United States v. Timothy Jefferson

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
• Decided: June 26, 2024
• Docket: 23-3639
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION File Name: 24a0278n.06

No. 23-3639

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT FILED Jun 26, 2024 ) KELLY L. STEPHENS, Clerk UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ) Plaintiff-Appellee, ) ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED ) v. STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR ) THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ) TIMOTHY S. JEFFERSON, OHIO ) OPINION Defendant-Appellant. ) )

Before: KETHLEDGE, THAPAR, and DAVIS, Circuit Judges.

KETHLEDGE, Circuit Judge. Timothy Jefferson pled guilty to two drug-trafficking

offenses, and the district court sentenced him to a within-guidelines sentence of 204 months’

imprisonment. Jefferson now argues that the district court did not adequately explain its reasons

for the sentence. We disagree and affirm.

Jefferson pled guilty to conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute cocaine, which

carried a mandatory-minimum sentence of ten years, and to possession of a firearm in furtherance

of a drug-trafficking offense, which carried a mandatory-minimum sentence of five years, to be

served consecutively. See 21 U.S.C. §§ 846, 841(b)(1)(A)-(B); 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). The probation

officer calculated a guideline range of 135 to 168 months for the conspiracy offense plus 60 months

for the firearm offense, and recommended a total sentence of 204 months. Neither party objected

to those calculations.

At sentencing, the government likewise recommended a 204-month sentence. Jefferson’s

counsel instead requested the mandatory-minimum (and below guidelines) sentence of 180 No. 23-3639, United States v. Jefferson

months, arguing that the “mandatory [terms] are pretty harsh” and that Jefferson was “not a young

man anymore. By the time he gets out of prison, you know, he’s going to be an older man,” so the

“minimum required sentence would be adequate.” The district court asked the government

whether it agreed that the mandatory-minimum sentence was sufficient. The government said no:

not only did Jefferson have “numerous” criminal convictions, it explained, he had been carrying a

loaded firearm while dealing drugs from three different locations—running a “drug trafficking

enterprise” beyond “that of just a simple drug dealer.” The district court asked whether the

government knew of cases with similar facts where a district court judge imposed a sentence above

the mandatory minimum. The government said yes.

After that exchange, the district court said that it had “reviewed the facts of this case very

carefully prior [to] today.” The court then sentenced Jefferson to the probation officer’s

recommended sentence of 204 months, which the court said “comport[ed] with 3553(a).”

Jefferson now argues that the district court did not adequately explain the reasons for its

sentence—specifically, its reasons for rejecting Jefferson’s age-related argument in support of his

request for a downward variance. Jefferson did not object at sentencing, so we review the district

court’s explanation for plain error. United States v. Vonner, 516 F.3d 382, 386 (6th Cir. 2008) (en

banc). To be plain, an error must be clear and must affect both the defendant’s substantial rights

and the “fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” United States v. Russell,

26 F.4th 371, 376 (6th Cir. 2022) (quotation marks omitted).

Typically, a district court’s explanation of a sentence is adequate when it addresses the

relevant factors from 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). United States v. Solano-Rosales, 781 F.3d 345, 351

(6th Cir. 2015). A brief explanation will often suffice, particularly when the district court “agree[d]

with the Sentencing Commission’s recommendations” and imposed a within-guidelines sentence.

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Vonner, 516 F.3d at 387. Here, the district court said that it considered a “large number of letters”

from Jefferson’s family, the § 3553(a) factors, the sentencing memoranda, and the probation

officer’s recommendation. We have no reason to think otherwise. Indeed, the district court

acknowledged the arguments Jefferson had made in his sentencing memorandum, including

Jefferson’s request to be sent to a medical facility.

Jefferson counters that the district court did not specifically respond to his argument about

his age. But we do not require district courts to “respond to mitigation arguments point-by-point.”

United States v. Gunter, 620 F.3d 642, 646 (6th Cir. 2010). And the argument itself amounted to

a sentence or two. The record as a whole shows that the district court did not plainly err when it

imposed Jefferson’s 204-month sentence.

The district court’s judgment is affirmed.

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