USCA4 Appeal: 23-4643 Doc: 37 Filed: 08/27/2024 Pg: 1 of 6
UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 23-4643
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
THOMAS TRAY SHARMONE KEARNEY,
Defendant - Appellant.
No. 23-4646
Appeals from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Norfolk and Newport News. Arenda L. Wright Allen, District Judge. (2:19-cr-00054- AWA-RJK-1; 4:04-cr-00027-AWA-RJK-1)
Submitted: June 28, 2024 Decided: August 27, 2024 USCA4 Appeal: 23-4643 Doc: 37 Filed: 08/27/2024 Pg: 2 of 6
Before AGEE and HARRIS, Circuit Judges, and FLOYD, Senior Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
ON BRIEF: Geremy C. Kamens, Federal Public Defender, Patrick L. Bryant, Assistant Federal Public Defender, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER, Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellant. Jessica D. Aber, United States Attorney, Richmond, Virginia, Dee M. Sterling, Assistant United States Attorney, Newport News, Virginia, Daniel J. Honold, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
2 USCA4 Appeal: 23-4643 Doc: 37 Filed: 08/27/2024 Pg: 3 of 6
PER CURIAM:
In 2004, in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North
Carolina, Thomas Tray Sharmone Kearney pled guilty to robbery of a postal carrier and
aiding and abetting, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2, 2114(a), and brandishing a firearm in
furtherance of a crime of violence, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). The North Carolina
district court sentenced Kearney to 204 months of imprisonment followed by five years of
supervised release. Around the same time, in the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Virginia, Kearney pled guilty to conspiracy to conceal property obtained
through the robbery of a mail carrier and to receive stolen money orders, in violation of 18
U.S.C. § 371; mail fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1341; possession of stolen money
orders, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2, 500; and money laundering, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§§ 2, 1956(a). The Virginia district court sentenced Kearney to a total of 76 months of
imprisonment followed by three years of supervised release. The sentences were imposed
to run concurrently with each other.
Following Kearney’s release onto supervision in 2019, the North Carolina district
court transferred jurisdiction over his supervision to the Virginia district court. In 2023,
the Virginia district court revoked Kearney’s supervision in both cases based on violations
of the terms of his supervised release, and sentenced Kearney to 13 months of
imprisonment followed by 47 months of supervised release. Kearney now appeals. On
appeal, Kearney argues the Government failed to comply with its obligations under
Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), by failing to collect certain evidence and that the
district court erred by conducting his supervised release revocation hearing without a jury
3 USCA4 Appeal: 23-4643 Doc: 37 Filed: 08/27/2024 Pg: 4 of 6
and by making factual findings under a preponderance of the evidence standard. We
affirm.
To revoke supervised release, a district court need only find a violation of the terms
of supervised release by a preponderance of the evidence. 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3). We
“review a district court’s factual findings underlying a revocation of supervised release for
clear error and its ultimate decision to revoke a defendant’s supervised release for abuse of
discretion.” United States v. Cohen, 63 F.4th 250, 254 (4th Cir.) (cleaned up), cert. denied,
144 S. Ct. 165 (2023). “As always, it is an abuse of discretion to commit legal error.” Id.
(cleaned up).
“Rule 32.1 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure sets out the basic procedures
required during a revocation hearing.” United States v. Combs, 36 F.4th 502, 505
(4th Cir. 2022). At a supervised release revocation hearing, the person is entitled to
“written notice of the alleged violation”; “disclosure of the evidence against” him; “an
opportunity to appear, present evidence, and question any adverse witness unless the court
determines that the interest of justice does not require the witness to appear”; “notice of
the person’s right to retain counsel or to request that counsel be appointed if the person
cannot obtain counsel”; and “an opportunity to make a statement and present any
information in mitigation.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.1(b)(2). A district court must also
“adequately demonstrate for us the evidence on which it relied . . . so that we may
understand its reasons for revoking supervised release.” United States v. Patterson, 957
F.3d 426, 434 (4th Cir. 2020) (cleaned up).
4 USCA4 Appeal: 23-4643 Doc: 37 Filed: 08/27/2024 Pg: 5 of 6
Kearney first argues that the Government violated its obligations under Brady by
failing to collect and tender to the defense evidence related to two of the charged supervised
release violations. While it is not clear whether the protections of Brady extend to a
supervised release revocation proceeding, we need not decide that issue because Kearney
has failed to demonstrate that, even if the Government was obliged to comply with Brady
in this proceeding, it violated its obligations under Brady. “To prove a Brady violation, a
defendant must show that non-disclosed evidence was favorable to the defendant, material,
and that the prosecution had the evidence and failed to disclose it.” United States v. Savage,
885 F.3d 212, 221 (4th Cir. 2018). “Evidence is material if there is a reasonable probability
that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would
have been different.” Id. “The mere possibility that an item of undisclosed information
might have helped the defense, or might have affected the outcome of the trial, does not
establish materiality in the constitutional sense.” United States v. Augurs, 427 U.S. 97,
109-10 (1976). Here, Kearney failed to demonstrate that the Government had possession
of the evidence that he sought and failed to show that the evidence would have been
favorable to his defense. See United States v. Caro, 597 F.3d 608, 619 (4th Cir. 2010)
(noting where defendant could only “speculate as to what the requested information might
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USCA4 Appeal: 23-4643 Doc: 37 Filed: 08/27/2024 Pg: 1 of 6
UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 23-4643
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
THOMAS TRAY SHARMONE KEARNEY,
Defendant - Appellant.
No. 23-4646
Appeals from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Norfolk and Newport News. Arenda L. Wright Allen, District Judge. (2:19-cr-00054- AWA-RJK-1; 4:04-cr-00027-AWA-RJK-1)
Submitted: June 28, 2024 Decided: August 27, 2024 USCA4 Appeal: 23-4643 Doc: 37 Filed: 08/27/2024 Pg: 2 of 6
Before AGEE and HARRIS, Circuit Judges, and FLOYD, Senior Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
ON BRIEF: Geremy C. Kamens, Federal Public Defender, Patrick L. Bryant, Assistant Federal Public Defender, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER, Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellant. Jessica D. Aber, United States Attorney, Richmond, Virginia, Dee M. Sterling, Assistant United States Attorney, Newport News, Virginia, Daniel J. Honold, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
2 USCA4 Appeal: 23-4643 Doc: 37 Filed: 08/27/2024 Pg: 3 of 6
PER CURIAM:
In 2004, in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North
Carolina, Thomas Tray Sharmone Kearney pled guilty to robbery of a postal carrier and
aiding and abetting, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2, 2114(a), and brandishing a firearm in
furtherance of a crime of violence, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). The North Carolina
district court sentenced Kearney to 204 months of imprisonment followed by five years of
supervised release. Around the same time, in the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Virginia, Kearney pled guilty to conspiracy to conceal property obtained
through the robbery of a mail carrier and to receive stolen money orders, in violation of 18
U.S.C. § 371; mail fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1341; possession of stolen money
orders, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2, 500; and money laundering, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§§ 2, 1956(a). The Virginia district court sentenced Kearney to a total of 76 months of
imprisonment followed by three years of supervised release. The sentences were imposed
to run concurrently with each other.
Following Kearney’s release onto supervision in 2019, the North Carolina district
court transferred jurisdiction over his supervision to the Virginia district court. In 2023,
the Virginia district court revoked Kearney’s supervision in both cases based on violations
of the terms of his supervised release, and sentenced Kearney to 13 months of
imprisonment followed by 47 months of supervised release. Kearney now appeals. On
appeal, Kearney argues the Government failed to comply with its obligations under
Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), by failing to collect certain evidence and that the
district court erred by conducting his supervised release revocation hearing without a jury
3 USCA4 Appeal: 23-4643 Doc: 37 Filed: 08/27/2024 Pg: 4 of 6
and by making factual findings under a preponderance of the evidence standard. We
affirm.
To revoke supervised release, a district court need only find a violation of the terms
of supervised release by a preponderance of the evidence. 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3). We
“review a district court’s factual findings underlying a revocation of supervised release for
clear error and its ultimate decision to revoke a defendant’s supervised release for abuse of
discretion.” United States v. Cohen, 63 F.4th 250, 254 (4th Cir.) (cleaned up), cert. denied,
144 S. Ct. 165 (2023). “As always, it is an abuse of discretion to commit legal error.” Id.
(cleaned up).
“Rule 32.1 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure sets out the basic procedures
required during a revocation hearing.” United States v. Combs, 36 F.4th 502, 505
(4th Cir. 2022). At a supervised release revocation hearing, the person is entitled to
“written notice of the alleged violation”; “disclosure of the evidence against” him; “an
opportunity to appear, present evidence, and question any adverse witness unless the court
determines that the interest of justice does not require the witness to appear”; “notice of
the person’s right to retain counsel or to request that counsel be appointed if the person
cannot obtain counsel”; and “an opportunity to make a statement and present any
information in mitigation.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.1(b)(2). A district court must also
“adequately demonstrate for us the evidence on which it relied . . . so that we may
understand its reasons for revoking supervised release.” United States v. Patterson, 957
F.3d 426, 434 (4th Cir. 2020) (cleaned up).
4 USCA4 Appeal: 23-4643 Doc: 37 Filed: 08/27/2024 Pg: 5 of 6
Kearney first argues that the Government violated its obligations under Brady by
failing to collect and tender to the defense evidence related to two of the charged supervised
release violations. While it is not clear whether the protections of Brady extend to a
supervised release revocation proceeding, we need not decide that issue because Kearney
has failed to demonstrate that, even if the Government was obliged to comply with Brady
in this proceeding, it violated its obligations under Brady. “To prove a Brady violation, a
defendant must show that non-disclosed evidence was favorable to the defendant, material,
and that the prosecution had the evidence and failed to disclose it.” United States v. Savage,
885 F.3d 212, 221 (4th Cir. 2018). “Evidence is material if there is a reasonable probability
that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would
have been different.” Id. “The mere possibility that an item of undisclosed information
might have helped the defense, or might have affected the outcome of the trial, does not
establish materiality in the constitutional sense.” United States v. Augurs, 427 U.S. 97,
109-10 (1976). Here, Kearney failed to demonstrate that the Government had possession
of the evidence that he sought and failed to show that the evidence would have been
favorable to his defense. See United States v. Caro, 597 F.3d 608, 619 (4th Cir. 2010)
(noting where defendant could only “speculate as to what the requested information might
reveal, he cannot satisfy Brady’s requirement of showing that the requested evidence would
be favorable to the accused” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
Kearney next argues that proof beyond a reasonable doubt, not preponderance of
the evidence, is the appropriate standard for supervised release revocation proceedings and
further claims that a jury must make the relevant factual findings. However, “the
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conditional liberty to which those under supervised release are subject entails the surrender
of certain constitutional rights, including any right to have the alleged supervised release
violation proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.” United States v. Ward, 770 F.3d
1090, 1099 (4th Cir. 2014); see Johnson v. United States, 529 U.S. 694, 700 (2000) (noting
that supervised release violation “need only be found by a judge under a preponderance of
the evidence standard, not by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt”). Although Kearney
argues that the Supreme Court’s holding in United States v. Haymond, 588 U.S. 634 (2019)
(striking down 18 U.S.C. § 3583(k)), should be extended to all supervised release
proceedings, we have previously concluded that the holding from Haymond does not apply
to other statutory provisions of 18 U.S.C. § 3583. United States v. Coston, 964 F.3d 289,
295-96 (4th Cir. 2020) (“[G]iven that no majority of the Supreme Court endorsed the
application of [Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S. 99 (2013),] in the supervised release
context, we remain bound by [our] prior decision that it does not.”). As one panel of this
court may not overrule another panel, see United States v. Runyon, 994 F.3d 192, 201
(4th Cir. 2021), Kearney’s claim must fail. Accordingly, because Ward remains good law,
its holding forecloses Kearney’s argument.
Accordingly, we affirm the revocation judgment. We also deny Kearney’s motions
for leave to file pro se supplemental briefs. We dispense with oral argument because the
facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and
argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED