United States v. Trucis

89 F.R.D. 671, 1981 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13128
CourtDistrict Court, E.D. Pennsylvania
DecidedApril 16, 1981
DocketCiv. A. No. 80-2321
StatusPublished
Cited by19 cases

This text of 89 F.R.D. 671 (United States v. Trucis) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
United States v. Trucis, 89 F.R.D. 671, 1981 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13128 (E.D. Pa. 1981).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM

LOUIS H. POLLAK, District Judge.

The United States has brought suit against Arnold Trucis, seeking revocation of his December 18, 1956 Certificate of Naturalization. The gravamen of the suit is that, when he petitioned to become a naturalized citizen, Trucis knowingly concealed certain biographical facts—facts showing his participation in the persecution of unarmed Jewish civilians during 1941-43 in Riga, Latvia—disclosure of which would have led to the denial of Trucis’ petition for naturalization. 8 U.S.C. § 1451.

Now before me are two discovery motions: (1) the Government’s motion to compel Trucis’ answers at a deposition and the production of documents, and (2) Trucis’ motion for a protective order prohibiting scheduled depositions in Latvia.

I. Government’s Motion to Compel

A.

Trucis has refused to answer questions or provide documents on the basis of his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. It is conceded that there is no possibility of prosecution in the United States. Accordingly, the principal issue of law is whether—as Trucis contends and the [673]*673Government denies—possible prosecution by a foreign sovereign brings the constitutional privilege into play.

The Supreme Court has not directly addressed the issue.1 But in determining that the privilege does apply as between the United States and the several states, Murphy v. Waterfront Commission of New York Harbor, 378 U.S. 52, 84 S.Ct. 1594, 12 L.Ed.2d 678 (1964), the Court did give some weight to English case law supportive of the proposition that the English privilege, from which our privilege derives, affords protection beyond the realm. The Court’s mode of approach to the applicability of the privilege in the federal-state context has led Judge Newman to hold that the privilege also applies as between the United States and foreign nations. In re Cardassi, 351 F.Supp. 1080 (D.Conn.1972). And Judge Fullam has followed Judge Newman. United States v. Kowalchuk, No. 77-118 (E.D.Pa. October 20, 1978). Cf. In re Federal Grand Jury Witness, 597 F.2d 1166, 1169 (9th Cir. 1979) (Hufstedler, J., concurring). But there is authority the other way. In re Parker, 411 F.2d 1067, 1070 (10th Cir. 1969), vacated as moot, 397 U.S. 96, 90 S.Ct. 819, 25 L.Ed.2d 81 (1970).

In this case, the Government has been unable to provide any assurances that, in the event he loses his citizenship, Trucis would not be sent to a nation interested in his prosecution.2 And so the Government takes the broad ground that it is entitled to an order from this court compelling potentially incriminating answers from Trucis, notwithstanding that it may thereafter deliver Trucis to a foreign government which may use those answers to fuel a criminal prosecution.

For the reasons given by Judges Newman and Fullam, I conclude that I cannot, consistently with the Fifth Amendment, direct Trucis to give what may be incriminating testimony—at least where, as here, the possible foreign prosecution would be for crimes recognized as such in this country.3 For the privilege is not simply a limit on the activities of American courts and law-enforcement authorities: it is a freedom conferred upon persons within the protection of American law. Cf. In re Letters Rogatory From the 9th Criminal Division, Regional Court, Mannheim Federal Republic of Germany, 448 F.Supp. 786 (S.D.Fla.1978) (U.S. citizen protected against foreign Government’s inquiry where foreign prosecution is contemplated).

B.

Given Trucis’ entitlement to invoke the privilege, the next issue before me is the substantiality, or reasonableness, of his fear of prosecution. None of the foreign sovereigns named in Trucis’ memoranda—the Soviet Union, Israel, and West Germany—has expressed any interest in Trucis’ prosecution. I conclude, however, that the atrocious nature of the crimes with which he is charged, coupled with the distinct possibility that, should Trucis’ citizenship be revoked, he will be removed to an interested nation,4 are, in combination, sufficient to give substance to his fears. Compare United States v. Yanagita, 552 F.2d 940, 946 (2d Cir. 1977).

While I conclude, therefore, that Trucis may invoke the Fifth Amendment in these discovery proceedings, invocation of the privilege is limited to those questions posing a real threat of incrimination. Trucis has argued that virtually all the information requested of him would forge links in a chain of circumstances proving his identity as one involved in the wartime persecution [674]*674of Jews. Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 486, 71 S.Ct. 814, 818, 95 L.Ed. 1118 (1951). However, certain matters—e. g., the circumstances, and associated documents, surrounding his entry into this country—are too far removed from the information needed to prosecute Trucis to permit the privilege’s invocation. As the person whose naturalization is at issue, Trucis must answer questions concerning his identity and all other matters pertaining to his entry into the United States and the subsequent naturalization proceedings. He need not answer questions concerning his activities in Latvia during the war years. Kowaichuk, supra.

The documents described in the Government’s Request for Production, also the subject matter of Trucis’ invocation of the Fifth Amendment, may contain incriminating information; but defendant has made no showing—indeed has not attempted to show—that their production will be “testimonial.” Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 410, 96 S.Ct. 1569, 1580, 48 L.Ed.2d 39 (1976); ICC v. Gould, 629 F.2d 847, 859 n.22 (3d Cir. 1980); Matter of Grand Jury Empanelled, 597 F.2d 851, 860-61 (3d Cir. 1979).5 Therefore, the requested documents will be required to be submitted to the Government within two weeks of the date of this Memorandum.

II. Defendant’s Motion for Protective Order

The Government has served notice of its intention to take the videotape depositions in Latvia of witnesses resident there. F.R.C.P. 28(b); 30(b)(4). Trucis has moved for a protective order, asserting that trustworthy depositions simply cannot be had in the Soviet Union.

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Bluebook (online)
89 F.R.D. 671, 1981 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13128, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/united-states-v-trucis-paed-1981.