United States v. Tommy Curtis Bunch

Fourth Circuit

United States v. Tommy Curtis Bunch

542 F.2d 629, 1976 U.S. App. LEXIS 11825, 19 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (West) 283

CourtCourt of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

DecidedApril 13, 1976

Docket75-2188

StatusPublished

Cited by6 cases

This text of 542 F.2d 629 (United States v. Tommy Curtis Bunch) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

United States v. Tommy Curtis Bunch, 542 F.2d 629, 1976 U.S. App. LEXIS 11825, 19 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (West) 283 (4th Cir. 1976).

Pincite

Opinion

PER CURIAM:

Tommy Curtis Bunch appeals his convictions on two counts of violating the Dyer Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2312, 2313. The evidence showed that Bunch drove a car from Tennessee to Maryland at the request of the owner, knowing that the car was subject to a bank’s security interest and that the owner wished to get rid of it since he could not keep up the payments. In Maryland, Bunch attempted to sell the car. Failing that, he abandoned it in a relative’s garage *630 after partially dismantling it and selling the parts. The car’s owner meanwhile reported it stolen and used the insurance proceeds from the theft coverage to pay the bank.

The sole question presented by this appeal is whether a car which has been taken with the intent to deprive a creditor of a security interest in it can be said to have been “stolen” within the meaning of the Act. Contending that a security interest alone cannot be the subject of theft, Bunch argues that property cannot be stolen from one who lacks a right of possession.

The district court carefully considered this argument in its opinion, United States v. Bunch, 399 F.Supp. 1156 (D.Md.1975). It relied on United States v. Turley, 352 U.S. 407, 417, 77 S.Ct. 397, 402, 1 L.Ed.2d 430 (1957), where the Court concluded that the definition of “stolen” in the Dyer Act includes “all felonious takings of motor vehicles with intent to deprive the owner of the rights and benefits of ownership, regardless of whether or not the theft constitutes common-law larceny.” Applying this standard, the district court determined that Bunch deprived the bank of significant property interests, tantamount to ownership, which it held in the car. The court concluded that for purposes of the Dyer Act the car was “stolen.” Of course, as the district court recognized, not every interstate transportation of a car that defeats a security interest could support a Dyer Act prosecution. In this case, before Bunch took the car across a state line, he intended to deprive the bank of its security. It is this intent that made his conduct criminal. Accordingly, we affirm Bunch’s convictions on the basis of the district court’s opinion.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

PER CURIAM:

Tommy Curtis Bunch appeals his convictions on two counts of violating the Dyer Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2312, 2313. The evidence showed that Bunch drove a car from Tennessee to Maryland at the request of the owner, knowing that the car was subject to a bank’s security interest and that the owner wished to get rid of it since he could not keep up the payments. In Maryland, Bunch attempted to sell the car. Failing that, he abandoned it in a relative’s garage *630 after partially dismantling it and selling the parts. The car’s owner meanwhile reported it stolen and used the insurance proceeds from the theft coverage to pay the bank.

The sole question presented by this appeal is whether a car which has been taken with the intent to deprive a creditor of a security interest in it can be said to have been “stolen” within the meaning of the Act. Contending that a security interest alone cannot be the subject of theft, Bunch argues that property cannot be stolen from one who lacks a right of possession.

The district court carefully considered this argument in its opinion, United States v. Bunch, 399 F.Supp. 1156 (D.Md.1975). It relied on United States v. Turley, 352 U.S. 407, 417, 77 S.Ct. 397, 402, 1 L.Ed.2d 430 (1957), where the Court concluded that the definition of “stolen” in the Dyer Act includes “all felonious takings of motor vehicles with intent to deprive the owner of the rights and benefits of ownership, regardless of whether or not the theft constitutes common-law larceny.” Applying this standard, the district court determined that Bunch deprived the bank of significant property interests, tantamount to ownership, which it held in the car. The court concluded that for purposes of the Dyer Act the car was “stolen.” Of course, as the district court recognized, not every interstate transportation of a car that defeats a security interest could support a Dyer Act prosecution. In this case, before Bunch took the car across a state line, he intended to deprive the bank of its security. It is this intent that made his conduct criminal. Accordingly, we affirm Bunch’s convictions on the basis of the district court’s opinion.

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)

542 F.2d 629, 1976 U.S. App. LEXIS 11825, 19 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (West) 283, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/united-states-v-tommy-curtis-bunch-ca4-1976.

Opinion

Related

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack