United States v. The Lutheran Medical Center-Richard H. Young Memorial Hospital
This text of 680 F.2d 1211 (United States v. The Lutheran Medical Center-Richard H. Young Memorial Hospital) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
This appeal presents the issue whether the general statute of limitations applicable to actions brought by the United States, governs an action for recoupment brought under a federal statute that does not contain a specific statute of limitations. The district court 1 held that the general statute of limitations does not apply. We affirm.
In 1968, Lutheran Medical Center (Lutheran) received a grant of $659,495 from the United States under the Community Mental Health Centers Act (the Act), 42 U.S.C. § 2681 et seq. (1964), for use in the construction of a community mental health center. Lutheran officially opened its facility on January 1,1973. By August 1, 1973, Lutheran failed to meet the conditions of the federal grant to operate a community mental health center. See 42 U.S.C. § 2691(c) (1970); 42 C.F.R. § 54.212 (1975).
On October 18, 1979, the United States instituted this action for recoupment of funds granted to Lutheran. The Act provides that the United States may recover a proportionate amount of funds (according to a statutorily prescribed formula) if the grantee ceases to provide the services of a community health center within twenty years after completion of construction. See 42 U.S.C. § 2695 (1970); see also 42 U.S.C. § 2689m (1976). 2
*1213 The defendant, Lutheran, moved for summary judgment on the ground that the United States had instituted this action more than six years after Lutheran failed to provide the services of a community mental health center as required by the Act. Although the Act does not contain a specific statute of limitations, Lutheran maintained that the general six-year statute of limitations applicable to actions by the United States barred this suit. See 28 U.S.C. § 2415 (1976). 3
*1214 The United States also moved for partial summary judgment, contending that no genuine issue of material fact existed between the parties, and that it should recover a specified amount from Lutheran pursuant to the Act because Lutheran had ceased to provide the requisite services within twenty years of completing construction of its facility without a determination of good cause by the Secretary for such failure.
The district court rejected Lutheran’s statute of limitations defense, and determined that the United States had established its entitlement to partial summary judgment as a matter of law. Lutheran brings this appeal from a nonfinal order by permission of this court and the district court under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b).
In considering the statute of limitations issue, the district court relied on United States v. City of Palm Beach Gardens, 635 F.2d 337, cert, denied, 454 U.S. 1081, 102 S.Ct. 635, 70 L.Ed.2d 615 (1981). In Palm Beach Gardens, the Fifth Circuit refused to apply the general six-year statute of limitations of 28 U.S.C. § 2415 in an action brought by the United States under analogous recoupment provisions of the Hill-Burton Act, to recover federal grant funds earmarked for hospital construction. -Concluding that 28 U.S.C. § 2415 does not apply to this action for recoupment under the Community Mental Health Centers Act, the district court granted the United States partial summary judgment and directed that the case proceed further in the district court.
Judge Schatz has written a comprehensive, well-reasoned opinion covering all issues presented on this appeal, with which we agree. Our elaboration on that opinion would serve no- purpose. Accordingly, we affirm on the basis of the district court opinion.
. The Honorable Albert G. Schatz, United States District Judge for the District of Nebraska. The district court opinion is reported at 524 F.Supp. 421 (D.Neb.1981).
. The district court found “ ‘that the provisions of these two sections are substantially the same[.]’ ” United States v. Lutheran Medical Center, supra, 524 F.Supp. at 423. They provide as follows:
§ 2695. Recovery of expenditures under certain conditions
If any facility or center with respect to which funds have been paid under section 2693 of this title shall, at any time within twenty years after the completion of construction—
(1) be sold or transferred to any person, agency, or organization (A) which is not qualified to file an application under section 2675 or 2685 of this title, or (B) which is not approved as a transferee by the State agency designated pursuant to section 2674 of this title (in the case of a facility for the mentally retarded or persons with other developmental disabilities) or section 2684 of this title (in case of a community mental health center), or its successor; or
(2) cease to be a public or other nonprofit facility for the mentally retarded or persons with other developmental disabilities or community mental health center, as the case may be, unless the Secretary determines, in accordance with regulations, that there is good cause for releasing the applicant or other owner from the obligation to continue such facility as a public or other nonprofit facility for the mentally retarded or persons with other developmental disabilities or such center as a community mental health center, the United States shall be entitled to recover from either the transferor or the transferee (or, in the case of a facility or center which has ceased to be public or other nonprofit facility for the mentally retarded or persons with other developmental disabilities or community mental health center, from the owners thereof) an amount bearing the same ratio to the then value (as determined by the *1213 agreement of the parties or by action brought in the district court of the United States for the district in which the center is situated) of so much of such facility or center as constituted an approved project or projects, as the amount of the Federal participation bore to the cost of the construction of such project or projects.
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680 F.2d 1211, 1982 U.S. App. LEXIS 18102, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/united-states-v-the-lutheran-medical-center-richard-h-young-memorial-ca8-1982.