene after a suspicious handoff just minutes earlier.
¡ȱȱȱȱȱȱǰȱsee FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(a)(2), preserving his right to appeal the ruling on his motion to suppress. The judge sentenced him to ȱ¢ȱȱǯ ¡ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ Ȭ press. As a ¢ȱmatter, it is not obvious at which point ¡ȱ ȱ ǻǯǯǰȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ £ȱ ȱ ǰȱȱǰȱ ȱ¢ȱransported him to the police station) andǰȱ¢ǰ whether the officers’ conduct should ȱ¢£ under a probable cause or reasonable suspicion 4 No. 22-2802
standard. But the government contends that the standard is immaterial because the officers “possessed both probable cause (as the district judge concluded) and reasonable suspi- ȱȱǰȱǰȱȱȄȱ¡ǯȱ the parties and district judge all evaluated whether there was probable ȱ ȱ ȱ ¡ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ frisked him, and probable cause is the more demanding ǰȱ ȱȱ¢£ȱ ȱȱȱȱȱ cause.
A warrantless arrest is valid under the Fourth Amend-
ȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȱ¢ȱȱǯȱDistrict of Columbia v. Wesby, 138 ǯȱǯȱśŝŝǰȱśŞŜȱǻŘŖŗŞǼǯ Probable cause ¡Ȭ ists, in turn, when ȱ¢ȱȱ—with the same information ȱ¢ȱȱȱ—would believe there ȱȱ¢ȱ ȱȱȱȱȱ ¢. Id. When reviewing the denial of a motion to suppress , we review the judge’s legal determination of probable cause de novo and the judge’s factual findings for clear error. Ornelas v. United StatesǰȱśŗŝȱǯǯȱŜşŖǰȱŜşşȱǻŗşşŜǼDzȱUnited States v. Key, 889 ǯřȱşŗŖǰȱşŗŘȱǻŝȱǯȱŘŖŗŞǼǯ ¡ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱȱȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȱȱt ȱȱȱȱ ¢ǯȱȱȱȱȱȱ more important, broader point. Even if—ȱ ¡ȱ Ȭ gues—the officers did not know that he ȱȱ¢ȱȬ tion or lacked a concealed-¢ȱ ǰȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ȱ cause to believe that he broke Illinois law, that is, the Illinois ȱȱ¢ȱ. That Act allows a person with ȱȱȱ¢ȱa ȱȱȱȱȱ¢ȱȱit is “com- ¢ȱȱ¢ȱȱȱ ǰȄȱŚřŖȱILCS ŜŜȦśǰȱŜŜȦŗŖDzȱ
No. 22-2802 5
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