United States v. Titus Bryant

Ninth Circuit

United States v. Titus Bryant

697 F. App'x 503

CourtCourt of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

DecidedSeptember 6, 2017

Docket16-30198

StatusUnpublished

This text of 697 F. App'x 503 (United States v. Titus Bryant) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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United States v. Titus Bryant, 697 F. App'x 503 (9th Cir. 2017).

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Opinion

MEMORANDUM ***

Titus M. Bryant appeals a special condition of his supervised release sentence. That special condition imposed by the district court requires Bryant to comply with the violent offender registration requirements of any state in which he resides. Bryant contends that the court abused its discretion because the condition does not reasonably relate to the statutory goals of sentencing and imposes a greater deprivation of liberty than is reasonably necessary. We reject these arguments and we affirm.

First, the requirement that Bryant comply with violent offender registration laws is reasonably related—indeed, it is perfectly tailored—to the goal of deterring him from violating those laws. That relationship is enough. See United States v. Bare, 806 F.3d 1011, 1017 (9th Cir. 2015) (“A condition of supervised release does not have to be related to the offense of conviction, because the sentencing judge is statutorily required to look forward in time to crimes that may be committed in the future by the convicted defendant.”) (quoting United States v. Blinkinsop, 606 F.3d 1110, 1119 (9th Cir. 2010)). Also, if a state requires Bryant to register as a violent offender, then the goals of deterring future acts of violence and protecting the public are served by notifying people about the potential danger Bryant poses.

Second, the condition does not deprive Bryant of any liberty he would otherwise *504 enjoy. Violent offender registration laws may encroach on Bryant’s liberty interests, but the condition requiring compliance with these laws does not. Bryant was not ever free to break the law. Uncertainty about the precise requirements of the laws of fifty states does not make this special condition unduly restrictive.

AFFIRMED.

***

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

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MEMORANDUM ***

Titus M. Bryant appeals a special condition of his supervised release sentence. That special condition imposed by the district court requires Bryant to comply with the violent offender registration requirements of any state in which he resides. Bryant contends that the court abused its discretion because the condition does not reasonably relate to the statutory goals of sentencing and imposes a greater deprivation of liberty than is reasonably necessary. We reject these arguments and we affirm.

First, the requirement that Bryant comply with violent offender registration laws is reasonably related—indeed, it is perfectly tailored—to the goal of deterring him from violating those laws. That relationship is enough. See United States v. Bare, 806 F.3d 1011, 1017 (9th Cir. 2015) (“A condition of supervised release does not have to be related to the offense of conviction, because the sentencing judge is statutorily required to look forward in time to crimes that may be committed in the future by the convicted defendant.”) (quoting United States v. Blinkinsop, 606 F.3d 1110, 1119 (9th Cir. 2010)). Also, if a state requires Bryant to register as a violent offender, then the goals of deterring future acts of violence and protecting the public are served by notifying people about the potential danger Bryant poses.

Second, the condition does not deprive Bryant of any liberty he would otherwise *504 enjoy. Violent offender registration laws may encroach on Bryant’s liberty interests, but the condition requiring compliance with these laws does not. Bryant was not ever free to break the law. Uncertainty about the precise requirements of the laws of fifty states does not make this special condition unduly restrictive.

AFFIRMED.

***

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

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697 F. App'x 503, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/united-states-v-titus-bryant-ca9-2017.

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