United States v. Terrance Pettiford

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
• Decided: July 24, 2025
• Docket: 24-4286
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

USCA4 Appeal: 24-4286 Doc: 24 Filed: 07/24/2025 Pg: 1 of 4

UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 24-4286

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee.

v.

TERRANCE DEVON PETTIFORD,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina, at Greensboro. Thomas D. Schroeder, District Judge. (1:23-cr-00199-TDS-1)

Submitted: April 11, 2025 Decided: July 24, 2025

Before WYNN and BENJAMIN, Circuit Judges, and FLOYD, Senior Circuit Judge.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

ON BRIEF: Louis C. Allen, Federal Public Defender, Ames C. Chamberlin, Assistant Federal Public Defender, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER, Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellant. Julie Carol Niemeier, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellee.

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PER CURIAM:

Terrance Devon Pettiford pled guilty, pursuant to a plea agreement, to possession

of a firearm by a felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1), 924(a)(8). The district court

sentenced Pettiford to 70 months of imprisonment, above the 51- to 63-month Sentencing

Guidelines range. On appeal, counsel has filed a brief pursuant to Anders v. California,

386 U.S. 738 (1967), conceding that there are no meritorious issues for appeal but

questioning whether the district court erred in applying a four-level increase under the

Guidelines for possession of a firearm in connection with another felony offense and

whether the sentence is substantively unreasonable. Pettiford filed a pro se brief also

challenging the reasonableness of the sentence. For the following reasons, we affirm.

We “review[] all sentences―whether inside, just outside, or significantly outside

the Guidelines range―under a deferential abuse of discretion standard.” United States v.

Claybrooks, 90 F.4th 248, 257 (4th Cir. 2024). “In determining procedural reasonableness,

[we] consider[] whether the district court properly calculated the defendant’s [G]uidelines

range, gave the parties an opportunity to argue for an appropriate sentence, considered the

18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors, and sufficiently explained the selected sentence.” United

States v. Jackson, 127 F. 4th 448, 454 (4th Cir. 2025) (internal quotation marks omitted).

“When determining whether the district court properly applied the advisory Sentencing

Guidelines, [we] review[] the district court’s legal conclusions de novo and its factual

findings for clear error.” Claybrooks, 90 F.4th at 253 (internal quotation marks omitted).

However, we can determine that asserted errors in the application of the Guidelines

do not require reversal if they are harmless, by determining that “(1) the district court would

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have reached the same result even if it had decided the Guidelines issue the other way, and

(2) the sentence would be reasonable even if the Guidelines issue had been decided in the

defendant’s favor.” United States v. Mills, 917 F.3d 324, 330 (4th Cir. 2019) (cleaned up).

“We will generally find a variance sentence reasonable when the reasons justifying the

variance are tied to [18 U.S.C.] § 3553(a) and are plausible.” United States v. Provance,

944 F.3d 213, 219 (4th Cir. 2019) (internal quotation marks omitted). Here, the district

court explicitly stated that irrespective of the correct Guidelines range, a 70-month sentence

was warranted under the § 3553(a) factors, namely respect for the law and protecting the

public. Therefore, we conclude that the district court would have imposed the same

sentence even if it had decided the challenged Guidelines calculation in Pettiford’s favor.

We further conclude that the 70-month upward variance sentence is substantively

reasonable based on the factors identified by the district court. The court discussed the

seriousness of Pettiford’s offense, noting that he did not use the firearm during the offense.

The court also acknowledged Pettiford’s age and substance abuse history and commended

him for earning his high school degree while incarcerated, but determined that the need to

deter Pettiford and protect the public outweighed these factors. Specifically, based on

Pettiford’s extensive history of firearm-related offenses, many of them violent, the court

was concerned with deterring Pettiford’s criminal activity and protecting the public from

him. In addition, the court cited the fact that Pettiford committed the instant offense only

two months after being released from his most recent incarceration for a violent offense

involving a firearm. We therefore conclude that the upward variant sentence is

substantively reasonable.

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In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the entire record in this case and have

found no meritorious grounds for appeal. We therefore affirm the district court’s judgment.

This court requires that counsel inform Pettiford, in writing, of the right to petition the

Supreme Court of the United States for further review. If Pettiford requests that a petition

be filed, but counsel believes that such a petition would be frivolous, then counsel may

move in this court for leave to withdraw from representation. Counsel’s motion must state

that a copy thereof was served on Pettiford.

We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are

adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the

decisional process.

AFFIRMED