NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT ____________
No. 24-1762 ____________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
TYLEE BROWN, Appellant ____________
On Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania (D.C. Crim. No. 3:20-cr-00262-001) District Judge: Honorable Robert D. Mariani ____________
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) June 16, 2025 ____________
Before: CHAGARES, Chief Judge, MONTGOMERY-REEVES and McKEE, Circuit Judges
(Filed: August 12, 2025) ____________
OPINION* ____________
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and, pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7, does not constitute binding precedent. CHAGARES, Chief Judge.
Tylee Brown moved to suppress evidence found during the search of a vehicle in
which he was a passenger. Brown argues that the police violated his Fourth Amendment
rights not only when officers detained him outside the vehicle, but also when they later
stopped the car, prolonged the stop, and searched the car. For the reasons below, we will
affirm the judgment of the District Court.
I.
We write primarily for the parties and so recite only those facts pertinent to our
decision. Police officers were investigating a rural lot in Susquehanna County,
Pennsylvania after receiving a report for stolen property allegedly located at the lot. As
the officers entered the lot, where it was raining heavily, a Volkswagen sedan pulled up
to the driveway. The driver of the vehicle, Edwin Blaisure, exited and spoke to the
officers. They discovered that Blaisure had an active arrest warrant out of New York,
prompting the officers to take him into custody.
As the officers arrested Blaisure, another vehicle arrived on the scene. A Chrysler
sedan with heavily tinted windows approached the driveway, but then abruptly stopped,
backed up, and became stuck in the mud along the roadway. The front-seat passenger,
Brown, then exited the vehicle and began pushing it from behind. After this unsuccessful
attempt to dislodge the car, Brown ran into the wooded area surrounding the lot,
unbeknownst to the officers as they approached the Chrysler. When the officers
eventually realized Brown’s flight, they pursued and apprehended him. Brown explained
that he ran because he was on parole and had marijuana in his possession, which he said
2 he discarded into the woods. The officers did not locate any marijuana and began
escorting Brown back to the lot in handcuffs.
Other officers, meanwhile, were questioning the remaining occupants of the
Chrysler. The driver and owner of the vehicle, Heriberto Delmoral, stated that he came
from Philadelphia to the lot to have his car mirrors repaired. Delmoral also explained
that Brown paid him $200 to drive him to the lot, where one of Brown’s vehicles was
being painted. Neither Delmoral nor the other occupants of the vehicle, Alisha Blye and
her young child, had physical identification in their possession. The questioning officer
observed that the journey from Philadelphia to the rural lot would have taken five hours
round-trip. The officer also noticed that Delmoral was winking and nodding at him as
they were speaking, which the officer found “extremely” unusual. Appendix (“App.”)
132.
Brown and the officers then returned to the lot. The officers conducted a pat-
down of Brown, noting to him that he “ran for no reason.” App. 19. The pat-down
uncovered two cellphones in Brown’s possession, which the officers associated with
trafficking of contraband. During the pat-down, the officers also asked Brown about the
rather long route for customary car repairs. Brown responded that he knew the lot owner
and had left another car, a Range Rover, to be repaired as well, but officers could not
locate any Range Rover on the premises. Brown also clarified that his travel originated
in Norristown (a suburb of Philadelphia) and included a stop in Scranton before their
arrival to the lot.
3 The officers, suspecting that the Chrysler contained contraband, asked Delmoral
for consent to search the car, which he refused. The police then called for a canine unit to
inspect the vehicle, which arrived forty minutes later. The drug-sniffing dog, Khan,
alerted the handler twice as they inspected the car, indicating the presence of controlled
substances. The officers searched the car, finding a tote bag containing crystal
methamphetamine in the trunk. Brown, Delmoral, and Blye were arrested.
A federal grand jury indicted Brown for conspiring to distribute and to possess
with intent to distribute more than 500 grams of methamphetamine, as well as possessing
with intent to distribute more than 500 grams of methamphetamine. Brown moved to
suppress the evidence obtained from the Chrysler, arguing that the police lacked
reasonable suspicion to detain him or the vehicle, improperly prolonged the stop to
investigate other crimes, and had no probable cause to search the car. Brown also sought
to suppress his statements from the day of his arrest, which he said contravened Miranda
v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
The District Court granted in part and denied in part his motion. It first held that
Brown lacked Fourth Amendment standing to challenge the vehicle’s detention and
search and that reasonable suspicion supported Brown’s detention. The only police
action that implicated Brown’s privacy interests was his detention in the woods,
according to the District Court, but reasonable suspicion supported his detention. The
District Court also held that even if Brown had standing as to the stop and search of the
vehicle, those investigatory actions would not have violated the Fourth Amendment
either. The District Court lastly held that because Brown was subject to custodial
4 interrogation during his initial detention, his un-Mirandized statements about his
marijuana possession and parole status were inadmissible. But the District Court noted
that this conclusion did not affect the admissibility of any physical evidence recovered at
the scene.
