NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION File Name: 22a0089n.06
No. 21-2652
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT FILED ) Mar 02, 2022 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, DEBORAH S. HUNT, Clerk ) Plaintiff-Appellee, ) ) v. ON APPEAL FROM THE ) UNITED STATES DISTRICT ) TERRELL REESE, COURT FOR THE EASTERN ) DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN Defendant-Appellant. ) ) )
BEFORE: SUTTON, Chief Judge; GIBBONS and GRIFFIN, Circuit Judges.
GRIFFIN, Circuit Judge.
Defendant Terrell Reese twice violated the terms of his supervised release, each within a
few months of completing a prison term. The district court revoked supervision and imposed a
custodial sentence after both violations. Reese contends the district court imposed a substantively
unreasonable sentence following his second violation when it varied upward from a four-to-ten-
month Guidelines range and imposed an eighteen-month term of imprisonment. We disagree and
affirm.
I.
In 2014, Reese acted as a lookout while a coconspirator robbed a credit union by passing
the teller a note indicating that he was armed and would “kill everybody” if she did not comply
with their demands. Reese subsequently pleaded guilty to one count of conspiracy to commit No. 21-2652, United States v. Reese
credit union robbery in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 371, 2113(a). He was sentenced to a term of
forty-two months incarceration, followed by three years of supervised release.
Shortly after Reese completed his prison sentence, a probation officer concluded that he
committed several supervised-release violations. The officer alleged, among other things, that
Reese had committed first degree premediated murder under Michigan law, fled from law
enforcement after leaving a vehicle where a handgun was present, and associated with another
felon. The district court found Reese committed all the charged conduct save the murder, revoked
his supervision, and imposed a twelve-month custodial sentence to be followed by twenty-four
months of supervised release.
Reese was six months removed from prison when he again ran afoul of the law. In May
2020, Detroit police officers responded to a report of “Shots Fired” and observed a handgun
sticking out of Reese’s pocket. They arrested him for carrying a concealed weapon in violation of
Michigan law, which led to his probation officer again petitioning the district court to revoke his
supervised release.1
The supervised-release violation report set forth a Guidelines range of four-to-ten months
imprisonment and a statutory maximum of two years. Reese admitted guilt, and his attorney asked
that the district court impose a custodial sentence at the lower end of the range because Reese was
“in the wrong place at the wrong time,” there was no evidence connecting Reese to the shooting,
and he was young and actively involved with his family. The district court declined, varied
upward, and imposed an eighteen-month sentence. The court emphasized the short turnaround
between Reese’s supervised-release violations and his conduct’s inherent risk to the public. In the
1 This also led to a new federal charge and conviction; Reese pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession and was sentenced by a different district court judge to serve twenty-one months in prison. -2- No. 21-2652, United States v. Reese
court’s view, the Guidelines range did not accurately reflect an appropriate sentence: “The Court
is concerned that the defendant’s repetitive behavior here with respect to violent or intended violent
misconduct . . . [is] establishing at an early age a very distressing pattern.” Its upward variance
was a “firm response” to deter such conduct and protect the public. This timely appeal followed.
II.
“[A]ppellate review of sentencing decisions is limited to determining whether they are
‘reasonable.’” Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 46 (2007). We review sentences imposed for
supervised-release violations under the familiar abuse-of-discretion standard and the procedural-
and-substantive-reasonableness rubric. See United States v. Peebles, 624 F.3d 344, 347 (6th Cir.
2010). Reese’s appeal concerns only whether the district court imposed a substantively reasonable
sentence.2
An above-Guidelines sentence is neither presumptively reasonable nor presumptively
unreasonable. United States v. Robinson, 813 F.3d 251, 264 (6th Cir. 2016). We review it for
abuse of discretion, “whether . . . just outside, or significantly outside the Guidelines range.”
United States v. Cunningham, 669 F.3d 723, 728 (6th Cir. 2012) (citation omitted). However, “a
major departure should be supported by a more significant justification than a minor one.” Gall,
552 U.S. at 50. We consider a sentence to be substantively unreasonable where the district court
“place[s] too much weight on some of the § 3553(a) factors and too little on others in sentencing
the individual.” United States v. Rayyan, 885 F.3d 436, 442 (6th Cir. 2018). It is in essence a
2 To the extent Reese complains the district court failed to comment about 18 U.S.C § 3553(a)(6)’s sentencing-disparity factor, we see no procedural error. It had a properly calculated Guidelines range before it, meaning it accounted for that factor. See, e.g., United States v. Hymes, 19 F.4th 928, 935 (6th Cir. 2021). Regardless, we have “never required the ritual incantation of the factors to affirm a sentence.” United States v. Polihonki, 543 F.3d 318, 324 (6th Cir. 2008) (citation omitted). -3- No. 21-2652, United States v. Reese
claim that a sentence is “too long (if a defendant appeals) or too short (if the government appeals).”
Id. Our review “will, of course, take into account the totality of the circumstances, including the
extent of any variance from the Guidelines range.” Gall, 552 U.S. at 51. But we “must give due
deference to the district court’s decision that the § 3553(a) factors, on a whole, justify the extent
of the variance.” Id.
Here, the district court rationally justified its upward variance given the short succession
of Reese’s violations, each of which involved a firearm and carried a risk to the public. True, the
Guidelines range accounted for the existence of his criminal history, but the same cannot be said
regarding its rapid repetition; the back-to-back-to-back nature of his offenses and violations
indicated a need for deterrence. We have often found that the need for deterrence supports an
upward variance when imposing a sentence following revocation of supervised release. See, e.g.,
United States v. Kontrol, 554 F.3d 1089, 1093 (6th Cir. 2009). And we do not require district
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NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION File Name: 22a0089n.06
No. 21-2652
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT FILED ) Mar 02, 2022 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, DEBORAH S. HUNT, Clerk ) Plaintiff-Appellee, ) ) v. ON APPEAL FROM THE ) UNITED STATES DISTRICT ) TERRELL REESE, COURT FOR THE EASTERN ) DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN Defendant-Appellant. ) ) )
BEFORE: SUTTON, Chief Judge; GIBBONS and GRIFFIN, Circuit Judges.
GRIFFIN, Circuit Judge.
Defendant Terrell Reese twice violated the terms of his supervised release, each within a
few months of completing a prison term. The district court revoked supervision and imposed a
custodial sentence after both violations. Reese contends the district court imposed a substantively
unreasonable sentence following his second violation when it varied upward from a four-to-ten-
month Guidelines range and imposed an eighteen-month term of imprisonment. We disagree and
affirm.
I.
In 2014, Reese acted as a lookout while a coconspirator robbed a credit union by passing
the teller a note indicating that he was armed and would “kill everybody” if she did not comply
with their demands. Reese subsequently pleaded guilty to one count of conspiracy to commit No. 21-2652, United States v. Reese
credit union robbery in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 371, 2113(a). He was sentenced to a term of
forty-two months incarceration, followed by three years of supervised release.
Shortly after Reese completed his prison sentence, a probation officer concluded that he
committed several supervised-release violations. The officer alleged, among other things, that
Reese had committed first degree premediated murder under Michigan law, fled from law
enforcement after leaving a vehicle where a handgun was present, and associated with another
felon. The district court found Reese committed all the charged conduct save the murder, revoked
his supervision, and imposed a twelve-month custodial sentence to be followed by twenty-four
months of supervised release.
Reese was six months removed from prison when he again ran afoul of the law. In May
2020, Detroit police officers responded to a report of “Shots Fired” and observed a handgun
sticking out of Reese’s pocket. They arrested him for carrying a concealed weapon in violation of
Michigan law, which led to his probation officer again petitioning the district court to revoke his
supervised release.1
The supervised-release violation report set forth a Guidelines range of four-to-ten months
imprisonment and a statutory maximum of two years. Reese admitted guilt, and his attorney asked
that the district court impose a custodial sentence at the lower end of the range because Reese was
“in the wrong place at the wrong time,” there was no evidence connecting Reese to the shooting,
and he was young and actively involved with his family. The district court declined, varied
upward, and imposed an eighteen-month sentence. The court emphasized the short turnaround
between Reese’s supervised-release violations and his conduct’s inherent risk to the public. In the
1 This also led to a new federal charge and conviction; Reese pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession and was sentenced by a different district court judge to serve twenty-one months in prison. -2- No. 21-2652, United States v. Reese
court’s view, the Guidelines range did not accurately reflect an appropriate sentence: “The Court
is concerned that the defendant’s repetitive behavior here with respect to violent or intended violent
misconduct . . . [is] establishing at an early age a very distressing pattern.” Its upward variance
was a “firm response” to deter such conduct and protect the public. This timely appeal followed.
II.
“[A]ppellate review of sentencing decisions is limited to determining whether they are
‘reasonable.’” Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 46 (2007). We review sentences imposed for
supervised-release violations under the familiar abuse-of-discretion standard and the procedural-
and-substantive-reasonableness rubric. See United States v. Peebles, 624 F.3d 344, 347 (6th Cir.
2010). Reese’s appeal concerns only whether the district court imposed a substantively reasonable
sentence.2
An above-Guidelines sentence is neither presumptively reasonable nor presumptively
unreasonable. United States v. Robinson, 813 F.3d 251, 264 (6th Cir. 2016). We review it for
abuse of discretion, “whether . . . just outside, or significantly outside the Guidelines range.”
United States v. Cunningham, 669 F.3d 723, 728 (6th Cir. 2012) (citation omitted). However, “a
major departure should be supported by a more significant justification than a minor one.” Gall,
552 U.S. at 50. We consider a sentence to be substantively unreasonable where the district court
“place[s] too much weight on some of the § 3553(a) factors and too little on others in sentencing
the individual.” United States v. Rayyan, 885 F.3d 436, 442 (6th Cir. 2018). It is in essence a
2 To the extent Reese complains the district court failed to comment about 18 U.S.C § 3553(a)(6)’s sentencing-disparity factor, we see no procedural error. It had a properly calculated Guidelines range before it, meaning it accounted for that factor. See, e.g., United States v. Hymes, 19 F.4th 928, 935 (6th Cir. 2021). Regardless, we have “never required the ritual incantation of the factors to affirm a sentence.” United States v. Polihonki, 543 F.3d 318, 324 (6th Cir. 2008) (citation omitted). -3- No. 21-2652, United States v. Reese
claim that a sentence is “too long (if a defendant appeals) or too short (if the government appeals).”
Id. Our review “will, of course, take into account the totality of the circumstances, including the
extent of any variance from the Guidelines range.” Gall, 552 U.S. at 51. But we “must give due
deference to the district court’s decision that the § 3553(a) factors, on a whole, justify the extent
of the variance.” Id.
Here, the district court rationally justified its upward variance given the short succession
of Reese’s violations, each of which involved a firearm and carried a risk to the public. True, the
Guidelines range accounted for the existence of his criminal history, but the same cannot be said
regarding its rapid repetition; the back-to-back-to-back nature of his offenses and violations
indicated a need for deterrence. We have often found that the need for deterrence supports an
upward variance when imposing a sentence following revocation of supervised release. See, e.g.,
United States v. Kontrol, 554 F.3d 1089, 1093 (6th Cir. 2009). And we do not require district
courts to sentence a defendant in a vacuum, considering only the fact of violation and not the actual
circumstances in which the defendant committed the violation. United States v. Johnson, 640 F.3d
195, 207 (6th Cir. 2011); see also United States v. Terry, 574 F. App’x 579, 582 (6th Cir. 2014)
(“The district court focused on Terry’s breach of trust in failing to comply with the conditions of
his supervised release and properly sanctioned him for that breach.”). Reese appeared before the
district court twice within a short period of time for substantially similar conduct. Given Reese’s
repetitive violations, the court did not abuse its discretion when it imposed a longer-than-
recommended sentence for the second violation. See United States v. Williams, 805 F. App’x 374,
379 (6th Cir. 2020) (stating that we have “repeatedly upheld above-guidelines sentences for
supervised release violations when the defendant has demonstrated an unwillingness to abide by
the conditions of supervised release” and collecting cases). Indeed, our caselaw suggests that the
-4- No. 21-2652, United States v. Reese
district court could have gone further: “For an offender who commits multiple supervised-release
violations, it is not an abuse of discretion to vary up to the applicable statutory maximum.” United
States v. Vines, 799 F. App’x 371, 375–76 (6th Cir. 2020) (collecting cases).
III.
For these reasons, we affirm the district court’s judgment.
-5-