United States v. Treyvion Sutton

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
• Decided: April 21, 2026
• Docket: 25-4024
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

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UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 25-4024

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

TREYVION MALEKE SUTTON,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina, at Raleigh. James C. Dever III, District Judge. (5:24-cr-00024-D-RN-1)

Submitted: March 26, 2026 Decided: April 21, 2026

Before RICHARDSON, HEYTENS, and BERNER, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

ON BRIEF: Thomas R. Wilson, GREENE WILSON & STYRON, New Bern, North Carolina, for Appellant. W. Ellis Boyle, United States Attorney, David A. Bragdon, Assistant United States Attorney, Khari L. Cyrus, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.

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PER CURIAM:

Treyvion Maleke Sutton pleaded guilty, without a plea agreement, to possession of

ammunition by a convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). The district court

imposed a sentence of 96 months’ imprisonment, within the advisory Sentencing

Guidelines range. On appeal, Sutton challenges the sentence, arguing that the district court

erred in applying a four-level enhancement under U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual

§ 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) (2023) for possession of a firearm or ammunition in connection with

another felony offense, contending there was no evidence that he intended to facilitate the

sale of marijuana; he further contends that his sentence is substantively unreasonable. We

affirm.

Rather than reviewing the merits of Sutton’s challenge to the application of this

enhancement, “we may proceed directly to an assumed error harmlessness inquiry.”

United States v. Gomez-Jimenez, 750 F.3d 370, 382 (4th Cir. 2014) (citation modified).

To apply this assumed error harmlessness inquiry we require (1) knowledge that the district court would have reached the same result even if it had decided the [Sentencing G]uidelines issue the other way and (2) a determination that the sentence would be [substantively] reasonable even if the [G]uidelines issue had been decided in the defendant’s favor.

United States v. McDonald, 850 F.3d 640, 643 (4th Cir. 2017) (citation modified); see also

United States v. Shivers, 56 F.4th 320, 327 (4th Cir. 2022). An asserted error will be

deemed harmless if we are certain that these requirements are satisfied. United States v.

Gomez, 690 F.3d 194, 203 (4th Cir. 2012).

Here, at the sentencing hearing, the district court calculated Sutton’s advisory

Guidelines range as 78 to 97 months’ imprisonment, with the contested enhancement

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included. However, the court also expressly stated that even if it had miscalculated the

advisory Guidelines range, it would have imposed the same 96-month sentence based on

its own assessment of the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors.

After thoroughly considering the § 3553(a) factors, the district court determined that

the sentence needed to address its concerns regarding, among other things, the seriousness

of Sutton’s criminal conduct, Sutton’s recidivism and criminal history, the need for

deterrence, and the danger Sutton posed to the community. The court then found that a

sentence of 96 months’ imprisonment was appropriate and was sufficient but not greater

than necessary to achieve the goals of sentencing. We are therefore satisfied that the district

court would have reached the same result even if it had decided the Guidelines issue the

other way. See McDonald, 850 F.3d at 643. Thus, the first requirement of the assumed

error harmlessness inquiry is satisfied. See Gomez-Jimenez, 750 F.3d at 383.

Turning to the second requirement, we consider whether Sutton’s sentence is

substantively reasonable, taking into account the Guidelines range that would have applied

absent the assumed error. Had the district court sustained Sutton’s objection to the

enhancement under § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B), Sutton’s advisory Guidelines range would have been

51 to 63 months, rather than 78 to 97 months.

In reviewing a variant sentence for substantive reasonableness, “we consider

whether the sentencing court acted reasonably both with respect to its decision to impose

such a sentence and with respect to the extent of the divergence from the sentencing range.”

United States v. Washington, 743 F.3d 938, 944 (4th Cir. 2014) (citation modified). We

afford “due deference to the district court’s decision that the § 3553(a) factors, on a whole,

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justify the extent of the variance, and the fact that we might reasonably have concluded

that a different sentence was appropriate is insufficient to justify reversal of the district

court.” United States v. Morace, 594 F.3d 340, 346 (4th Cir. 2010) (citation modified).

Our ultimate inquiry is whether, considering the totality of the circumstances, the court

“abused its discretion in concluding that the sentence it chose satisfied the standards set

forth in § 3553(a).” United States v. Mendoza-Mendoza, 597 F.3d 212, 216 (4th Cir. 2010).

We are satisfied that the 96-month sentence imposed by the district court is

substantively reasonable even if the court had used a Guidelines range of 51 to 63 months.

As previously noted, after thoroughly considering the § 3553(a) factors, the district court

found that a sentence of 96 months’ imprisonment was appropriate based on the seriousness

of Sutton’s offense, his quick return to criminal activity after being released from state

custody, and the seriousness of his past offenses. Thus, even if the district court had ruled

that the challenged enhancement was inapplicable, it is clear from the record that the court

would have varied above the 51-to-63-month range.

Furthermore, we conclude that the variance is substantively reasonable in light of

the district court’s thorough and explicit consideration of the § 3553(a) factors. While

acknowledging Sutton’s young age and difficult background, the court reasonably found

that, given Sutton’s quick return to criminal activity even while on state supervision, along

with his significant past criminal behavior, the need to protect the public would not be

served with a lower sentence. Because Sutton’s sentence is supported by the district court’s

thorough consideration of the § 3553(a) factors, we conclude that the sentence is

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substantively reasonable. We are therefore satisfied that any Guidelines calculation error

is harmless. See McDonald, 850 F.3d at 645.

Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment. We dispense with oral

argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials

before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED