United States v. Travis Colson

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
• Decided: September 29, 2023
• Docket: 22-4486
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

USCA4 Appeal: 22-4486 Doc: 23 Filed: 09/29/2023 Pg: 1 of 3

UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 22-4486

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

TRAVIS DEVON COLSON, a/k/a Swift,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina, at Greensboro. Thomas D. Schroeder, Chief District Judge. (1:22-cr-00013-TDS-1)

Submitted: August 28, 2023 Decided: September 29, 2023

Before RICHARDSON and RUSHING, Circuit Judges, and KEENAN, Senior Circuit Judge.

Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

ON BRIEF: Thomas M. King, Salisbury, North Carolina, for Appellant. Angela Hewlett Miller, Assistant United States Attorney, Craig Matthew Principe, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellee.

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PER CURIAM:

Travis Devon Colson pleaded guilty, pursuant to a written plea agreement, to being

a felon in possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1), 924(a)(2). The

district court sentenced Colson to 60 months of imprisonment. On appeal, Colson’s

counsel filed a brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), asserting that

there are no meritorious grounds for appeal but questioning the reasonableness of Colson’s

sentence. Colson has not filed a pro se supplemental brief despite being notified of his

right to do so. Finding no error, we affirm.

We review a criminal sentence for reasonableness “under a deferential abuse-of-

discretion standard.” United States v. Williams, 5 F.4th 500, 505 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,

142 S. Ct. 625 (2021). “[W]e must first ensure that the district court committed no

significant procedural error, such as improperly calculating the [Sentencing] Guidelines

range, selecting a sentence based on clearly erroneous facts, or failing to adequately explain

the chosen sentence.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). “If the sentence is

procedurally sound, we then consider the substantive reasonableness of the sentence, taking

into account the totality of the circumstances.” United States v. McCain, 974 F.3d 506,

515 (4th Cir. 2020) (internal quotation marks omitted). “Where, as here, the sentence is

outside the advisory Guidelines range, we must consider whether the sentencing court acted

reasonably both with respect to its decision to impose such a sentence and with respect to

the extent of the divergence from the sentencing range.” United States v. Nance, 957 F.3d

204, 215 (4th Cir. 2020) (internal quotation marks omitted). In reviewing an upward

variance, this court “may consider the extent of the deviation, but must give due deference

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to the district court’s decision that the [18 U.S.C.] § 3553(a) factors, on a whole, justify the

extent of the variance.” Id. at 212 (internal quotation marks omitted).

During the sentencing hearing, the district court accurately calculated Colson’s

advisory Sentencing Guidelines range, accorded Colson an opportunity to argue for an

appropriate sentence, addressed Colson’s and the Government’s sentencing arguments,

considered the §3553(a) factors, and adequately explained the chosen sentence. Despite

considering the mitigating factors argued by Colson, the court concluded that an upward

variance of 14 months was necessary to protect the public and deter Colson from further

criminal conduct. Based on the factors identified by the district court, along with our

review of the record, we conclude that the court did not abuse its discretion by imposing

an upward-variant sentence. See Nance, 957 F.3d at 212, 215.

In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the entire record in this case and have

found no meritorious grounds for appeal. We therefore affirm the district court’s judgment.

This court requires that counsel inform Colson, in writing, of the right to petition the

Supreme Court of the United States for further review. If Colson requests that a petition

be filed, but counsel believes that such a petition would be frivolous, then counsel may

move in this court for leave to withdraw from representation. Counsel’s motion must state

that a copy thereof was served on Colson.

We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are

adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the

decisional process.

DISMISSED