USCA11 Case: 20-10236 Date Filed: 10/28/2020 Page: 1 of 9
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT ________________________
No. 20-10236 Non-Argument Calendar ________________________
D.C. Docket No. 1:18-cr-00259-MLB-CMS-1
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
TITUS LAMB,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia ________________________
(October 28, 2020)
Before JILL PRYOR, BRASHER, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM: USCA11 Case: 20-10236 Date Filed: 10/28/2020 Page: 2 of 9
Titus Lamb appeals his conviction for two counts of Hobbs Act robbery,
three counts of bank robbery, and two counts of brandishing a firearm. On appeal,
Lamb argues that the district court abused its discretion when it admitted Fed. R.
Evid. 404(b) (“Rule 404(b)”) evidence of a prior Mississippi bank robbery. Lamb
also argues that the district court erred in denying his motion for judgment of
acquittal because sufficient evidence did not exist for a reasonable jury to find him
guilty of Counts 1-6 of the superseding indictment.
I.
We review the district court’s decision to admit prior crimes or bad acts
under Rule 404(b) for abuse of discretion. United States v. Ellisor, 522 F.3d 1255,
1267 (11th Cir. 2008). We recognize a three-part test to determine if evidence is
admissible under Rule 404(b): (1) the evidence must be relevant to an issue other
than the defendant’s character; (2) there must be sufficient proof that a jury could
find by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant committed the act; and
(3) the probative value of the evidence must not be substantially outweighed by
undue prejudice, as established in Fed. R. Evid. 403 (“Rule 403”). United States v.
Edouard, 485 F.3d 1324, 1344 (11th Cir. 2007). The principles governing Rule
404(b) evidence are the same whether the conduct occurs before or after the
2 USCA11 Case: 20-10236 Date Filed: 10/28/2020 Page: 3 of 9
charged offense. United States v. Dickerson, 248 F.3d 1036, 1046 (11th Cir. 2001)
(citation omitted).
Under the first prong, Rule 404(b) permits the admission of prior bad acts
evidence to show motive, identity, preparation, knowledge, and intent. Fed. R.
Evid. 404(b)(2). The test for whether Rule 404(b) evidence should be allowed
varies depending on the issue for which it is offered. United States v. Lail, 846
F.2d 1299, 1301 (11th Cir. 1988) (citation omitted). The standard for
establishing identity is particularly stringent. Id. (holding that the district court
abused its discretion because the similarities between the charged conduct and
the 404(b) evidence did not provide a “signature” and there were major
dissimilarities between the charged robberies and the 404(b) robbery). We have
held that when 404(b) evidence is introduced for identity, the similarities
between the two offenses must demonstrate modus operandi or the handiwork of
the accused. United States v. Stubbins, 877 F.2d 42, 44 (11th Cir. 1989) (citation
and quotation omitted). Evidence cannot be admitted to prove identity if the
defendant has simply at other times committed the “same commonplace variety
of criminal act.” United States v. Phaknikone, 605 F.3d 1099, 1108 (11th Cir.
2010) (citation and quotations omitted).
In United States v. Whatley, we held that an uncharged bank robbery was
admissible under Rule 404(b) because it was sufficiently similar to the charged
3 USCA11 Case: 20-10236 Date Filed: 10/28/2020 Page: 4 of 9
crimes to prove modus operandi. United States v. Whatley, 719 F.3d 1206,
1218- 19 (11th Cir. 2013). In Whatley, the charged and uncharged robberies both
involved a casually dressed bank robber who committed takeover style bank
robberies. Id. at 1218. We noted that there were no major dissimilarities
between the charged and uncharged offenses. Id. We also noted that the later
charged robberies were most similar to the uncharged attempted bank robbery,
which suggested that Whatley’s modus operandi evolved over time. Id. at
1218- 19.
Under prong two, the prosecution must prove by a preponderance of the
evidence that the extrinsic act occurred. However, the uncorroborated testimony
of an accomplice can provide a sufficient basis for concluding that the defendant
committed extrinsic acts. United States v. Bowe, 221 F.3d 1183, 1192 (11th Cir.
2000).
The third prong of the Rule 404(b) test consists of balancing, under Fed. R.
