UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
No. 94-2170
UNITED STATES, Appellee,
v.
THREE JUVENILES, Defendants - Appellees.
GLOBE NEWSPAPER COMPANY, Intervenor - Appellant.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
[Hon. Patti B. Saris, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Torruella, Chief Judge,
Bownes, Senior Circuit Judge,
and Selya, Circuit Judge.
Jonathan M. Albano, with whom Mark W. Batten, Alicia L.
Downey and Bingham, Dana & Gould, were on brief for appellant.
Eileen Penner, Attorney, Department of Justice, with whom
Deval L. Patrick, Assistant Attorney General, and Jessica
Dunsay Silver, Attorney, Department of Justice, were on brief for
appellee, United States.
July 31, 1995
TORRUELLA, Chief Judge. This appeal requires us to TORRUELLA, Chief Judge
interpret and apply the confidentiality provisions of the Federal
Juvenile Delinquency Act (the "Act"), 18 U.S.C. 5031-5042. We
hold that the Act authorizes, but does not mandate, closure of
juvenile proceedings. Although we disagree with the district
court's interpretation of the statute, we nevertheless find that
the court's decision to close the proceedings was within its
discretion and proper under the Act.
I. I.
On July 19, 1994, the government charged three
juveniles with civil rights violations under the Federal Juvenile
Delinquency Act (the "Act"), 18 U.S.C. 5031-5042. The charges
involved "hate crimes" allegedly committed by the juveniles as
members of a white supremacist group. On the same day that the
juveniles were charged, the grand jury indicted an adult, Brian
Clayton, with violations of 18 U.S.C. 241 (conspiracy to
violate civil rights) and 371 (conspiracy to intimidate and
interfere with federally protected activities on account of
race). The indictment charges that Clayton committed these
violations as a member of the same white supremacist group to
which the three juveniles allegedly belonged.
Just prior to the juveniles' arraignments on July 20,
1994, intervenor-appellant Globe Newspaper Company (the "Globe")
moved to intervene in the juvenile proceedings for purposes of
gaining access to the arraignments and subsequent proceedings, as
well as to any judicial documents filed in connection with those
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proceedings. The district court allowed the Globe to intervene
and granted it access to certain redacted court documents, but
denied public access to the arraignments on the grounds that
5038 of the Act mandated closure of the proceedings. United
States v. Three Juveniles, Globe Newspaper Co., 862 F. Supp. 651,
658 (D. Mass. 1994). The court alternatively held that, even if
closure were discretionary, it would close the proceedings in
this case. See id. at 658. The Globe argues on appeal that the
First Amendment creates a right of access to juvenile
proceedings, that the district court erred by interpreting the
Act to mandate closure of juvenile proceedings, and that the
factors set forth and relied upon by the district court in its
opinion are not sufficiently compelling to justify closure of the
proceedings.
II. II.
The issues presented by this appeal involve the
interpretation and constitutionality of certain provisions of the
Act. Because these are purely questions of law, our review is
plenary. See United States v. Gifford, 17 F.3d 462, 472 (1st
Cir. 1994); see also United States v. M.I.M., 932 F.2d 1016, 1019
(1st Cir. 1991) (district court's interpretation of statute is
reviewed de novo).
The Act governs the detention and disposition of
juveniles charged with delinquency. 18 U.S.C. 5031-5037. The
statute also contains confidentiality provisions, set forth in
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5032 and 5038.1 Enacted in 1938, the Act was intended "to
1 Section 5032 provides in relevant part that:
. . . any proceedings against [an alleged juvenile delinquent] shall be in an appropriate district court of the United States. For such purposes, the court may be convened at any time and place within the district, in chambers or otherwise
. . . .
18 U.S.C. 5032 (emphasis added). The second confidentiality provision, 5038, provides that:
(a) Throughout and upon the completion of the juvenile delinquency proceeding, the records shall be safeguarded from disclosure to unauthorized persons. The records shall be released to the extent necessary to meet the following circumstances:
(1) inquiries received from another court of law; (2) inquiries from an agency preparing a presentence report for another court; (3) inquiries from law enforcement agencies where the request for information is related to the investigation of a crime or a position within that agency; (4) inquiries, in writing, from the director of a treatment agency or the director of a facility to which the juvenile has been committed by the court; (5) inquiries from an agency considering the person for a position immediately and directly affecting the national security; and (6) inquiries from any victim of such juvenile delinquency, or if the victim is deceased from the immediate family of such victim, related to the final disposition of such juvenile by the court in accordance with section 5037.
