United States v. Trask

143 F. Supp. 2d 88, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5357, 2001 WL 455839
CourtDistrict Court, D. Massachusetts
DecidedApril 20, 2001
DocketCRIM. 00CR10111-NG
StatusPublished
Cited by3 cases

This text of 143 F. Supp. 2d 88 (United States v. Trask) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Massachusetts primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
United States v. Trask, 143 F. Supp. 2d 88, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5357, 2001 WL 455839 (D. Mass. 2001).

Opinion

SENTENCING MEMORANDUM

GERTNER, District Judge.

Dale Trask (“Trask”) was charged with “churning” in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) and Title 17, CFR, § 240.10b-5. He pled guilty to the charges on June 27, 2000, with a sentencing set for September 6, 2000. I sentenced Trask to fifteen months, with a recommendation that he be incarcerated at Ft. Devens and participate in the 500 Hour intensive drug treatment program, with three years’ supervised release. My reasons are as follows:

The defendant was charged with churning client funds belonging to George and Madelyn Davis during his employment as a stock broker. “Churning” occurs when a broker causes transactions to be made in a customer’s account that are excessive in amount and frequency, given the nature of that account. The core of the accusation is that the broker is trading the account for his own benefit and gain, to maximize his commissions, rather than for the benefit and gain of the customer. 1

*90 Trask’s choice of victim was particularly-troubling. George B. Davis, then 90 years of age, gave Trask power of attorney in April 1993. In June 1996, Davis moved to a nursing home where he later died. Davis’ wife, Madelyn, who suffered from Alzheimer’s disease, died shortly after-wards. From July 1995 until August of 1996, the Davis account had an average account equity of $53,202.00. At the end of this period, the account had lost $64,206.00. Trask had generated approximately $43,214 in commissions by making 99 transactions on the Davis account. During an interview with the FBI, Trask readily admitted the crime.

All parties agree (1) that the base offense level under U.S.S.G. § 2F1.1 is six, (2) that the total loss was $64,206, which yields an increase of five levels under U.S.S.G. § 2F1.1(b)(1)(F), and (3) that the offense level should be increased by two on account of the reasonably known vulnerability of the victims under U.S.S.G. § 3A1.1(b)(1), and (4) that the total should be decreased for acceptance of responsibility under U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1.

Four issues are in dispute: (1) Whether the offense level should be increased for the abuse of position of trust under U.S.S.G. § 3B 1.3, (2) whether the offense level should be increased for “more than minimal planning” under U.S.S.G. § 2F1.1(b)(2), (3) whether the Court should depart from whatever level that results on the grounds that Mr. Trask’s behavior was “aberrant”, and, (4) whether the Court should depart downward from the level IV criminal history, on the ground that that level overstates his culpability.

I. ENHANCEMENTS

A. Abuse of Trust

U.S.S.G. § 3B1.3 provides for a two-level enhancement “[i]f the defendant abused a position of public or private trust, or used a special skill, in a manner that significantly facilitated the commission or concealment of the offense ...” In United States v. Queen, 4 F.3d 925 (10th Cir.1993), the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit summarized the requirements for the application of this enhancement, stating it is appropriate “only if 1) the defendant occupied a position of trust, 2) the defendant abused this position in a manner that significantly facilitated his or her offense, and 3) abuse of trust is not included in the base level offense or specific offense characteristics pertaining to the defendant’s crime.” Id. at 927

On the first question, whether the defendant occupied a position of trust, “[t]he primary concern of § 3B1.3 is to penalize defendants who take advantage of a position that provides them freedom to commit or conceal a difficult-to-detect wrong.” United States v. Koehn, 74 F.3d 199, 201 (10th Cir.1996). Thus, for example, the adjustment would not apply to embezzlement by an ordinary bank teller whose position is not necessarily one of public or private trust characterized by professional or managerial discretion. Trask, a broker with a power of attorney, occupies the opposite end of the spectrum, as someone who held a position of significant trust that gave him the freedom to “churn” this account, largely undetected.

On the second question, causation, the Application Notes to § 3B1.3 at 1 state that “[t]he position of trust must have contributed in some substantial way to facilitating the crime or concealment of the offense (e.g. by making the detection of the offense or the defendant’s responsibility for the offense more difficult.)” Here too, there is no question that the defendant’s position of trust made the offense possible.

*91 The problem arises with the third question, the relationship between the enhancement, on the one hand, and the underlying offense, on the other. The Guidelines indicate that § 3 B 1.3 is not to be applied, “if an abuse of trust or skill is included in the base offense level or specific offense characteristic.” If the Commission has already included this factor in computing the base offense level, or if it is already included in a “specific offense characteristic” then it would be impermissible to take the factor into consideration as an enhancement to Trask’s sentencing. Put otherwise, enhancement makes sense if the base offense level contemplated a range of misconduct, only some of which involved an abuse of trust. While the run-of-the-mill defendant would get the “regular” level, a subset of defendants would get this enhancement.

There is considerable ambiguity whether to use the guideline definition of base offense level or the statutory definition of the offense with which to compare the defendant’s conduct. The issue is significant in this case. Churning under 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) necessarily involves the acts of a broker in a position of trust. In contrast, the relevant Guideline is the general one for offenses involving fraud or deceit. If I focused on the Guideline I would enhance since some fraud offenses involve an abuse of trust and some do not. If I focused on the elements of the offense as defined in the statute, I would not enhance since churning necessarily involves abuse of a position of trust.

The Tenth Circuit, in three decisions, outlined the problem but did not resolve it. In United States v. Chimal, 976 F.2d 608, 613-614 (10th Cir.1992), the Court upheld an abuse of trust enhancement for a defendant convicted of embezzling from an Indian tribe in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1163, focusing on the elements of the underlying offense. It concluded that although embezzlement by definition involves an abuse of trust to some degree, there were differences in how the crime could be achieved.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Fazio v. Lehman Brothers, Inc.
340 F.3d 386 (Sixth Circuit, 2003)
Robert Fazio v. Lehman Brothers, Inc. Lehman Brothers Holdings, Inc., S.G. Cowen Securities Corporation Societe Generale, Hambrecht & Quist, Inc. J.P. Morgan Chase & Company, Robert Fazio v. Lehman Brothers, Inc. Lehman Brothers Holdings, Inc., S.G. Cowen Securities Corporation Societe Generale Hambrecht & Quist, Inc. J.P. Morgan Chase & Company, Robert Fazio v. Lehman Brothers, Inc. Lehman Brothers Holdings, Inc. S.G. Cowen Securities Corporation Societe Generale, Hambrecht & Quist, Inc. J.P. Morgan Chase & Company, Robert Fazio, Samuel Glazer v. Lehman Brothers, Inc. Lehman Brothers Holdings, Inc., S.G. Cowen Securities Corporation Societe Generale, Robert Fazio, Samuel Glazer v. Lehman Brothers, Inc. Lehman Brothers Holdings, Inc., S.G. Cowen Securities Corporation Societe Generale Hambrecht & Quist, Inc. J.P. Morgan Chase & Company, Robert Fazio, Dominic A. Visconsi, Sr. v. Lehman Brothers, Inc. Lehman Brothers Holdings, Inc., S.G. Cowen Securities Corporation Societe Generale, Robert Fazio, Dominic A. Visconsi, Sr. v. Lehman Brothers, Inc. Lehman Brothers Holdings, Inc., S.G. Cowen Securities Corporation Societe Generale, Peter A. Spitalieri v. Lehman Brothers, Inc. Lehman Brothers Holdings, Inc., S.G. Cowen Securities Corporation Societe Generale, Peter A. Spitalieri v. Lehman Brothers, Inc. Lehman Brothers Holdings, Inc., S.G. Cowen Securities Corporation Societe Generale, Richard Lopardo v. Lehman Brothers, Inc. Lehman Brothers Holdings, Inc., S.G. Cowen Securities Corporation, Richard Lopardo v. Lehman Brothers, Inc., S.G. Cowen Securities Corporation, Peter M. Bonutti, M.D. v. Lehman Brothers, Inc., S.G. Cowen Securities Corporation, Peter M. Bonutti, M.D. v. Lehman Brothers, Inc., S.G. Cowen Securities Corporation, Robert Fazio v. Cowen & Company, Dominic A. Visconsi, Sr. v. Cowen & Company, Richard Lopardo v. Cowen & Company, Peter M. Bonutti, M.D. v. Cowen & Company, Dominic A. Visconsi, Sr. v. Lehman Brothers, Inc. Lehman Brothers Holdings, Inc., Dominic A. Visconsi, Sr. v. S.G. Cowen Securities Corporation Societe Generale
340 F.3d 386 (Sixth Circuit, 2003)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
143 F. Supp. 2d 88, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5357, 2001 WL 455839, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/united-states-v-trask-mad-2001.