USCA4 Appeal: 24-4154 Doc: 26 Filed: 11/14/2025 Pg: 1 of 6
UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 24-4154
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
TITUS COSTON,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina, at Wilmington. Richard E. Myers, II, Chief District Judge. (7:23-cr-00067-M-KS-1)
Submitted: October 14, 2025 Decided: November 14, 2025
Before QUATTLEBAUM, Circuit Judge, and TRAXLER and KEENAN, Senior Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
ON BRIEF: G. Alan DuBois, Federal Public Defender, Jennifer C. Leisten, Assistant Federal Public Defender, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellant. Michael F. Easley, Jr., United States Attorney, David A. Bragdon, Assistant United States Attorney, Kristine L. Fritz, Assistant United States Attorney, Lucy Partain Brown, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. USCA4 Appeal: 24-4154 Doc: 26 Filed: 11/14/2025 Pg: 2 of 6
PER CURIAM:
Titus Coston appeals the 115-month sentence imposed following his guilty plea to
possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). He
asserts that his sentence is procedurally unreasonable because the district court erred when
calculating his Sentencing Guidelines range. We affirm.
In calculating Coston’s Guidelines range, the district court established a base
offense level of 26 because, inter alia, “the offense involved a semiautomatic firearm that
is capable of accepting a large capacity magazine.” U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual
§ 2K2.1(a)(1) (2023). Coston’s total offense level of 23 and criminal history category of
VI yielded a Guidelines range of 92 to 115 months’ imprisonment. Coston did not object
to the court’s Guidelines calculation. After the parties argued for an appropriate sentence
and Coston allocuted, the district court imposed a 115-month sentence.
Several days later, Coston filed a Fed. R. Crim. P. 35(a) motion, advising the district
court that upon further inquiry, he had learned that the extended magazine he possessed
did not satisfy the Guidelines commentary’s definition of a “large capacity magazine.” He
therefore asserted that his base offense level should have been 24, rather than 26. He asked
the court to enter an amended judgment reflecting the “[G]uidelines range that would
properly have applied but for the aforementioned mistake.” (J.A. 68). * The Government
conceded the error but contended it was harmless in light of the alternative variant sentence
announced by the district court at sentencing. The district court denied the motion.
* “J.A.” refers to the joint appendix filed by the parties in this appeal.
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On appeal, Coston argues that the district court’s error in applying a base offense
level of 26, rather than 24, when calculating his Guidelines range requires this court to
vacate and remand for resentencing. As the parties agree, because Coston did not object
to his base offense level in the district court, we review this issue for plain error only.
United States v. Lynn, 592 F.3d 572, 577 (4th Cir. 2010). “To establish plain error,
[Coston] must show that an error (1) was made, (2) is plain (i.e., clear or obvious), and
(3) affects substantial rights.” Id. If he makes this showing, we will exercise our discretion
“to correct the error only if it seriously affects the fairness, integrity or public reputation of
judicial proceedings.” Id. (citation modified). “Relief on plain error review is difficult to
get, as it should be.” United States v. Carthorne, 726 F.3d 503, 510 (4th Cir. 2013) (citation
modified).
The Government does not contest the first two prongs of the plain-error analysis,
but it asserts that the error did not affect Coston’s substantial rights because the district
court repeatedly advised that, if it had miscalculated the Guidelines range, it would impose
the same 115-month sentence as an alternative variance. We agree.
“An error affects a defendant’s substantial rights if the error affected the outcome
of the district court proceedings.” United States v. Hargrove, 625 F.3d 170, 184 (4th Cir.
2010) (citation modified). “To satisfy this requirement in the sentencing context, the
defendant must show that he would have received a lower sentence had the error not
occurred.” Id. at 184-85 (citation modified). “We have recognized that a Guidelines error
is harmless and does not warrant vacating the defendant’s sentence if the record shows that
(1) the district court would have reached the same result even if it had decided the
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Guidelines issue the other way, and (2) the sentence would be reasonable even if the
Guidelines issue had been decided in the defendant’s favor.” United States v. Mills, 917
F.3d 324, 330 (4th Cir. 2019) (citation modified).
First, the record amply shows that the district court would have reached the same
result even if it had applied the lower base offense level. After the court announced its
115-month sentence, it explicitly stated that it “would impose the same sentence as an
alternative variant sentence in light of all the Section 3553(a) factors that [the court had]
discussed. This is the sentence sufficient but not greater than necessary in this case.”