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provide for the care and treatment of juvenile delinquents."
H.R. Rep. No. 2617, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. 1 (1938). "[T]he Act's
underlying purpose is to rehabilitate, not to punish, so as 'to
assist youths in becoming productive members of our society
. . .'." In re Sealed Case (Juvenile Transfer), 893 F.2d 363,
367 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (quoting S. Rep. No. 1011, 93d Cong., 2d
Sess. 22 (1974)); accord United States v. Welch, 15 F.3d 1202,
1211 n.12 (1st Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1863 (1994).
To this end, the Act attempts to insulate juveniles from the
stigma of a criminal record. In re Sealed Case, 893 F.2d at 367-
68; see also S. Rep. No. 1989, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. 1 (1938)
Unless otherwise authorized by this section, information about the juvenile record may not be released when the request for information is related to an application for employment, license, bonding, or any civil right or privilege. Responses to such inquiries shall not be different from responses made about persons who have never been involved in a delinquency proceeding . . . .
(c) During the course of any juvenile proceeding, all information and records relating to the proceeding, which are obtained or prepared in the discharge of an official duty by an employee of the court or an employee of any other governmental agency, shall not be disclosed directly or indirectly to anyone other than the judge, counsel for the juvenile and the Government, or others entitled under this section to receive juvenile records . . . .
(e) Unless a juvenile who is taken into custody is prosecuted as an adult neither the name nor picture of any juvenile shall be made public in connection with a juvenile delinquency proceeding . . . .
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("[A] juvenile delinquent for whom there is some hope of
rehabilitation should not receive the stigma of a criminal record
that would attach to him throughout his life."). The
confidentiality provisions of the Act are therefore quite
essential to the Act's statutory scheme and overarching
rehabilitative purpose.
Based on its reading of the statute and its legislative
history, the district court held that the Act allowed it some
discretion to disclose information about juvenile proceedings, so
long as the disclosure does not contravene the "express mandate"
of 5038(e) that the juvenile's name and picture not be made
public. 862 F. Supp. at 658. This construction of the Act,
according to the district court, is also consistent with the
Supreme Court's First Amendment jurisprudence. Id. at 655-56
(citing, inter alia, Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court for
the County of Norfolk, 457 U.S. 596, 608 (1982)). We turn now to
the Globe's contention that the district court's interpretation
was in error.
III. III.
As the district court recognized, the Act implicates
First Amendment concerns, and thus must be interpreted with the
Supreme Court's First Amendment jurisprudence in mind. It is
well-settled that the First Amendment provides a right of public
access to most proceedings growing out of adult criminal cases.
See Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 478 U.S. 1, 3 (1986)
("Press-Enterprise II") (First Amendment provides right of access
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to transcript of preliminary hearing of a criminal prosecution);
Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court of California, 464 U.S.
501, 508-510 (1984) ("Press-Enterprise I") (First Amendment
creates "presumption of openness" of voir dire proceedings in
criminal case); Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S.
555, 580 (1980) (plurality opinion) (the public's right to attend
criminal trials is implicit in First Amendment's guarantees).2
This First Amendment right of access is not absolute, however.
Competing values and interests may warrant a denial of access to
proceedings and records in some situations. Press-Enterprise II,
478 U.S. at 9; see also Rivera-Puig v. Garc a-Rosario, 983 F.2d
311, 314 (1st Cir. 1992). In such a case, reviewing courts must
determine whether the closure is "essential to preserve higher
values" and "narrowly tailored to serve that interest." Press-
Enterprise I, 464 U.S. at 510.
Since the "Juvenile Court" movement began in this
country at the end of the last century, all states, the District
of Columbia, and Puerto Rico have adopted juvenile court systems.
See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 14 (1967). The development of the
juvenile justice system throughout the country has been marked by
a "special sensitivity" about information regarding juveniles and
"the impact that public dissemination of such information may
2 Although some circuits have recognized a public right of access to civil trials as well, see, e.g., Republic of
Philippines v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 949 F.2d 653, 659 (3d
Cir. 1991), this Circuit has never decided whether the First Amendment mandates such a general right of access. Anderson v.
