United States v. Torres-Gonzalez

570 F. Supp. 2d 217, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 60310, 2008 WL 3198244
CourtDistrict Court, D. Puerto Rico
DecidedFebruary 11, 2008
DocketCriminal 07-170(JAG)
StatusPublished

This text of 570 F. Supp. 2d 217 (United States v. Torres-Gonzalez) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Puerto Rico primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
United States v. Torres-Gonzalez, 570 F. Supp. 2d 217, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 60310, 2008 WL 3198244 (prd 2008).

Opinion

OPINION AND ORDER

GARCIA-GRE GORY, District Judge.

Pending before the Court is Defendant Waldemar Torres Gonzalez’s (“Defendant”) Motion Requesting Severance or Bifurcation. (Docket No. 254). For the reasons set forth below, the Court DENIES Defendant’s Motion.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Defendant Waldemar Torres Gonzalez’s stands charged in a Superseding Indictment for the following violations of law: 1) Count One, conspiring to deal in firearms without a license, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(a)(1) and 371, 2) Count Three and Six, aiding and abetting in the dealing of a firearm without a license, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(a)(1)(A), 924(a)(1)(D), and 2, 3) Count Seven, aiding and abetting in the carrying of a firearm during and in relation to a drug trafficking crime, in violation 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(a)(1)(A), 924(a)(1)(D), and 2, 4) Count Eight, aiding and abetting in possessing with intent to distribute a mixture or substance containing a detectable amount of cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), and 841(b)(1)(A), and 18 U.S.C. § 2, and 5) Count Eleven and Twenty-One, being a felon-in-possession of a firearm, all in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) and 924(a)(2). (Docket No. 151).

On February 6, 2008, Defendant filed a Motion Requesting Severance or Bifurcation. In said motion, Defendant argues that Counts Eleven and Twenty-One should be severed or bifurcated because said counts require the introduction of previous conviction evidence which would be highly prejudicial to Defendant. 1 Namely, Defendant avers that under Fed.R.Evid. 404(b), the admissibility of the nature of Defendant’s prior conviction would serve no other purpose but to demonstrate his propensity to commit the crimes charged in the remaining Counts. (Docket No. 254).

On February 8, 2008, the Government filed its opposition to Defendant’s motion. The Government contends that Counts Eleven and Twenty-One should not be severed nor should a bifurcated trial be held because the nature of Defendant’s prior conviction is admissible. Specifically, the Government alleges that Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) does not preclude the admissibility of the nature of Defendant’s *219 conviction and the sentenced imposed. (Docket No. 267).

DISCUSSION

Our Circuit has consistently held that when a defendant is charged with being a felon-in-possession of a firearm, evidence of the nature of the prior conviction is not admissible unless special circumstances establish that the relevance of the evidence is sufficiently compelling to survive the balancing test of Fed.R.Evid. 403. United, States v. Lewis, 40 F.3d 1325, 1342-1343 (1st Cir.1994); United States v. Melvin, 27 F.3d 703, 707 (1st Cir.1994); United States v. Tavares, 21 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir.1994). As such, evidence of a defendant’s prior conviction can only be admitted if the Court identifies special circumstances which show that the relevant evidence 2 outweighs any likely prejudice. Melvin, 27 F.3d at 707; United States v. Tavares, 21 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 1994). 3 Furthermore, the admissibility of prior convictions can be analyzed under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b). See Melvin, 27 F.3d at 709. Similar to the test under Rule 403, Rule 404(b) requires a balancing analysis where the relevance of the admissibility of the prior convictions outweighs its prejudice. Id.

The Government contends that evidence of the nature of Defendant’s prior conviction is admissible under Rule 404(b) because it is relevant to show that Defendant possessed knowledge, intent, lack of mistake or accident, plan and preparation. 4 Furthermore, the Government alleges that evidence of the nature of Defendant’s prior conviction is relevant to rebut Defendant’s possible assertion that the possessions of firearms violations for which he now stands charged were accidental, mistaken or innocent. This Court disagrees with the Government’s contentions.

Similar to the case at bar, in Melvin, our Circuit Court noted that the Government also alleged that evidence of the defendant’s prior convictions was admissible under Fed.R.Evid. 404(b). Id. The Government argued that said evidence was admissible to prove defendant’s plan or intent. Id. at 709 n. 6. The Circuit Court concluded that the District Court’s ruling that the prejudicial value of Defendant’s prior conviction outweighed the relevance of the evidence should not be disturbed. Id. at 709.

In the present case, this Court finds that the relevance of the nature of the prior conviction does not outweigh its prejudice. Admitting evidence of Defendant’s prior *220 firearm possession convictions would prejudice the jury because it would portray Defendant as an individual, who has a propensity to use firearms. 5 Id. As such, this Court holds that the evidence of Defendant’s prior convictions is inadmissible.

However, evidence that Defendant was previously convicted of an unspecified felony is admissible.

Related

United States v. Tavares
21 F.3d 1 (First Circuit, 1994)
United States v. Lewis
40 F.3d 1325 (First Circuit, 1994)
United States v. Joseph P. Fahey
769 F.2d 829 (First Circuit, 1985)
United States v. Melvin
27 F.3d 703 (First Circuit, 1994)

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Bluebook (online)
570 F. Supp. 2d 217, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 60310, 2008 WL 3198244, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/united-states-v-torres-gonzalez-prd-2008.