(J.A. 55-56). The court reiterated this fact in its written statement of reasons. And when
denying Coston’s Rule 35(a) motion, the court again referenced its alternative variance,
cited caselaw concerning harmless error, and reaffirmed its belief that “the sentence
previously imposed was then, and remains today, sufficient but not greater than necessary
in this case.” (J.A. 82 (citation modified)). “This expression of the sentencing court’s
views suffices to establish that the court would have imposed the same sentence even had
it resolved the [unpreserved] challenged Guidelines calculation in the defendant’s favor.”
Mills, 917 F.3d at 331 (citation modified).
Turning to the second prong, without the increased base offense level, Coston’s
Guidelines range would have been 77 to 96 months. See USSG §§ 2K2.1(a)(2); 3E1.1; see
also USSG ch. 5, pt. A (sentencing table). His 115-month sentence thus constitutes a
19-month upward variance from the Guidelines range that the parties now agree should
have applied. “We will generally find a variance sentence reasonable when the reasons
justifying the variance are tied to § 3553(a) and are plausible.” United States v. Provance,
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944 F.3d 213, 219 (4th Cir. 2019) (citation modified). “When the variance is a substantial
one .
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USCA4 Appeal: 24-4154 Doc: 26 Filed: 11/14/2025 Pg: 1 of 6
UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 24-4154
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
TITUS COSTON,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina, at Wilmington. Richard E. Myers, II, Chief District Judge. (7:23-cr-00067-M-KS-1)
Submitted: October 14, 2025 Decided: November 14, 2025
Before QUATTLEBAUM, Circuit Judge, and TRAXLER and KEENAN, Senior Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
ON BRIEF: G. Alan DuBois, Federal Public Defender, Jennifer C. Leisten, Assistant Federal Public Defender, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellant. Michael F. Easley, Jr., United States Attorney, David A. Bragdon, Assistant United States Attorney, Kristine L. Fritz, Assistant United States Attorney, Lucy Partain Brown, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. USCA4 Appeal: 24-4154 Doc: 26 Filed: 11/14/2025 Pg: 2 of 6
PER CURIAM:
Titus Coston appeals the 115-month sentence imposed following his guilty plea to
possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). He
asserts that his sentence is procedurally unreasonable because the district court erred when
calculating his Sentencing Guidelines range. We affirm.
In calculating Coston’s Guidelines range, the district court established a base
offense level of 26 because, inter alia, “the offense involved a semiautomatic firearm that
is capable of accepting a large capacity magazine.” U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual
§ 2K2.1(a)(1) (2023). Coston’s total offense level of 23 and criminal history category of
VI yielded a Guidelines range of 92 to 115 months’ imprisonment. Coston did not object
to the court’s Guidelines calculation. After the parties argued for an appropriate sentence
and Coston allocuted, the district court imposed a 115-month sentence.
Several days later, Coston filed a Fed. R. Crim. P. 35(a) motion, advising the district
court that upon further inquiry, he had learned that the extended magazine he possessed
did not satisfy the Guidelines commentary’s definition of a “large capacity magazine.” He
therefore asserted that his base offense level should have been 24, rather than 26. He asked
the court to enter an amended judgment reflecting the “[G]uidelines range that would
properly have applied but for the aforementioned mistake.” (J.A. 68). * The Government
conceded the error but contended it was harmless in light of the alternative variant sentence
announced by the district court at sentencing. The district court denied the motion.
* “J.A.” refers to the joint appendix filed by the parties in this appeal.
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On appeal, Coston argues that the district court’s error in applying a base offense
level of 26, rather than 24, when calculating his Guidelines range requires this court to
vacate and remand for resentencing. As the parties agree, because Coston did not object
to his base offense level in the district court, we review this issue for plain error only.
United States v. Lynn, 592 F.3d 572, 577 (4th Cir. 2010). “To establish plain error,
[Coston] must show that an error (1) was made, (2) is plain (i.e., clear or obvious), and
(3) affects substantial rights.” Id. If he makes this showing, we will exercise our discretion
“to correct the error only if it seriously affects the fairness, integrity or public reputation of
judicial proceedings.” Id. (citation modified). “Relief on plain error review is difficult to
get, as it should be.” United States v. Carthorne, 726 F.3d 503, 510 (4th Cir. 2013) (citation
modified).