Evid. 403 (“Rule 403”), the probative value of the evidence against its prejudicial
effect, and requires the court to conduct the Rule 403 inquiry based “upon the
circumstances of the extrinsic offense.” United States v. Ramirez, 426 F.3d 1344,
1354 (11th Cir. 2005). We view the disputed evidence in the light most favorable
to admission, maximizing the probative value of the evidence and minimizing the
prejudicial impact of the evidence. United States v. Elkin, 885 F.2d 775, 784 (11th
4 USCA11 Case: 20-10236 Date Filed: 10/28/2020 Page: 5 of 9
Cir. 1989). The risk of undue prejudice can be reduced by an appropriate limiting
instruction. Edouard, 485 F.3d at 1346.
Here, the district court did not abuse its discretion in allowing Rule 404(b)
evidence of the Mississippi bank robbery because it was relevant to prove identity
and its probative value outweighed the risk of unfair prejudice, particularly in light
of the district court’s limiting instructions. Throughout the trial and on appeal,
Lamb’s sole argument was that he did not commit the Georgia robberies with
Williams; as a result, Lamb made identity the primary issue during trial. At trial,
the district court allowed in evidence of Lamb’s prior conviction for a Mississippi
bank robbery for the purpose of proving the identity of the robber in the charged
conduct. Here, the robberies were sufficiently similar to meet the standard
required to present the Rule 404(b) evidence.
The Mississippi robbery occurred in July 2015, approximately one month
after the last robbery charged in the indictment. Dickerson, 248 F.3d at 1046.
During the Mississippi bank robbery, the robber asked to make a withdrawal, had a
note which specifically referenced shooting and dye packs, asked the teller to
“hurry the F up,” started counting down, had a backpack, and was described as
being around 6’3” or 6’4”, thin, young, black, and wearing a hat. Kay Vandiver,
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USCA11 Case: 20-10236 Date Filed: 10/28/2020 Page: 1 of 9
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT ________________________
No. 20-10236 Non-Argument Calendar ________________________
D.C. Docket No. 1:18-cr-00259-MLB-CMS-1
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
TITUS LAMB,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia ________________________
(October 28, 2020)
Before JILL PRYOR, BRASHER, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM: USCA11 Case: 20-10236 Date Filed: 10/28/2020 Page: 2 of 9
Titus Lamb appeals his conviction for two counts of Hobbs Act robbery,
three counts of bank robbery, and two counts of brandishing a firearm. On appeal,
Lamb argues that the district court abused its discretion when it admitted Fed. R.
Evid. 404(b) (“Rule 404(b)”) evidence of a prior Mississippi bank robbery. Lamb
also argues that the district court erred in denying his motion for judgment of
acquittal because sufficient evidence did not exist for a reasonable jury to find him
guilty of Counts 1-6 of the superseding indictment.
I.
We review the district court’s decision to admit prior crimes or bad acts
under Rule 404(b) for abuse of discretion. United States v. Ellisor, 522 F.3d 1255,
1267 (11th Cir. 2008). We recognize a three-part test to determine if evidence is
admissible under Rule 404(b): (1) the evidence must be relevant to an issue other
than the defendant’s character; (2) there must be sufficient proof that a jury could
find by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant committed the act; and
(3) the probative value of the evidence must not be substantially outweighed by
undue prejudice, as established in Fed. R. Evid. 403 (“Rule 403”). United States v.
Edouard, 485 F.3d 1324, 1344 (11th Cir. 2007). The principles governing Rule
404(b) evidence are the same whether the conduct occurs before or after the
2 USCA11 Case: 20-10236 Date Filed: 10/28/2020 Page: 3 of 9
charged offense. United States v. Dickerson, 248 F.3d 1036, 1046 (11th Cir. 2001)
(citation omitted).
Under the first prong, Rule 404(b) permits the admission of prior bad acts
evidence to show motive, identity, preparation, knowledge, and intent. Fed. R.
Evid. 404(b)(2). The test for whether Rule 404(b) evidence should be allowed
varies depending on the issue for which it is offered. United States v. Lail, 846
F.2d 1299, 1301 (11th Cir. 1988) (citation omitted). The standard for
establishing identity is particularly stringent. Id. (holding that the district court
abused its discretion because the similarities between the charged conduct and
the 404(b) evidence did not provide a “signature” and there were major
dissimilarities between the charged robberies and the 404(b) robbery). We have
held that when 404(b) evidence is introduced for identity, the similarities
between the two offenses must demonstrate modus operandi or the handiwork of
the accused. United States v. Stubbins, 877 F.2d 42, 44 (11th Cir. 1989) (citation
and quotation omitted). Evidence cannot be admitted to prove identity if the
defendant has simply at other times committed the “same commonplace variety
of criminal act.” United States v. Phaknikone, 605 F.3d 1099, 1108 (11th Cir.