Cryovac, Inc., 805 F.2d 1, 10-11 (1st Cir. 1986). We find it
unnecessary to do so here.
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have on the youths involved." United States v. A.D., PG
Publishing Co., 28 F.3d 1353, 1357 (3d Cir. 1994) ("PG
Publishing"). Accordingly, many, if not most, states currently
authorize or mandate closure of juvenile proceedings.3 The
Supreme Court has also acknowledged this tradition of
confidentiality of juvenile proceedings. See, e.g., In re Gault,
387 U.S. at 25 ("[T]here is no reason why, consistently with due
process, a State cannot continue, if it deems appropriate, to
provide and to improve provision for the confidentiality of
records of police contacts and court action relating to
juveniles.").
The Supreme Court has never determined whether the
First Amendment right of public access attaches to juvenile
proceedings, and thus has not decided whether across-the-board
closure of such proceedings violates the First Amendment. See PG
3 See, e.g., Ala. Code 12-15-65(a); Alaska Stat. 47.10.070(a);
Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. 54-76h; D.C. Code Ann. 16-2316(e); Ga. Code Ann. 15-11-28(c); Hawaii Rev. Stat. Tit. 31 s. 571-41(b); Idaho Juv. R. 22(b); Ill. Rev. Stats. Ch. 705 s. 405/l-5(6); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. 610.070(3); Miss. Code Ann. 43-21-203(6); Mo. Ann. Stat. 211.171(5); Nev. Rev. Stat. 62.193(1); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. 169-B:34; N.D. Cent. Code 27-20-24(5); Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. 6336(d); R.I. Gen. L. 14-1-30; S.C. Code Ann. 20-7-755; S.D. Codified Laws Ann. 26-7A-36; Vt. Stat. Ann. Tit. 33 s. 5523(c); Va. Code 16.1-302; Wash. Rev. Code Ann. 13-34.110; W. Va. Code 49-5-1(d); Wis. Stat. Ann. 48-299(1)(a); Wyo. Stat. 14-6-224(b) (all authorizing or requiring that the general public be excluded from juvenile proceedings). See also Calif. Welf. & Inst. Code
676(a); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. Tit. 15 s. 3307(2)(B); Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 119 s. 65; Minn. Stat. Ann. 260.155(c); Okla. Stat. Ann. Tit. 10 s. 1111(A)(1); Tex. Fam. Code Ann. 54-08; Utah Code Ann. 78-3a-33(2) (all barring the public from juvenile proceedings except for those involving certain classes of offenses, such as murder, or when the juvenile is older than fifteen years).
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Publishing, 28 F.3d at 1357. In a very instructive case,
however, the Court addressed whether the First Amendment allows a
statutory bar to public access to adult criminal trials during
the testimony of sex-offense victims who are minors. See Globe,
457 U.S. at 607. Although the Supreme Court acknowledged the
compelling state interests of protecting the victims from further
trauma and embarrassment and encouraging other victims to come
forward, it held that neither interest sufficiently justified a
blanket closure in every case involving a youthful sex-offense
victim. Id. at 607. The Court explained:
[A]s compelling as that interest [in protecting the minor victims] is, it does not justify a mandatory closure rule, for
it is clear that the circumstances of the particular case may affect the significance of the interest. A trial court can determine on a case-by-case basis whether closure is necessary to protect the welfare of a minor victim. . . . Section 16A, in contrast, requires closure even if the victim does not seek the exclusion of the press and general public, and would not suffer injury by their presence. . . . In short, 16A cannot be viewed as a narrowly tailored means of accommodating the State's asserted interest: That interest could be served just as well by requiring the trial court to determine on a case-by-case basis whether the State's legitimate concern for the well-being of the minor victim necessitates closure. Such an approach ensures that the constitutional right of the press and the public to gain access to criminal trials will not be restricted except where necessary to protect the State's interest.
