United States v. Thornton

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
• Decided: April 1, 2026
• Docket: 25-2076
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

Appellate Case: 25-2076 Document: 32 Date Filed: 04/01/2026 Page: 1 FILED United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS April 1, 2026 FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT _________________________________ Christopher M. Wolpert Clerk of Court UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v. No. 25-2076 (D.C. No. 2:21-CR-00878-KG-JFR-1) JOHN BENJAMIN THORNTON, (D. N.M.)

Defendant - Appellant. _________________________________

ORDER AND JUDGMENT * _________________________________

Before PHILLIPS, EID, and FEDERICO, Circuit Judges. _________________________________

Defendant John Benjamin Thornton appeals the district court’s

judgment revoking his term of supervised release. Exercising jurisdiction

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm.

*After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined unanimously to honor the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. Pro. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 32.1 and Tenth Circuit Rule 32.1. Appellate Case: 25-2076 Document: 32 Date Filed: 04/01/2026 Page: 2

I

In 2023, Thornton pleaded guilty to one count of cyberstalking and

eight counts of transmitting threats in interstate commerce. The district

court sentenced him to a term of imprisonment of 60 months, to be followed

by a three-year term of supervised release. He appealed pro se, seeking to

withdraw his guilty plea, but this court affirmed the district court’s

judgment. United States v. Thornton, No. 23-2201, 2024 WL 4471085, at *1

(10th Cir. Oct. 11, 2024).

Thornton completed his term of imprisonment and on March 27, 2025,

he began serving his three-year term of supervised release. One condition

of his supervised release required him to report to the probation office in

the federal district where he was authorized to reside, within 72 hours of

his release.

Upon his release from the Federal Correctional Institute in Pekin,

Illinois, Thornton was instructed to report to the probation office in

Albuquerque, New Mexico. He was provided with an itinerary and a bus

ticket to Albuquerque. But he did not travel to Albuquerque or report to the

probation office there. Instead, he traveled to Denver, Colorado.

Once he arrived in Denver, Thornton reported to the probation office

in Denver. He presented them with a “request for relocation to Denver” he

had drafted that contained a “protective order.” R. I at 202 (capitalization

2 Appellate Case: 25-2076 Document: 32 Date Filed: 04/01/2026 Page: 3

omitted). The “protective order” expressed his concern that Thornton was

in danger from the “Surreños” and “Nuevos Mexicos” gangs after his

encounters with a gang member in Otero County Prison in Chapparal, New

Mexico. The order also stated that another inmate later warned him that

the New Mexico gang member inmate had “put a street stomp order out on

[him].” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Thornton believed New

Mexico contained many members of the two gangs, so he had decided not to

report there as he was ordered to do.

On April 1, Thornton contacted his New Mexico probation officer by

phone and informed her about his fears about returning to the District of

New Mexico. This was the first time she learned of his concerns. She was

surprised because he had not mentioned those concerns to the facility prior

to his release or told them that he intended to report to Denver rather than

New Mexico. The probation officer immediately investigated his allegations

but found no validity to them. But she agreed to help Thornton by

submitting a transfer of supervision request to attempt to permit him to

remain in Denver.

The probation office in Denver declined to accept the transfer.

Notably, when Thornton met with the Denver probation officer about the

transfer, he made several comments about her personal life and told her he

had “looked her up” on the Internet “because he wanted to know who he was

3 Appellate Case: 25-2076 Document: 32 Date Filed: 04/01/2026 Page: 4

dealing with.” R. III at 28. This made the officer extremely uncomfortable,

and the interview was terminated.

Later and following a hearing, the district court found Thornton had

violated a mandatory condition of his supervised release by failing to report

to the New Mexico probation office as ordered. 1 The court terminated his

term of supervised release and sentenced him to imprisonment for five

months, to be followed by an additional three-year term of supervised

release. This timely appeal follows.

II

A district court may revoke a defendant’s term of supervised release

if it “finds by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant violated a

condition of supervised release.” 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3). We review the

decision to revoke supervised release for an abuse of discretion. See United

States v. Jones, 818 F.3d 1091, 1097 (10th Cir. 2016). “A district court

abuses its discretion when it relies on an incorrect conclusion of law or a

clearly erroneous finding of fact.” United States v. Piper, 839 F.3d 1261,

1 The district court also found he had violated two other supervised

release conditions, by failing to cooperate and comply with the probation office’s Computer Restriction and Monitoring program, and by failing to follow the instructions of the probation officer related to the conditions of his supervision. Thornton does not challenge those violations in this appeal, and the government does not argue that the district court’s judgment should be upheld based on the unchallenged violations. See Aplee. Br. at 2 n.1. 4 Appellate Case: 25-2076 Document: 32 Date Filed: 04/01/2026 Page: 5

1265 (10th Cir. 2016). “Legal questions relating to the revocation of

supervised release are reviewed de novo.” Jones, 818 F.3d at 1097 (internal

quotation marks omitted). “A factual finding is clearly erroneous only if it

is without factual support in the record or if, after reviewing all the

evidence, we are left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has

been made.” Piper, 839 F.3d at 1270 (internal quotation marks omitted).