2010) (citation and quotations omitted).
In United States v. Whatley, we held that an uncharged bank robbery was
admissible under Rule 404(b) because it was sufficiently similar to the charged
3 USCA11 Case: 20-10236 Date Filed: 10/28/2020 Page: 4 of 9
crimes to prove modus operandi. United States v. Whatley, 719 F.3d 1206,
1218- 19 (11th Cir. 2013). In Whatley, the charged and uncharged robberies both
involved a casually dressed bank robber who committed takeover style bank
robberies. Id. at 1218. We noted that there were no major dissimilarities
between the charged and uncharged offenses. Id. We also noted that the later
charged robberies were most similar to the uncharged attempted bank robbery,
which suggested that Whatley’s modus operandi evolved over time. Id. at
1218- 19.
Under prong two, the prosecution must prove by a preponderance of the
evidence that the extrinsic act occurred. However, the uncorroborated testimony
of an accomplice can provide a sufficient basis for concluding that the defendant
committed extrinsic acts. United States v. Bowe, 221 F.3d 1183, 1192 (11th Cir.
2000).
The third prong of the Rule 404(b) test consists of balancing, under Fed. R.
Evid. 403 (“Rule 403”), the probative value of the evidence against its prejudicial
effect, and requires the court to conduct the Rule 403 inquiry based “upon the
circumstances of the extrinsic offense.” United States v. Ramirez, 426 F.3d 1344,
1354 (11th Cir. 2005). We view the disputed evidence in the light most favorable
to admission, maximizing the probative value of the evidence and minimizing the
prejudicial impact of the evidence. United States v. Elkin, 885 F.2d 775, 784 (11th
4 USCA11 Case: 20-10236 Date Filed: 10/28/2020 Page: 5 of 9
Cir. 1989). The risk of undue prejudice can be reduced by an appropriate limiting
instruction. Edouard, 485 F.3d at 1346.
Here, the district court did not abuse its discretion in allowing Rule 404(b)
evidence of the Mississippi bank robbery because it was relevant to prove identity
and its probative value outweighed the risk of unfair prejudice, particularly in light
of the district court’s limiting instructions. Throughout the trial and on appeal,
Lamb’s sole argument was that he did not commit the Georgia robberies with
Williams; as a result, Lamb made identity the primary issue during trial. At trial,
the district court allowed in evidence of Lamb’s prior conviction for a Mississippi
bank robbery for the purpose of proving the identity of the robber in the charged
conduct. Here, the robberies were sufficiently similar to meet the standard
required to present the Rule 404(b) evidence.
The Mississippi robbery occurred in July 2015, approximately one month
after the last robbery charged in the indictment. Dickerson, 248 F.3d at 1046.
During the Mississippi bank robbery, the robber asked to make a withdrawal, had a
note which specifically referenced shooting and dye packs, asked the teller to
“hurry the F up,” started counting down, had a backpack, and was described as
being around 6’3” or 6’4”, thin, young, black, and wearing a hat. Kay Vandiver,
the teller at the Mississippi bank identified Lamb as the robber. Williams testified
that she and Lamb robbed the bank together and used her Buick LaCrosse.
5 USCA11 Case: 20-10236 Date Filed: 10/28/2020 Page: 6 of 9
The first charged robbery was the robbery of the CVS which occurred in
December 2014. The CVS robbery had several similarities, including the use of
the same getaway car, partner, the use of a note, a gun, and a countdown.
Additionally, the CVS clerk identified the robber as being between 6’3” and 6’4”.
The second charged robbery was the Morrow Fidelity Bank robbery in early
January 2015. During the Morrow robbery, the robber had a note that stated he
had a gun, had a countdown, the same partner, and was identified as being 6’3” to
6’6”, slim, black, and leaving in the same getaway car. The third charged robbery
was of the McDonough Fidelity Bank robbery in late January 2015. In the
McDonough robbery, the robber had a gun, was somewhere around 6’3” to 6’5”,
170 pounds, wore a scarf, had the same partner, and the same getaway car. The
fourth charged robbery was of a Dollar General in April 2015. That robbery was
also similar because the robber had a gun, the same partner, the same getaway
vehicle, and was given a similar description. The final charged robbery was of the
Bank of North Georgia in June 2015. The robbery at the Bank of North Georgia
also had several similarities: the man asked to make a withdrawal, handed her a
note, went through a countdown, used the same getaway car and partner, and was
described similarly. Additionally, a dye pack went off following the Bank of
North Georgia robbery.
6 USCA11 Case: 20-10236 Date Filed: 10/28/2020 Page: 7 of 9
The robbery of the Bank of North Georgia was the closest in time to the
robbery in Mississippi and had the most similarities. There, the robber asked to
make a withdrawal, was described similarly, and used a note, a countdown, the
same getaway vehicle, and the same partner. See Whatley, 719 F.3d at 1218-19.
Additionally, the note in the Mississippi robbery specifically mentioned not to
include a dye pack, suggesting that Lamb had adapted his modus operandi. See id.
Furthermore, there were no major dissimilarities between the crimes, such as a
different weapon, multiple robbers in banks or convenience stores, or a vast change
in technique. See Lail, 846 F.3d at 1301. All of the robberies involved a similarly
described man, the same partner, the same getaway car, and very brief threats
interactions. The robberies do not appear to be so “commonplace” that any
individual could have committed then. Phaknikone, 605 F.3d at 1108.
Furthermore, the Rule 404(b) evidence of the Mississippi bank robbery was
more probative than prejudicial. See Ramirez, 426 F.3d at 1345. Here, Lamb’s
primary defense was that he was not the one that committed the robbery; thus,
identity was the main issue during the trial, making the probative value of the Rule
404(b) evidence particularly high. See Smith, 459 F.3d at 1295. Additionally, the
district court provided multiple limiting instructions to the jury reducing the risk of
undue prejudice. Edouard, 485 F.3d at 1346. Thus, the district court did not abuse
its discretion by admitting the Rule 404(b) evidence because it was relevant to
7 USCA11 Case: 20-10236 Date Filed: 10/28/2020 Page: 8 of 9
prove identity and its probative value outweighed its prejudicial effect especially in
light of the district court’s limiting instructions. Accordingly, we affirm Lamb’s
convictions.
II.
When the defendant properly preserves the claim, we will conduct a de
novo review of the claim. United States v. Jiminez, 564 F.3d 1280, 1284 (11th
Cir. 2009). The district court’s denial of a motion for judgment of acquittal will
be upheld if a reasonable trier of fact could determine that the evidence
establishes the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. United States v.
Rodriguez, 218 F.3d 1243, 1244 (11th Cir. 2000). We view the facts and draw
all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the government. United
States v. Hansen, 262 F.3d 1217, 1236 (11th Cir. 2001) (citation omitted). We
must sustain a verdict where there is a reasonable basis for it in the record.
United States v. Farley, 607 F.3d 1294, 1333 (11th Cir. 2010). In conducting
sufficiency review, we will not consider testimony incredible as a matter of law
unless it cannot, on its face, be believed, such as where the witness could not
have observed certain events or they are contrary to the laws of nature. United
States v. Thompson, 422 F.3d 1285, 1291 (11th Cir. 2005).
8 USCA11 Case: 20-10236 Date Filed: 10/28/2020 Page: 9 of 9
The district court did not err by denying Lamb’s motion for acquittal.
Lamb’s ex-girlfriend’s testimony was not incredible as a matter of law: she
testified that she and Lamb committed each robbery together, and the government
presented additional testimony and evidence that corroborated that Lamb robbed
the stores and banks. See Thompson, 422 F.3d at 1291. The government
introduced several witnesses who testified about the robber’s height and
appearance as well as the getaway car. The witnesses corroborated some of the
details Williams provided about the various robberies. It also introduced
surveillance footage and photos of several of the robberies. A reasonable trier of
fact could find Lamb guilty beyond a reasonable doubt on Counts 1-6, especially
when the evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the government. See
Hansen, 262 F.3d at 1236; Rodriguez, 218 F.3d at 1244. Accordingly, we affirm
Lamb’s convictions.
AFFIRMED.