Brown then entered into a conditional plea agreement, reserving the right to appeal
the denial of his motion to suppress. The District Court sentenced him to 228 months of
imprisonment. Brown timely appealed.
II.1
A.
The District Court concluded that reasonable suspicion justified the initial
detention of the Chrysler, and probable cause supported the ensuing search. We agree.
Assessing reasonable suspicion requires considering the “totality of the circumstances to
determine whether ‘the detaining officers . . . [had] a particularized and objective basis
for suspecting the particular person stopped of criminal activity.’” United States v.
Johnson, 592 F.3d 442, 448–49 (3d Cir. 2010) (alteration in original) (quoting United
States v. Brown, 448 F.3d 239, 246 (3d Cir. 2006)). And “a dog’s positive alert while
sniffing the exterior of the car provides an officer with the probable cause necessary to
search the car without a warrant.” United States v. Pierce, 622 F.3d 209, 213 (3d Cir.
2010).
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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT ____________
No. 24-1762 ____________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
TYLEE BROWN, Appellant ____________
On Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania (D.C. Crim. No. 3:20-cr-00262-001) District Judge: Honorable Robert D. Mariani ____________
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) June 16, 2025 ____________
Before: CHAGARES, Chief Judge, MONTGOMERY-REEVES and McKEE, Circuit Judges
(Filed: August 12, 2025) ____________
OPINION* ____________
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and, pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7, does not constitute binding precedent. CHAGARES, Chief Judge.
Tylee Brown moved to suppress evidence found during the search of a vehicle in
which he was a passenger. Brown argues that the police violated his Fourth Amendment
rights not only when officers detained him outside the vehicle, but also when they later
stopped the car, prolonged the stop, and searched the car. For the reasons below, we will
affirm the judgment of the District Court.
I.
We write primarily for the parties and so recite only those facts pertinent to our
decision. Police officers were investigating a rural lot in Susquehanna County,
Pennsylvania after receiving a report for stolen property allegedly located at the lot. As
the officers entered the lot, where it was raining heavily, a Volkswagen sedan pulled up
to the driveway. The driver of the vehicle, Edwin Blaisure, exited and spoke to the
officers. They discovered that Blaisure had an active arrest warrant out of New York,
prompting the officers to take him into custody.
As the officers arrested Blaisure, another vehicle arrived on the scene. A Chrysler
sedan with heavily tinted windows approached the driveway, but then abruptly stopped,
backed up, and became stuck in the mud along the roadway. The front-seat passenger,
Brown, then exited the vehicle and began pushing it from behind. After this unsuccessful
attempt to dislodge the car, Brown ran into the wooded area surrounding the lot,
unbeknownst to the officers as they approached the Chrysler. When the officers
eventually realized Brown’s flight, they pursued and apprehended him. Brown explained
that he ran because he was on parole and had marijuana in his possession, which he said
2 he discarded into the woods. The officers did not locate any marijuana and began
escorting Brown back to the lot in handcuffs.
Other officers, meanwhile, were questioning the remaining occupants of the
Chrysler. The driver and owner of the vehicle, Heriberto Delmoral, stated that he came
from Philadelphia to the lot to have his car mirrors repaired. Delmoral also explained
that Brown paid him $200 to drive him to the lot, where one of Brown’s vehicles was
being painted. Neither Delmoral nor the other occupants of the vehicle, Alisha Blye and
her young child, had physical identification in their possession. The questioning officer
observed that the journey from Philadelphia to the rural lot would have taken five hours
round-trip. The officer also noticed that Delmoral was winking and nodding at him as
they were speaking, which the officer found “extremely” unusual. Appendix (“App.”)
132.
Brown and the officers then returned to the lot. The officers conducted a pat-
down of Brown, noting to him that he “ran for no reason.” App. 19. The pat-down
uncovered two cellphones in Brown’s possession, which the officers associated with
trafficking of contraband. During the pat-down, the officers also asked Brown about the
rather long route for customary car repairs. Brown responded that he knew the lot owner
and had left another car, a Range Rover, to be repaired as well, but officers could not
locate any Range Rover on the premises. Brown also clarified that his travel originated
in Norristown (a suburb of Philadelphia) and included a stop in Scranton before their
arrival to the lot.
3 The officers, suspecting that the Chrysler contained contraband, asked Delmoral
for consent to search the car, which he refused. The police then called for a canine unit to
inspect the vehicle, which arrived forty minutes later. The drug-sniffing dog, Khan,
alerted the handler twice as they inspected the car, indicating the presence of controlled
substances. The officers searched the car, finding a tote bag containing crystal
methamphetamine in the trunk. Brown, Delmoral, and Blye were arrested.
A federal grand jury indicted Brown for conspiring to distribute and to possess
with intent to distribute more than 500 grams of methamphetamine, as well as possessing
with intent to distribute more than 500 grams of methamphetamine. Brown moved to
suppress the evidence obtained from the Chrysler, arguing that the police lacked
reasonable suspicion to detain him or the vehicle, improperly prolonged the stop to
investigate other crimes, and had no probable cause to search the car. Brown also sought
to suppress his statements from the day of his arrest, which he said contravened Miranda
v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
The District Court granted in part and denied in part his motion. It first held that
Brown lacked Fourth Amendment standing to challenge the vehicle’s detention and
search and that reasonable suspicion supported Brown’s detention. The only police
action that implicated Brown’s privacy interests was his detention in the woods,
according to the District Court, but reasonable suspicion supported his detention. The
District Court also held that even if Brown had standing as to the stop and search of the
vehicle, those investigatory actions would not have violated the Fourth Amendment
either. The District Court lastly held that because Brown was subject to custodial
4 interrogation during his initial detention, his un-Mirandized statements about his
marijuana possession and parole status were inadmissible. But the District Court noted
that this conclusion did not affect the admissibility of any physical evidence recovered at
the scene.
Brown then entered into a conditional plea agreement, reserving the right to appeal
the denial of his motion to suppress. The District Court sentenced him to 228 months of
imprisonment. Brown timely appealed.
II.1
A.
The District Court concluded that reasonable suspicion justified the initial
detention of the Chrysler, and probable cause supported the ensuing search. We agree.
Assessing reasonable suspicion requires considering the “totality of the circumstances to
determine whether ‘the detaining officers . . . [had] a particularized and objective basis
for suspecting the particular person stopped of criminal activity.’” United States v.
Johnson, 592 F.3d 442, 448–49 (3d Cir. 2010) (alteration in original) (quoting United
States v. Brown, 448 F.3d 239, 246 (3d Cir. 2006)). And “a dog’s positive alert while
sniffing the exterior of the car provides an officer with the probable cause necessary to
search the car without a warrant.” United States v. Pierce, 622 F.3d 209, 213 (3d Cir.
2010).
1 The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231. We have jurisdiction to review Brown’s conviction and sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a). This Court reviews the denial of a motion to suppress for clear error as to a district court’s factual findings but exercises plenary review over its legal determinations. See United States v. Stewart, 92 F.4th 461, 466 (3d Cir. 2024).
5 The investigatory actions here complied with the Fourth Amendment, as the
District Court concluded. The vehicle’s presence in a “haven for illegal activity,” App.
176 — a remote lot where “drugs and stolen property” were suspected, id., someone had
recently been arrested, and another had just run into the woods — combined with its
evasive maneuvering and likely violation of Pennsylvania law on tinted windows,
allowed the police to temporarily detain the Chrysler and its occupants. That stop was
also not unreasonably delayed, given the time required to procure a drug-sniffing dog in
the area.2 See United States v. Garner, 961 F.3d 264, 272 (3d Cir. 2020). And as the
District Court noted, the dog positively alerted to the presence of drugs, the handler
testified to the dog’s certification and experience, and Brown offers nothing to rebut the
credibility of those alerts. See Florida v. Harris, 568 U.S. 237, 248 (2013). Brown’s
challenge to the stop and search of the Chrysler is therefore unavailing.3
B.
We likewise agree with the District Court that the circumstances here support the
officers’ reasonable suspicion that Brown was engaged in criminal activity. First, the
remote lot where Brown was driven to was well known for criminal activity, with one
officer testifying that it was “an area involved in high crime” and “a haven for illegal
2 We do not decide whether unreasonable delays to investigatory stops under Rodriguez v. United States, 575 U.S. 348 (2015), apply to non-traffic stops as here. 3 Brown’s argument that he has standing to challenge the search is unpersuasive. Brown fled from the vehicle, effectively abandoning any privacy interest he had in the items searched therein. See United States v. Burnett, 773 F.3d 122, 127, 132 (3d Cir. 2014) (holding that a former passenger of a car — who did not own the car and voluntarily left the car — did not have standing to challenge the search of the car).
6 activity, especially, regarding drugs and stolen property.” App. 171, 176. Second, the
officers were already at the scene to investigate stolen property. Third, the officers had
already arrested another individual who had an active warrant out for his arrest. Fourth,
Brown, unprovoked, ran into a wooded area despite the cool temperatures and rainfall so
heavy that the vehicle became stuck in the mud.
Unlike Brown suggests, these circumstances are not akin to United States v.
Navedo, 694 F.3d 463 (3d Cir. 2012). That case involved testimony that the officers did
not “observe[] any conduct that would have suggested that Navedo was doing anything
illegal,” but rather observed Navedo standing on his apartment building’s porch and
running up the stairs into his apartment building where he was tackled. Id. at 465–66.
By contrast, Brown drove a long distance to a remote location; the officers were already
on the scene investigating illegal activity at that address; the officers had already arrested
on individual on the scene; and Brown, unprovoked and without the police announcing
themselves, ran into a heavily wooded area during what he describes as “pouring rain.”
Brown Br. 10. In light of the totality of the circumstances, the police had reasonable
suspicion to detain Brown to continue their investigation.
III.
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.