Id. Significantly, the Court added:
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We emphasize that our holding is a narrow one: that a rule of mandatory closure respecting the testimony of minor sex victims is constitutionally infirm. In
individual cases, and under appropriate
circumstances, the First Amendment does
not necessarily stand as a bar to the
exclusion from the courtroom of the press
and general public during the testimony
of minor sex-offense victims. But a
mandatory rule, requiring no
particularized determinations in
individual cases, is unconstitutional.
Id. at 611 n.27 (emphasis added).
In the instant case, the Globe argues that the public
does have a First Amendment right of access to juvenile
proceedings. Relying on the Court's language in Globe, 457 U.S.
at 607-08, 611, the Globe contends that the district court's
construction of the Act as imposing "a mandatory closure
requirement on all juvenile proceedings" renders the Act
unconstitutional. Assuming arguendo that the First Amendment
right of public access does apply to some degree to juvenile
proceedings,4 we agree that while the Globe case is not directly
applicable here, the Court's reasoning in that case strongly
suggests that the district court's preferred reading of the Act
raises some serious First Amendment concerns.
There may, however, be no need to resolve this
potential conflict between the Act and the First Amendment. It
4 This is, however, a highly dubious assumption, particularly in light of the long, entrenched, and well-founded tradition of confidentiality regarding juvenile proceedings, and the compelling rehabilitative purposes behind this tradition. See
supra note 2; see also In re Sealed Case (Juvenile Transfer), 893
F.2d 363, 367 (D.C. Cir. 1990); discussion infra section IV.
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is a well-established rule of statutory construction that "where
an otherwise acceptable construction of a statute would raise
serious constitutional problems, [reviewing courts should]
construe the statute to avoid such problems unless such
construction is plainly contrary to the intent of Congress."
DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast Trades Council, 485 U.S.
568, 575 (1988). We therefore must examine the Act's purpose and
language to determine whether it is necessary to call the Act's
constitutionality into question by construing it to mandate an
across-the-board bar to public access.
IV. IV.
As we have explained, the primary purpose of the Act is
to facilitate the rehabilitation of juvenile delinquents. In re
Sealed Case, 893 F.2d at 367. Protection of the juvenile from
the stigma of a criminal record by preserving the confidentiality
of proceedings is an essential element of the Act's statutory
scheme. See discussion supra at 5.
The government argues that the Act's rehabilitative
purpose can only be effectuated by prohibiting public disclosure
of information about juvenile proceedings, and contends that the
Act's language explicitly so directs. The Globe contends,
conversely, that the Act's language does not mandate closure, but
leaves the decision to the district court's discretion, to be
determined on a case-by-case basis. In so contending, the Globe
relies heavily on PG Publishing, 28 F.3d at 1359-60, and we
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agree that the Third Circuit's reasoning in that case is quite
persuasive.
As the district court acknowledged, the Act does not
expressly require a closed hearing for a juvenile proceeding.
862 F. Supp. at 655. Section 5032 of the Act provides that
juvenile proceedings may be convened "at any time and place
within the district, in chambers or otherwise." This phrase
certainly seems to contemplate that district court judges will
exercise their discretion to determine when, where, and in what
manner juvenile proceedings will be conducted. Moreover, we
agree with the Third Circuit that the language "in chambers or
otherwise" strongly implies that the district court's discretion
includes "a decision regarding the availability and degree of
public access." PG Publishing, 28 F.3d at 1359. This section of
the Act therefore provides "strong evidence" that Congress did
not intend mandatory closure of all juvenile proceedings, but
rather left the question of public access to the district court's
discretion. Id.
The first paragraph of 5038(a) of the Act states that
"the records [of any juvenile proceeding] shall be safeguarded
from disclosure to unauthorized persons." Pointing to this
provision, the government contends that the Act explicitly
prohibits disclosure of juvenile records except to the entities
enumerated in subsequent paragraphs, and that this evidences
Congressional intent to create an across-the-board ban on
disclosure to any and all other parties. We do not think,
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however, that this language is quite so conclusive; the section
does not explicitly mandate denial of public access to juvenile
records, but provides only that the records are to be
"safeguarded from disclosure to unauthorized persons." Giving
this phrase a less strained, more common sense reading, we think
that the section prohibits disclosure only to those persons not
authorized by the district court to receive such information.
