United States v. The Sarah B. Harris

27 F. Cas. 954, 4 Cliff. 147
CourtU.S. Circuit Court for the District of Maine
DecidedSeptember 15, 1870
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 27 F. Cas. 954 (United States v. The Sarah B. Harris) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering U.S. Circuit Court for the District of Maine primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
United States v. The Sarah B. Harris, 27 F. Cas. 954, 4 Cliff. 147 (circtdme 1870).

Opinion

CLIPPOBD. Circuit Justice.

American ships are forbidden to bring goods from any foreign port into the United States, unless the master thereof shall have a manifest in writing, signed by the proper person, deserib-ing the goods and the vessel, and containing the name of the port where the goods were taken on board and the name of the port for which the same are consigned or destined. 1 Stat. 644. Imported goods may be entered for consumption or for warehousing, but the entry, in either case, must be in writing, and must be made to the collector of the district within fifteen days after the required report of the arrival of the vessel is filed by the master. Id. 649. Such goods are required to be landed, in open day, and the same section provides that they shall not at any time be landed or delivered from such ship ór vessel “without a permit from the collector, and naval officer, if any, for such unlading and delivery.” Id. 665. Authority to grant a permit does not exist until the duties are paid or secured to be paid, and the duties are never paid or secured to be paid before the goods are imported, nor before they are entered either for consumption or warehousing. Masters of such ships or vessels, on their arrival within four leagues of our coast, or within any of the bays, harbors, ports, or inlets thereof, are required, upon demand, to produce the manifest of the goods to such officer of the customs as shall come on- board their ship, for his inspection, and it is made the duty of the said officer of the customs to certify the fact of compliance with that requirement and the day when it was so produced. Examination of the entry is usually made by the entry clerk, and if found to be correct, the collector proceeds to estimate the duties “on the invoice value and quantity,” and if the estimated amount of duty is paid or secured to be paid as required by law, the collector certifies the invoice and grants a permit in due form for the unlading and delivery of the cargo. Waring v. The Mayor, 8 Wall. [75 U. S.] 110; Gen. Reg. 1857, p. 145. Congress, therefore, has prescribed the rule of decision, and while that provision remains in force no goods brought in any ship or vessel from any foreign port or placed unless falling within some exceptional rule not applicable in this case, can lawfully be unladen or delivered from any such ship or vessel within the United States without a permit from the collector, and naval officer, if any, for such unlading and delivery..

Three principal defences are set up by the appellants. (1) They insist that the proofs show that the deputy collector assented to the unlading and delivery of the mackerel at the time and place alleged in the information, and they contend that a verbal permit under the circumstances disclosed in the evidence, is sufficient to shield the schooner from the forfeiture demanded in the act of congress on which the information is founded. (2) Suppose the rule is otherwise, and that a written permit is required where the goods unladen and delivered are dutiable, still they contend that the decree of the district court in this case was erroneous, because, as they insist, the mackerel in question were American caught, and not subject to duty, and they contend that the act of congress, even if it does require a written permit for the unlad-ing and delivery of imported goods subject to duty, contains no such requirement where it appears that the goods are -not dutiable, [956]*956but that the purpose of the law, at least in all such cases, is as well answered by a verbal permit as by one in writing. (3) Accessories, other than the master, are not liable to the penalty annexed to the offence, unless they were “knowingly concerned or aiding therein or in removing, storing, or otherwise securing the goods,” and the claimants insist that the vessel in this case is not liable to forfeiture, because, as they assume, the master supposed and believed that the mackerel were American caught, and that they were not subject to duty as imported goods.

Goods imported from a foreign country are required to be entered at the custom-house where the vessel voluntarily arrives with intent to unlade the cargo. They may be entered for consumption or for warehousing, but they must be regularly entered, and the duties be paid or be secured to be paid, before any authority exists to grant a permit for their unlading and delivery. Until the permit is received by the inspector, no one has authority to remove the hatches or to break bulk, but the cargo is under the charge of the officer of the customs. By the directions of the principal collection act, the collector, jointly with the naval officer, or alone where there is none, shall, according to the best of his or their judgment or information, make a gross estimate of the amount of the duties on the goods to which the entry of any owner or consignee, his or her factor or agent, shall relate, which estimate shall be indorsed upon such entry and be signed by the officer or officers making the same.

Before any permit can be issued, the amount of the duties so estimated must first be paid or be secured to be paid, and the provision then is that the collector, together with the naval officer, where there is one, or alone where there is none, shall grant a permit to land the goods, &e., whereof entry shall have been so made, and then, and not before, it shall be lawful to land the said goods. Permits are to be “granted” by the collector, together with the naval officer where there is one, or alone where there is none, and as a further evidence that permits are to be made in writing, the provision is that they shall specify as particularly as may be the goods to be delivered, namely, the number and description of the packages, whether trunks, bale, chest, box, case, pipe, hogshead, barrel, keg. or any other packages- whatever, with the mark and number of each package, and, as far as circumstances will admit, the contents thereof, together with the names of the vessel and master, in which, and the place from whence, they were imported, and no goods . . . shall be delivered by any inspector or other offieei of the customs that shall not fully agree with the description thereof in such permit. Evidence that congress intended that the permit should be in writing is derived from every part of the regulations upon the subject; but if more be needed to make it certain that such was the intention of congress, it is found in the fact that the form of the permit is prescribed by law, and the same section enacts that the form of all permits for the purposes aforesaid, and for deliveries from the public stores, shall be as therein directed and prescribed. 1 Stat. 664. Prior to the granting of the permit, the duties are estimated on the invoice value and quantity, and the amount as estimated being paid or secured to be paid, the collector certifies the invoice and grants a permit in due form for the unlading and delivery of the cargo, first designating the packages, one in ten, to be sent to the public store for examination and marking the same on the entry, invoice, and permit. Gen. Reg. 1857, p. 145.

Dutiable goods, therefore, cannot be unladen or delivered without a written permit from the collector as prescribed by law and the regulations of the treasury department, but the appellants contend that the mackerel in this case were American caught, and that as such they were not dutiable, and that imported goods not dutiable may be unladen and delivered without a written permit for that purpose. Evidently the proposition of the appellants embraces two questions, one of fact and one of law; and it is clear that the defence in this respect must fail unless both are found in their favor.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

United States v. Curtis
16 F. 184 (S.D. New York, 1883)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
27 F. Cas. 954, 4 Cliff. 147, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/united-states-v-the-sarah-b-harris-circtdme-1870.