The Government does not contest the first two prongs of the plain-error analysis,
but it asserts that the error did not affect Coston’s substantial rights because the district
court repeatedly advised that, if it had miscalculated the Guidelines range, it would impose
the same 115-month sentence as an alternative variance. We agree.
“An error affects a defendant’s substantial rights if the error affected the outcome
of the district court proceedings.” United States v. Hargrove, 625 F.3d 170, 184 (4th Cir.
2010) (citation modified). “To satisfy this requirement in the sentencing context, the
defendant must show that he would have received a lower sentence had the error not
occurred.” Id. at 184-85 (citation modified). “We have recognized that a Guidelines error
is harmless and does not warrant vacating the defendant’s sentence if the record shows that
(1) the district court would have reached the same result even if it had decided the
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Guidelines issue the other way, and (2) the sentence would be reasonable even if the
Guidelines issue had been decided in the defendant’s favor.” United States v. Mills, 917
F.3d 324, 330 (4th Cir. 2019) (citation modified).
First, the record amply shows that the district court would have reached the same
result even if it had applied the lower base offense level. After the court announced its
115-month sentence, it explicitly stated that it “would impose the same sentence as an
alternative variant sentence in light of all the Section 3553(a) factors that [the court had]
discussed. This is the sentence sufficient but not greater than necessary in this case.”
(J.A. 55-56). The court reiterated this fact in its written statement of reasons. And when
denying Coston’s Rule 35(a) motion, the court again referenced its alternative variance,
cited caselaw concerning harmless error, and reaffirmed its belief that “the sentence
previously imposed was then, and remains today, sufficient but not greater than necessary
in this case.” (J.A. 82 (citation modified)). “This expression of the sentencing court’s
views suffices to establish that the court would have imposed the same sentence even had
it resolved the [unpreserved] challenged Guidelines calculation in the defendant’s favor.”
Mills, 917 F.3d at 331 (citation modified).
Turning to the second prong, without the increased base offense level, Coston’s
Guidelines range would have been 77 to 96 months. See USSG §§ 2K2.1(a)(2); 3E1.1; see
also USSG ch. 5, pt. A (sentencing table). His 115-month sentence thus constitutes a
19-month upward variance from the Guidelines range that the parties now agree should
have applied. “We will generally find a variance sentence reasonable when the reasons
justifying the variance are tied to § 3553(a) and are plausible.” United States v. Provance,
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944 F.3d 213, 219 (4th Cir. 2019) (citation modified). “When the variance is a substantial
one . . . we must more carefully scrutinize the reasoning offered by the district court in
support of the sentence. And the farther the court diverges from the advisory guideline
range, the more compelling the reasons for the divergence must be.” Id. at 219-20 (citation
modified, discussing “two-thirds reduction from the bottom of the advisory guideline
range”). Still, we “must give due deference to the district court’s decision that the
§ 3553(a) factors, on a whole, justify the extent of the variance.” Gall v. United States,
552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007).
In light of the district court’s extensive engagement with the parties’ arguments and
its detailed explanation of its sentence, we conclude that the court thoroughly justified a
19-month upward variance. The court engaged with each mitigation argument Coston
proffered, ordered all his requested treatment and evaluations, and explained that it credited
Coston’s allocution statement that he intended to work hard to be able to return home to
his sons. The court confirmed with defense counsel that it addressed all of Coston’s
mitigation arguments.
In explaining its chosen sentence, the district court repeatedly expressed concern
with the need to protect the public in light of Coston’s extensive, violent criminal history,
and his continued possession and use of firearms. The court stated that—contrary to
Coston’s request for a downward variance—it seriously had considered an upward variance
to 130 months. But the court ultimately found that balancing the § 3553(a) factors in light
of all the parties’ arguments warranted a 115-month sentence. The court’s explanation
amply demonstrates that it thoughtfully weighed the § 3553(a) factors and determined that,
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even if the court had miscalculated the advisory Guidelines range, the 115-month sentence
imposed was “sufficient, but not greater than necessary,” to satisfy the goals of sentencing,
see 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).
Because the Guidelines calculation error was harmless, Coston has not established
that the plain error in this case affected his substantial rights. Accordingly, we affirm the
criminal judgment. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would
not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED