United States v. Three Hundred & Ninety-Six Barrels Distilled Spirits

28 F. Cas. 115, 3 Int. Rev. Rec. 114, 1866 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29
CourtDistrict Court, E.D. Missouri
DecidedMarch 1, 1866
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 28 F. Cas. 115 (United States v. Three Hundred & Ninety-Six Barrels Distilled Spirits) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. Missouri primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
United States v. Three Hundred & Ninety-Six Barrels Distilled Spirits, 28 F. Cas. 115, 3 Int. Rev. Rec. 114, 1866 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29 (E.D. Mo. 1866).

Opinion

THE COURT

(charging jury). Under the pleadings and admissions in this case, it is necessary for the court to direct your attention only to the following considerations: When a cause of forfeiture exists, under the 68th section of the act of June 30, 1864, the collector or deputy collector may seize the property supposed to be forfeited, at any time within thirty days after the cause of forfeiture comes to his knowledge; and must within twenty days after such seizure, cause proceedings to enforce the forfeiture to be commenced. The testimony, as to the time when the cause of forfeiture in this case came to the knowledge of the collector, and of the deputy collector as to the time within which proceedings were commenced to enforce said forfeiture. The collector has stated, as a witness, when his knowledge as to the cause of forfeiture occurred, and so has the deputy collector as to the date of his knowledge. You have also before you the date of the commencement of proceedings to enforce said forfeiture, to wit: 18th of April. If the seizure and proceedings fall within the time mentioned, then you are to enquire into the existence or non-existence of the causes of forfeiture alleged in the 2d, 7 th, 10th, 11th, and 13th articles of the amended information filed on the twentieth of November, 1863. Some, of the causes alleged in those articles may not have been averred in the original information filed on the 18th of April, 1863, but, if the additional causes actually existed at the time of seizure, they are as proper subjects of inquiry on this trial as if they had been so averred originally. The charges in said articles of the amended information are for violations of the act of June 30,1864; and, therefore, no violations of any antecedent act, and no violations of said act of June, which may have occurred after the seizure in this case, are subject matters of inquiry in this suit. Testimony as to the antecedent and subsequent matters has been admitted; not, however, for the purpose of showing a cause of forfeiture prior to June 30, 1S64, or subsequent to the seizure, but to enable you to determine whether any of the causes of forfeiture, alleged in the amended information, occurred within the periods of time stated. The sale of distilled spirits, which may have been made to Reuss & Co. after the seizure in this case, is not a cause of forfeiture, now on trial, and the jury should, disregard so much of the testimony relating thereto as refers to the nature or good faith of that particular transaction. A portion of the testimony consists of alleged admissions made by the claimant, Ferdinand Braun. Some are said to be direct statements by him, and some acquiescence by him in statements made by others. All such testimony, especially the latter, Is to be received with great caution. Hence the jury should duly weigh the circumstances under which the alleged admissions are said to have been made, in order to ascertain whether the recollection and repetition thereof by the witnesses are accurate; whether they caught the precise meaning intended to be conveyed, or whether the person making the admissions caused himself to be clearly understood. Admissions by acquiescence depend, for their force and effect, upon the relations which the parties to the conversation bear to each other, and the circumstances under which the conversation between them takes place. If the statement acquiesced in is made by one who has a right to be informed or to investigate the subject, then the acquiescence, by silence or otherwise, is to receive more weight than under other circumstances it would be entitled to receive. A statement by a mere stranger, which, for its impertinence, receives the rebuke implied by silent contempt, should have no force as evidence. It is the duty of the jury, therefore, who are exclusively to judge of the weight due to the evidence before them, to consider all the facts and circumstances attending the alleged conversations, in the course of which admissions are said to have been made, in order that they may determine what weight is due to the alleged statements of Braun, or his acquiescence in the statements made to him by the witnesses.

The court designed to exclude ail his statements which were confidential overtures of pacification, or offers or propositions of compromise, or which were made as a part of negotiations for compromise, or under the faith of pending negotiations into which he had been led by confidence in the success of a suggested or proposed compromise. If, however, any statements or admissions by him, under such circumstances, have been given in evidence, the jury should disregard them. But any independent statement of facts made by him, not on the condition, tacit or express, that the same was to be treated as confidential, or as an overture for a compromise, should be treated as evidence in the cause and duly weighed. An offer to pay a sum uamed, by way of compromise, is not admissible as proof that any sum is due; but an admission that a sum is due, as an independent fact, is proper evidence, and is to be treated as all other admissions.

[119]*119Tile jury should also weigh all other testimony, in older to ascertain what is the exact truth with respect to every controverted fact They are to judge of the credibility of the witnesses and of their statements, not only by their manner of testifying, but by their opportunities for knowing accurately or definitely the precise fact, or facts detailed by them. It is proper to consider also their relations to the case and to the parties, their means of knowledge, accuracy of memory, disinterestedness, and all other facts and circumstances which will enable the jury to judge, with correctness concerning the reliability of the testimony in any one or all respects. The act of congress, approved June 30, 1864, under which this suit is brought, imposes on a licensed distiller within the United States, the following among other duties: (1) He shall not use, or remove, for any purpose, from his distillery, any spirits distilled by him, before the same are inspected, gauged and proved by the proper official inspector. It is apparent that the provision just named is deemed essential to the due protection of the government revenue. The law imposes on the official inspector several duties, for a failure to perform which, the distiller is not liable in person or property. Hence, a failure by the inspector to properly mark pn any one or more barrels of distilled spirits the date of the inspection, the quantity and proof of the contents, or any other matter required of him, does not work a forfeiture of the distiller’s property. The latter has performed his duty if he refrains from removing or using the spirits before the same have been inspected, gauged, and proved by the official inspector. If, on the other hand, he uses or removes the spirits distilled by him before such inspection has been made, he forfeits not only the un-inspected spirits, but all others distilled by or for him which he still owns, and which may be seized by the collector or deputy collector, under the circumstances and within the times already stated. Hence, the evidence offered in this case upon that point, is not for the purpose of ascertaining as an independent fact, whether the inspector properly marked the barrels, but whether he ever inspected the spirits at all, before the same were removed from the distillery to St. Louis, or any other spirits so removed.

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28 F. Cas. 115, 3 Int. Rev. Rec. 114, 1866 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/united-states-v-three-hundred-ninety-six-barrels-distilled-spirits-moed-1866.