On appeal, Thornton argues: (1) he did not willfully or intentionally

violate his supervised release; (2) his New Mexico probation officer

consented to his actions when she asked the District of Colorado to accept

a transfer of supervision; and (3) he was not given a chance to report to the

District of New Mexico after the transfer was denied, so the filing of charges

in this case was “nothing more than a ‘gotcha.’” Aplt. Opening Br. at 7. None

of these arguments have merit.

A

There is ample evidence to support the district court’s conclusion that

Thornton violated the terms of his supervised release. But he argues the

violation was not willful or intentional because he believed that his life was

being threatened by New Mexico gangs. Assuming a willful or intentional

violation was required for revocation – an issue Thornton does not

specifically discuss – his argument actually relies on necessity or duress

rather than a lack of willfulness or intent. See Dixon v. United States, 548

5 Appellate Case: 25-2076 Document: 32 Date Filed: 04/01/2026 Page: 6

U.S. 1, 7 (2006) (“Like the defense of necessity, the defense of duress does

not negate a defendant’s criminal state of mind when the applicable offense

requires a defendant to have acted knowingly or willfully; instead, it allows

the defendant to avoid liability . . . because coercive conditions or necessity

negates a conclusion of guilt even though the necessary mens rea was

present.”) (internal quotation marks omitted); United States v. Romero, 132

F.4th 1208, 1214 (10th Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 146 S. Ct. 176 (2025).

We will assume without deciding that a district court would abuse its

discretion by finding a violation that the defendant proved he had

committed while under legal duress. Cf. United States v. Rife, 835 F.2d 154,

156 (7th Cir. 1987) (suggesting, in response to duress defense raised at

probation revocation hearing, that revocation of probation would be

inappropriate in the case of “extreme circumstances” where “the actor was

actually forced to commit the act”). But although he mentions necessity or

distress, Thornton has failed to develop an adequate appellate argument on

this issue.

The affirmative defense of duress requires the defendant to establish

“(1) an immediate threat of death or serious bodily injury, (2) a

well-grounded fear that the threat will be carried out, and (3) no reasonable

opportunity to escape the threatened harm.” Romero, 132 F.4th at 1214

6 Appellate Case: 25-2076 Document: 32 Date Filed: 04/01/2026 Page: 7

(internal quotation marks omitted). 2 Thornton has made no effort to show

that he meets these factors, nor does he point us to where he established

the elements of a duress defense before the district court. His argument is

therefore insufficiently developed for appeal and is waived. See Bronson v.

Swensen, 500 F.3d 1099, 1104 (10th Cir. 2007) (“[W]e routinely have

2 The defense, known interchangeably as duress, necessity or justification, see United States v. Butler, 485 F.3d 569, 572 n.1 (10th Cir. 2007), has also been formulated using a four-factor test:

(1) that defendant was under an unlawful and present, imminent, and impending threat of such a nature as to induce a well-grounded apprehension of death or serious bodily injury;

(2) that defendant had not recklessly or negligently placed himself in a situation in which it was probable that he would be forced to choose the criminal conduct;

(3) that defendant had no reasonable, legal alternative to violating the law, a chance both to refuse to do the criminal act and also to avoid the threatened harm; and

(4) that a direct causal relationship may be reasonably anticipated between the criminal action taken and the avoidance of the threatened harm.”

Id. at 572 (brackets and internal quotation marks omitted).

Regardless of which specific test is appropriate here, Thornton has waived the issue through inadequate appellate briefing.

7 Appellate Case: 25-2076 Document: 32 Date Filed: 04/01/2026 Page: 8

declined to consider arguments that are not raised, or are inadequately

presented, in an appellant’s opening brief.”). 3

B

Thornton next argues that his failure to report as required was

excused when his New Mexico probation officer asked the District of

Colorado to accept a transfer of his supervision to Colorado. He notes he

was permitted to stay in Denver while the request was pending. But his

supervised release was not revoked because he stayed in Denver after

arriving there. It was revoked because he failed to report to the probation

office in New Mexico in the first place, as instructed. He fails to show the

subsequent permission excused his earlier violation. We see no basis to

conclude the district court abused its discretion by relying on that violation

to revoke his supervised release, even if he had received after-the-fact

permission to remain in Denver while his transfer request was pending.

3 Thornton also argues that the district court erred by declining to

decide whether his fear of being killed by the gangs was credible. He urges us to remand with instructions to make this finding. But even if he established a credible fear, he would still have to satisfy the other factors required to establish a duress or necessity defense, including that the harm was immediate or imminent and that he had no reasonable opportunity to escape the threatened harm other than by violating his supervised release terms. As noted, he has waived any appellate argument concerning those factors by failing to brief them. We therefore decline to reverse or remand for a further finding on the threat issue. 8 Appellate Case: 25-2076 Document: 32 Date Filed: 04/01/2026 Page: 9

C

Finally, Thornton argues that he should have been given a chance to

report to New Mexico after his request for transfer was denied, and that

failure to give him that opportunity made “the filing of charges in this case

. . . nothing more than a ‘gotcha.’” Aplt. Opening Br. at 7. But he fails to

show that failure to accord him such a second chance excused the initial

violation or made it an abuse of discretion to revoke his supervised release.

AFFIRMED.

Entered for the Court

Richard E.N. Federico Circuit Judge