See PG Publishing, 28 F.3d at 1359 (reaching the same
conclusion). The only express prohibitive mandate contained in
all of 5038(a) rests in the final paragraph, which prohibits
the district court from authorizing disclosure in situations
"when the request for information is related to an application
for employment, license, bonding or any civil right or
privilege."
Nor do we think that the parties enumerated in
paragraphs (a)(1) through (a)(6) of 5038 constitute the
exclusive list of persons intended by Congress to ever receive
information about juvenile proceedings. Rather, the paragraphs
merely list those persons who have a right to obtain juvenile
records upon request. Indeed, if this were meant to be an
exclusive list, then the final paragraph of the section
(prohibiting disclosure when the information is sought in
relation to a job application, etc.) would be superfluous. PG
Publishing, 28 F.3d at 1360. Read as a whole, then, we think
that 5038(a) further evidences Congressional intent to leave
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disclosure of juvenile records within the district court's
discretion.5
The only section of the Act that suggests that Congress
intended an across-the-board bar to public access is 5038(e),
which provides that "neither the name nor picture of any juvenile
shall be made public in connection with a juvenile delinquency
proceeding." The district court reasoned that if it were to
permit public access to the proceedings, the juveniles' names
would certainly, unavoidably, be made public, in direct
contravention of 5038(e). 862 F. Supp. at 655. Because it saw
no way to obey the letter of 5038(e) short of closing the
proceedings, the district court interpreted the Act to mandate
closure. Id. at 655-56. The government now urges us to affirm
this interpretation, arguing that any other reading would render
the confidentiality provisions a nullity.
On this point, however, we are persuaded once again by
the reasoning of the PG Publishing court, which explained:
A prohibition against making a juvenile's name or picture available to the public, however, strikes us as an indirect and unlikely way for Congress to stipulate that all hearings under the Act will be closed to the public. State statutes that restrict access to juvenile proceedings generally do so directly and
5 The language of 5038(c) does not conflict with our interpretation. This section provides that all information and records relating to the proceeding "shall not be disclosed directly or indirectly to anyone other than the judge, counsel for the juvenile and the Government, or others entitled under
this section to receive juvenile records." (Emphasis added). We
read the underlined phrase to mean any other persons authorized by the court to receive information under 5038(a).
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clearly. . . . We think it far more likely that 5038(e) was intended not to limit the discretion of trial judges to regulate access to juvenile delinquency proceedings, but to foreclose law enforcement officials from holding press conferences at which the name and picture of the juvenile would be "made public in connection with a juvenile delinquency proceeding."
28 F.3d at 1360-61 (quoting 18 U.S.C. 5038(e)). Certainly, if
Congress intended to mandate closure of all juvenile proceedings,
it could have done so expressly and directly. Cf., e.g., 18
U.S.C. 3509(e) (authorizing "the exclusion from the courtroom
of all persons, including members of the press, who do not have a
direct interest in the case" during the testimony of child
witnesses).
We also agree with the Globe that even if the
prohibition on disclosure of a juvenile's name and picture
prevents unfettered public access to proceedings, it does not
necessarily follow that 5038(e) commands total closure. The
statutory directive can in many instances be satisfied by other,
less restrictive means. For example, public access to records or
proceedings poses no risk of disclosure of the juvenile's
picture, as cameras can be banned from the proceedings and names
redacted from documents. Similarly, there are methods short of
complete closure, such as the use of initials or pseudonyms, that
would protect against inadvertent disclosure of the juveniles'
names.
Finally, we think that interpreting the entire Act in
light of 5038(e), rather than vice versa, attributes undue
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significance to that section. To hold that the Act must mandate
closure because of 5038(e) is effectively to ignore strong
indicia elsewhere in the statute that Congress did not intend to
create a blanket prohibition on public access, but rather to vest
discretion with the district courts to fashion proceedings in a
manner most appropriate for each individual case.
For these reasons, we hold that the Act does not
mandate across-the-board closure for all juvenile proceedings,
but merely authorizes closure, or any other measures designed to
ensure confidentiality, to be determined on a case-by-case basis
at the discretion of the district court.6 We think that this
interpretation fully comports with the purpose and language of
the statute as a whole, and is far preferable to a strained
construction of the Act that mandates complete closure and thus
triggers First Amendment concerns.
