United States v. Terrence Williams, Also Known as Rico, Also Known as Terron Darrel Williams

Eighth Circuit

United States v. Terrence Williams, Also Known as Rico, Also Known as Terron Darrel Williams

324 F.3d 1049, 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 6994, 2003 WL 1869954

CourtCourt of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

DecidedApril 14, 2003

Docket02-3020

StatusPublished

Cited by18 cases

This text of 324 F.3d 1049 (United States v. Terrence Williams, Also Known as Rico, Also Known as Terron Darrel Williams) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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United States v. Terrence Williams, Also Known as Rico, Also Known as Terron Darrel Williams, 324 F.3d 1049, 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 6994, 2003 WL 1869954 (8th Cir. 2003).

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Opinion

PER CURIAM.

Defendant-Appellant Terrance Williams pled guilty to conspiracy to distribute cocaine and crack cocaine. Based on the drug quantity, William’s role in the conspiracy, his acceptance of responsibility, and his criminal history, he was assessed a total offense level of 39 and a criminal history of category VI. The applicable guideline range was therefore 360 months to life imprisonment. The district court 1 granted a downward departure for substantial assistance based on the government’s motion under U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1 and sentenced Williams to 168 months imprisonment. The district court refused to depart further downward to the 120 month statutory minimum urged by Williams. *1050 On appeal, Williams challenges the district court's refusal to grant a further departure.

In general, the extent of a downward departure is not subject to review. United States v. McCarthy, 97 F.3d 1562, 1577 (8th Cir.1996); United States v. Goodwin, 72 F.3d 88, 91 (8th Cir.1995); United States v. Dutcher, 8 F.3d 11, 12 (8th Cir.1993) ("[W]e may not review the extent of the district court's downward departure, regardless of the district court's reasons for refraining from departing further."). A refusal to depart downward may, however, become reviewable if a "defendant [makes] a `substantial showing' that the district court's refusal to depart `was based on an unconstitutional motive.'" McCarthy, 97 F.3d at 1578 (quoting Wade v. United States, 504 U.S. 181, 186, 112 S.Ct. 1840, 118 L.Ed.2d 524 (1992)). Here, Williams argues that the district court improperly relied on evidence of his involvement in a crime for which he was not charged, namely, the murder of four-year-old Davisha Gillum by William's fellow gang members. Williams does not allege that the district court's refusal to depart further was the result of an unconstitutional motive. Accordingly, the extent of his departure remains unre-viewable, and the judgment of the district court is affirmed.

1

. The Honorable Donovan W. Frank, United States District Judge for the District of Minnesota.

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PER CURIAM.

Defendant-Appellant Terrance Williams pled guilty to conspiracy to distribute cocaine and crack cocaine. Based on the drug quantity, William’s role in the conspiracy, his acceptance of responsibility, and his criminal history, he was assessed a total offense level of 39 and a criminal history of category VI. The applicable guideline range was therefore 360 months to life imprisonment. The district court 1 granted a downward departure for substantial assistance based on the government’s motion under U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1 and sentenced Williams to 168 months imprisonment. The district court refused to depart further downward to the 120 month statutory minimum urged by Williams. *1050 On appeal, Williams challenges the district court's refusal to grant a further departure.

In general, the extent of a downward departure is not subject to review. United States v. McCarthy, 97 F.3d 1562, 1577 (8th Cir.1996); United States v. Goodwin, 72 F.3d 88, 91 (8th Cir.1995); United States v. Dutcher, 8 F.3d 11, 12 (8th Cir.1993) ("[W]e may not review the extent of the district court's downward departure, regardless of the district court's reasons for refraining from departing further."). A refusal to depart downward may, however, become reviewable if a "defendant [makes] a `substantial showing' that the district court's refusal to depart `was based on an unconstitutional motive.'" McCarthy, 97 F.3d at 1578 (quoting Wade v. United States, 504 U.S. 181, 186, 112 S.Ct. 1840, 118 L.Ed.2d 524 (1992)). Here, Williams argues that the district court improperly relied on evidence of his involvement in a crime for which he was not charged, namely, the murder of four-year-old Davisha Gillum by William's fellow gang members. Williams does not allege that the district court's refusal to depart further was the result of an unconstitutional motive. Accordingly, the extent of his departure remains unre-viewable, and the judgment of the district court is affirmed.

1

. The Honorable Donovan W. Frank, United States District Judge for the District of Minnesota.

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324 F.3d 1049, 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 6994, 2003 WL 1869954, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/united-states-v-terrence-williams-also-known-as-rico-also-known-as-ca8-2003.

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