Case: 17-11082 Date Filed: 10/09/2018 Page: 1 of 7
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT ________________________
No. 17-11082 ________________________
D.C. Docket No. 1:16-cr-20556-WPD-1
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
versus
TRAVIS BUCKNER,
Defendant - Appellant.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida ________________________
(October 9, 2018)
Before ROSENBAUM, HULL and JULIE CARNES, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Following a jury trial, Travis Buckner was convicted of one count of
aggravated sexual abuse of a child, two counts of attempted aggravated sexual Case: 17-11082 Date Filed: 10/09/2018 Page: 2 of 7
abuse of a child, and one count of travel with intent to engage in illicit sexual
conduct. The district court sentenced him to life in prison. Buckner now
challenges the district court’s denial of his motion for a continuance of the trial, its
admission of certain evidence during trial, its denial of his motions for mistrial, and
the sentence he received. After careful review of the record and consideration of
the parties’ arguments, and with the benefit of oral argument, we now affirm.
I.
On December 13, 2016, a federal jury convicted defendant Travis Buckner
on four criminal counts arising from the sexual abuse of his fourteen-year-old
daughter, A.B. Overwhelming evidence at trial showed that from the time A.B.
was twelve years old, Buckner frequently pressured her into performing sexual acts
with him.
The charges against Buckner stemmed from two particular incidents of
abuse: one that occurred on a church-led mission trip to Haiti, and another that
happened on a cruise vacation. Though Buckner had urged A.B. to keep their
sexual interactions over the prior two years a secret, on the cruise, in July of 2016,
A.B. reported the two years of abuse.
The district court delayed Buckner’s trial so he could undergo a competency
evaluation, but a court-appointed psychologist found him to be feigning symptoms
2 Case: 17-11082 Date Filed: 10/09/2018 Page: 3 of 7
of mental impairment. 1 The district court concluded he was competent to stand
trial. Buckner’s attorney then moved for a continuance, citing the need for extra
preparation time. The court denied the motion, noting that the trial had already
been delayed two months—partly because of Buckner’s malingering. At trial, in
addition to presenting physical evidence, the government called A.B. and her
mother as its primary witnesses. Over Buckner’s objections, the government also
called Buckner’s niece and his younger brother, both of whom testified that
Buckner sexually abused them as children, though Buckner never faced criminal
charges for doing so. The jury found Buckner guilty on all four counts against
him.
At Buckner’s sentencing, the district court applied several enhancements to
his base offense level. These included a five-level increase for his history of
sexual assault against minors, a four-level increase for engaging in aggravated
sexual abuse in the special maritime jurisdiction of the United States, a two-level
increase because A.B. was under his custody, another two-level increase because
Buckner knew or should have known A.B. was a vulnerable victim, and one final
two-level increase for obstruction of justice. All together, these enhancements put
Buckner well above the Sentencing Guidelines’ maximum offense level, giving
1 For example, the psychologist gave Buckner a test in which a subject must engage in simple counting of up to four objects. The psychologist testified that even individuals with actual brain damage typically do not miss more than one out of the entire set of 28 questions. Buckner missed twenty-one. 3 Case: 17-11082 Date Filed: 10/09/2018 Page: 4 of 7
him a recommended sentence of life in prison for three out of the four counts
against him. The court imposed a life sentence on those three, as well as the
maximum sentence of thirty years (to run concurrently) on the fourth.
Buckner now challenges several components of his proceedings: the denial
of his pre-trial continuance motion, the admission of his brother’s testimony, the
admission of his niece’s testimony, the denial of two mistrial motions, his
sentencing enhancement for obstruction of justice, and the reasonableness of his
life sentence. All of these matters we review for abuse of discretion. See United
States v. Jeri, 869 F.3d 1247, 1257 (11th Cir. 2017) (denial of a continuance);
United States v. Edouard, 485 F.3d 1324, 1343 (11th Cir. 2007) (evidentiary
rulings); United States v. Snyder, 291 F.3d 1291, 1294 (11th Cir. 2002) (mistrial
motion); Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007) (reasonableness of criminal
sentence). Buckner also alleges that cumulative error marred his trial, a claim we
review de novo. United States v. Dohan, 508 F.3d 989, 993 (11th Cir. 2007).
After thorough review, we find no abuse of discretion as to any of the claims
Buckner raises, nor do we find cumulative error in his trial.
II.
We begin with Buckner’s trial-related claims. To demonstrate that a district
court has reversibly erred in denying a motion for continuance of trial to permit
more preparation, a defendant must show not only an abuse of discretion but also
4 Case: 17-11082 Date Filed: 10/09/2018 Page: 5 of 7
“specific, substantial prejudice.” See United States v. Saget, 991 F.2d 702, 708
(11th Cir. 1993). To do this, a defendant must point to “relevant, non-cumulative
evidence that would have been presented if [the defendant’s] request for a
continuance had been granted.” Id. Buckner has identified neither evidence he
would have obtained nor strategic opportunities he would have pursued had the
court granted his motion for a pre-trial continuance. The court had already granted
Buckner two continuances he had sought before that, and it found he had tried to
prolong his proceedings by feigning mental incompetence. We see no error in the
court’s decision that further delay was unwarranted.
Turning to the admission of Buckner’s niece’s and brother’s testimony, we
find no error there, either. As we have mentioned, their testimony focused on how
Buckner sexually abused them while they were children. Where a defendant
stands accused of sexual assault or child molestation, the trial court can allow
evidence of similar past acts “on any matter to which it is relevant.” See Fed. R.
Evid. 413(a), 414(a). Buckner effectively concedes relevance here and instead
challenges the testimony as unduly prejudicial. See Fed. R. Evid. 403.
We find no abuse of discretion in the district court’s implicit determination
to the contrary.
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Case: 17-11082 Date Filed: 10/09/2018 Page: 1 of 7
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT ________________________
No. 17-11082 ________________________
D.C. Docket No. 1:16-cr-20556-WPD-1
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
versus
TRAVIS BUCKNER,
Defendant - Appellant.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida ________________________
(October 9, 2018)
Before ROSENBAUM, HULL and JULIE CARNES, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Following a jury trial, Travis Buckner was convicted of one count of
aggravated sexual abuse of a child, two counts of attempted aggravated sexual Case: 17-11082 Date Filed: 10/09/2018 Page: 2 of 7
abuse of a child, and one count of travel with intent to engage in illicit sexual
conduct. The district court sentenced him to life in prison. Buckner now
challenges the district court’s denial of his motion for a continuance of the trial, its
admission of certain evidence during trial, its denial of his motions for mistrial, and
the sentence he received. After careful review of the record and consideration of
the parties’ arguments, and with the benefit of oral argument, we now affirm.
I.
On December 13, 2016, a federal jury convicted defendant Travis Buckner
on four criminal counts arising from the sexual abuse of his fourteen-year-old
daughter, A.B. Overwhelming evidence at trial showed that from the time A.B.
was twelve years old, Buckner frequently pressured her into performing sexual acts
with him.
The charges against Buckner stemmed from two particular incidents of
abuse: one that occurred on a church-led mission trip to Haiti, and another that
happened on a cruise vacation. Though Buckner had urged A.B. to keep their
sexual interactions over the prior two years a secret, on the cruise, in July of 2016,
A.B. reported the two years of abuse.
The district court delayed Buckner’s trial so he could undergo a competency
evaluation, but a court-appointed psychologist found him to be feigning symptoms
2 Case: 17-11082 Date Filed: 10/09/2018 Page: 3 of 7
of mental impairment. 1 The district court concluded he was competent to stand
trial. Buckner’s attorney then moved for a continuance, citing the need for extra
preparation time. The court denied the motion, noting that the trial had already
been delayed two months—partly because of Buckner’s malingering. At trial, in
addition to presenting physical evidence, the government called A.B. and her
mother as its primary witnesses. Over Buckner’s objections, the government also
called Buckner’s niece and his younger brother, both of whom testified that
Buckner sexually abused them as children, though Buckner never faced criminal
charges for doing so. The jury found Buckner guilty on all four counts against
him.
At Buckner’s sentencing, the district court applied several enhancements to
his base offense level. These included a five-level increase for his history of
sexual assault against minors, a four-level increase for engaging in aggravated
sexual abuse in the special maritime jurisdiction of the United States, a two-level
increase because A.B. was under his custody, another two-level increase because
Buckner knew or should have known A.B. was a vulnerable victim, and one final
two-level increase for obstruction of justice. All together, these enhancements put
Buckner well above the Sentencing Guidelines’ maximum offense level, giving
1 For example, the psychologist gave Buckner a test in which a subject must engage in simple counting of up to four objects. The psychologist testified that even individuals with actual brain damage typically do not miss more than one out of the entire set of 28 questions. Buckner missed twenty-one. 3 Case: 17-11082 Date Filed: 10/09/2018 Page: 4 of 7
him a recommended sentence of life in prison for three out of the four counts
against him. The court imposed a life sentence on those three, as well as the
maximum sentence of thirty years (to run concurrently) on the fourth.
Buckner now challenges several components of his proceedings: the denial
of his pre-trial continuance motion, the admission of his brother’s testimony, the
admission of his niece’s testimony, the denial of two mistrial motions, his
sentencing enhancement for obstruction of justice, and the reasonableness of his
life sentence. All of these matters we review for abuse of discretion. See United
States v. Jeri, 869 F.3d 1247, 1257 (11th Cir. 2017) (denial of a continuance);
United States v. Edouard, 485 F.3d 1324, 1343 (11th Cir. 2007) (evidentiary
rulings); United States v. Snyder, 291 F.3d 1291, 1294 (11th Cir. 2002) (mistrial
motion); Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007) (reasonableness of criminal
sentence). Buckner also alleges that cumulative error marred his trial, a claim we
review de novo. United States v. Dohan, 508 F.3d 989, 993 (11th Cir. 2007).
After thorough review, we find no abuse of discretion as to any of the claims
Buckner raises, nor do we find cumulative error in his trial.
II.
We begin with Buckner’s trial-related claims. To demonstrate that a district
court has reversibly erred in denying a motion for continuance of trial to permit
more preparation, a defendant must show not only an abuse of discretion but also
4 Case: 17-11082 Date Filed: 10/09/2018 Page: 5 of 7
“specific, substantial prejudice.” See United States v. Saget, 991 F.2d 702, 708
(11th Cir. 1993). To do this, a defendant must point to “relevant, non-cumulative
evidence that would have been presented if [the defendant’s] request for a
continuance had been granted.” Id. Buckner has identified neither evidence he
would have obtained nor strategic opportunities he would have pursued had the
court granted his motion for a pre-trial continuance. The court had already granted
Buckner two continuances he had sought before that, and it found he had tried to
prolong his proceedings by feigning mental incompetence. We see no error in the
court’s decision that further delay was unwarranted.
Turning to the admission of Buckner’s niece’s and brother’s testimony, we
find no error there, either. As we have mentioned, their testimony focused on how
Buckner sexually abused them while they were children. Where a defendant
stands accused of sexual assault or child molestation, the trial court can allow
evidence of similar past acts “on any matter to which it is relevant.” See Fed. R.
Evid. 413(a), 414(a). Buckner effectively concedes relevance here and instead
challenges the testimony as unduly prejudicial. See Fed. R. Evid. 403.
We find no abuse of discretion in the district court’s implicit determination
to the contrary. See Bhogaita v. Altamonte Heights Condo. Ass’n, Inc., 765 F.3d
1277, 1290-91 (11th Cir. 2014) (trial court’s “discretion is particularly broad with
respect to Rule 403 determinations”). Both witnesses offered testimony highly
5 Case: 17-11082 Date Filed: 10/09/2018 Page: 6 of 7
probative of Buckner’s history of sexually abusing children, a relevant purpose
under Rule 414. See United States v. McGarity, 669 F.3d 1218, 1224 (11th Cir.
2012) (noting Rule 414 exempts child molestation cases from Federal Rules’
general ban on propensity evidence). Any risk of unfair prejudice did not
outweigh the probative value of their testimony.
We also find no abuse of discretion in the district court’s denial of Buckner’s
mistrial motions. His first motion, made during trial, alleged that prosecutors
impermissibly elicited testimony from his brother about Buckner’s abuse of other
children. But we find no prosecutorial misconduct because the trial transcripts
show Buckner’s brother brought up these incidents unprompted. See Trial Tr.
(12/13/16) at 315-16. And we find no actionable prejudice because the judge
instructed the jury to ignore Buckner’s brother’s testimony on this matter. See id.
We must presume the jury followed these instructions. See United States v. Stone,
9 F.3d 934, 938 (11th Cir. 1993) (“Few tenets are more fundamental to our jury
trial system than the presumption that juries obey the court’s instructions.”).
Buckner’s second motion, made after the government rested, alleged that
prosecutors had failed to disclose the substance of his niece’s testimony ahead of
time. But a review of the government’s pretrial filings reflects that the government
did, in fact, disclose her material testimony well in advance. See ECF No. 29 at 5.
So the district court committed no error in denying that motion for mistrial.
6 Case: 17-11082 Date Filed: 10/09/2018 Page: 7 of 7
Finally, with respect to alleged trial-related errors, Buckner contends that the
cumulative effect of all of these alleged errors warrants reversal. But since we
observe no error in any of these claims, we also find no cumulative error in
Buckner’s trial proceedings. See United States v. Waldon, 363 F.3d 1103, 1110
(11th Cir. 2004) (“[B]ecause no individual errors . . . have been demonstrated,
there can be no cumulative error.”).
As for Buckner’s sentence, we find it was both procedurally and
substantively reasonable. First, with respect to Buckner’s challenge to the district
court’s application of the obstruction-of-justice enhancement, the record
demonstrates that the district court had two independently sufficient grounds on
which to find the enhancement warranted: Buckner’s use of threats to convince
A.B. not to report his abuse, and Buckner’s feigning mental incompetence ahead of
trial.
And concerning the substantive reasonableness of the sentence, the life
sentence fell within, though at the upper end of, the Guidelines range for three of
Buckner’s four counts of conviction. But the district court expressly found no
mitigating circumstances and no reason to depart downward from the Guidelines
recommendation. Given the severity of Buckner’s crimes and the record in this
case, the district court was well within its discretion to sentence Buckner as it did.
AFFIRMED.