V. V.
We turn now to the Globe's final contentions on appeal,
namely, that the district court's articulated reasons for closing
the proceedings are not "sufficiently compelling" to justify
closure in this case, that the court's order does not effectively
serve its intended interests, and that the order is not "narrowly
tailored." The Globe offers several theories in support of these
contentions, none of which we find persuasive.
6 We emphasize that we are not holding or even suggesting that juvenile proceedings ought to be open. We are merely holding that the Act does not invariably require them to be closed.
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As an initial matter, we note that the Globe's
arguments on this point seem to rest on the assumption that
juvenile proceedings should be open as a rule, and only
compelling interests justify closure. Certainly, a district
court must exercise its discretion soundly, and must articulate
reasons which are supported by the record and in keeping with the
policies of the Act. Contrary to the Globe's implied assumption,
however, the language and policy of the Act, as well as the
history of juvenile justice proceedings in this country over the
past century, indicate that a court's exercise of its discretion
to close juvenile proceedings is not an exception to some general
rule of openness, but the norm.
The district court's findings here were meticulously
specific. The court first correctly noted the Act's overarching
objective of protecting juveniles from stigma in order to
facilitate rehabilitation. 862 F. Supp. at 657. The court found
that these juveniles were particularly amenable to
rehabilitation, based on the prosecutor's decision not to seek
transfer to adult status and the clean prior records of two of
the juveniles. Id. The district court also gave weight to the
juveniles' opposition to open proceedings, noting that the media
had already subjected the youths to overwhelming publicity, and
concluding that adequate protection of the juveniles from stigma
and public scrutiny would be impossible unless the proceedings
were closed. Id.
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The Globe contends that the court should not have
relied upon the opposition of the juveniles themselves to open
proceedings, as such a wish is "unremarkable" and "does not
suggest that this case involves any individualized concern for
closure different from those present in virtually every juvenile
proceeding." As the government points out, however, protection
of the accused is one of the strongest justifications for
allowing public access to the proceeding. When the accused
juvenile, on advice of counsel, opposes public access, this
justification is vitiated. Further, the juveniles' own
assessment of their interests is a highly reliable indicator of
whether they will be irreparably stigmatized by open proceedings.
Given the Act's strong policy in favor of protecting juveniles
from such stigma, we think the juveniles' opposition to open
proceedings was a relevant factor for the district court to
consider.
The Globe also attempts to downplay the significance of
the fact that the juveniles had not been transferred for adult
prosecution. The prosecutors' determination not to transfer the
juveniles is based on an evaluation of criteria set forth by the
Act, including the age and social background of the juvenile, the
nature of the alleged offense, the extent of the juvenile's prior
record, and the juvenile's present intellectual development and
psychological maturity. 18 U.S.C. 5032. Because all of these
criteria are highly significant indicators of the amenability of
the juvenile to rehabilitation, they are also very relevant to
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the court's decision whether to close the proceedings. By taking
the prosecutors' decision into consideration, then, the court was
also giving weight to these factors. That these factors will
often militate in favor of closure in juvenile proceedings does
not in any way diminish their relevance or weight; to the
contrary, it merely underscores the Act's strong preference for
preserving the confidentiality of juvenile records.7
The Globe also contends that the district court's order
does not effectively serve its intended interests, as nothing in
the court's opinion indicates that the closure order will
"effectively preserve the juveniles' confidentiality." In its
opinion, the district court recognized that media coverage of the
proceedings had already been extensive, that one of the juveniles
had already been interviewed, that the juveniles had already been
identified several times in the press, and that many of the
details of their alleged conduct had already been disclosed
through the related adult criminal prosecution of Clayton. 862
F. Supp. at 659. The Globe now points to these facts and argues
that because all this information had already been aired in the
press, "whatever stigma the juveniles may acquire will attach
even if the press is excluded from the proceedings." Therefore,
7 The Globe also suggests that the heinous nature of the juveniles' alleged conduct augments the public interest in "seeing justice done," and therefore supports opening the proceedings. Given the Act's policy of preventing stigma, however, this argument is completely misguided. It is precisely because the alleged crimes have provoked so much public outrage
and antipathy that closure becomes more appropriate, in order to best effectuate the Act's purpose.
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according to the Globe, because the district court's closure
order cannot possibly preserve the juveniles' anonymity, it is
ineffective, and cannot stand.
This is a flawed, circular argument with disturbing
ramifications. Essentially, the Globe is arguing that because
the press has already obtained and published some information,
any further attempts by the district court to preserve
confidentiality are either futile or irrelevant. Contrary to the
Globe's contention, the fact that the juveniles have already
suffered stigma does not justify removing or denying them all
further protections created by the Act. Moreover, we agree with
the government that to allow the media to "leverage" partial
information into an unfettered right of access to otherwise
nonpublic proceedings would grant the media a dangerous control
over important state interests. We therefore reject the Globe's
contentions on this point, and hold that the district court's
closure order sufficiently serves its stated purpose of
preserving what confidentiality remains of the proceedings.
The Globe also argues that the district court's closure
order is not "narrowly tailored." Because the district court
could have effected its intended purpose through less restrictive
means, such as using pseudonyms and redacting identifying
information from proceedings and records, the Globe argues, its
total ban on public access was unwarranted. Again, we note that
the Globe is relying on the dubious assumption that district
courts must meet the extremely stringent First Amendment
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standards applied to adult criminal cases in order to justify
closure of juvenile proceedings.
Even assuming, however, that such standards are
applicable here, we find that they are sufficiently met by the
court's order. As the district court recognized, it could not
bar the media from publishing information legally obtained. 862
F. Supp. at 657 (citing Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Co., 443
U.S. 97 (1979)). Because it had no way of ensuring that certain
identifying information would remain confidential if the
proceedings were open to the press, the court concluded that it
had no less restrictive alternative to closing the proceedings.
Id. We think this reasoning is quite sound. The identities of
the juveniles had already been widely publicized. Redaction of
the juveniles' names from the proceedings as the Globe suggests
would therefore have been an exercise in futility.
Realistically, the press would merely publish detailed accounts
of the "redacted" proceedings, substituting the identifying
information previously obtained. In short, redaction, or any
other compromise measure, would have been ineffective in
preserving the confidentiality of the proceedings.8
8 We likewise reject the Globe's arguments that the district court's order impermissibly infringes the public right of access to court records by shifting the burden of obtaining access onto the public. Rather than sealing the case file and requiring interested parties to move for further disclosures, the Globe suggests, the court should have done just the opposite and required trial counsel to move for impoundment of particular documents. This contention is yet another example of the Globe's attempt to force juvenile proceedings into the First Amendment framework developed for adult criminal proceedings. Section 5038(a) of the Act specifically provides that throughout a
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Finally, the Globe contends that the district court's
order violates the public's common law right of access to
proceedings and records. It is true that "courts of this country
recognize a general right to inspect . . . judicial records and
documents." Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc., 435 U.S. 589,
597 (1978). The Supreme Court has explained, however, that this
right is not absolute; rather, the decision as to such access is
"best left to the sound discretion of the trial court, a
discretion to be exercised in light of the relevant facts and
circumstances of the particular case." Id. at 598-99. Assuming
that this common law right of access applies to juvenile court
records,9 we do not think that the district court's order here
improperly infringes on this right. In this context, the
qualified common law right of access to proceedings has been
supplanted by the statutory scheme of the Act. As we interpret
them, however, the Act's confidentiality provisions do not
significantly alter or restrict that common law right in any way,
but leave public access to the sound discretion of trial courts.
Because the district court's order fully comports with the
juvenile delinquency proceeding, "the records shall be safeguarded from disclosure to unauthorized persons." As we have explained, this section grants the district court the discretion to release juvenile records as it deems appropriate. The district court's order here meticulously tracks this language of the Act, and we therefore find that its method of determining public access to court records is entirely proper.
9 It is not altogether clear that this common law right of access applies to juvenile court records, in light of the long, sound tradition of preserving the confidentiality of juvenile proceedings. See supra note 4.
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provisions of the Act and is thus a proper exercise of its
discretion, the order cannot be said to infringe on any pre-
existing common law right of access. We therefore reject the
Globe's arguments on this point.
VI. VI.
In sum, we hold that the Act authorizes, but does not
mandate, the closure of juvenile proceedings. The district
court's closure order was fully justified on the record and was
therefore an entirely proper exercise of its discretion under the
Act.
Affirmed.
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