NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION File Name: 26a0142n.06
No. 25-5252
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FILED FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT Mar 18, 2026 KELLY L. STEPHENS, Clerk ) UNITED STATES OF AMERICA ) Plaintiff - Appellee, ) ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED ) STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE v. ) WESTERN DISTRICT OF ) TENNESSEE TERRANCE PATTERSON, ) Defendant - Appellant. ) OPINION ) )
Before: BUSH, READLER, and DAVIS, Circuit Judges.
JOHN K. BUSH, Circuit Judge. Terrance Patterson pleaded guilty to being a felon in
possession of a firearm and was sentenced to 88 months’ imprisonment. He now argues that the
district court erred by accepting his guilty plea without sua sponte ordering a competency hearing.
He requests that we vacate his guilty plea and remand for a competency determination. We decline
his request and AFFIRM.
I.
In 2023, a federal jury indicted Patterson for one count of possessing a firearm as a felon
in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), conduct that occurred on or about July 17, 2022. In 2024,
he pleaded guilty to this charge in a written plea agreement. Under the terms of this agreement,
the government agreed to recommend that he receive full credit for acceptance of responsibility
and represented that it would not seek a sentencing enhancement under the Armed Career Criminal
Act. No. 25-5252, United States v. Patterson
During the colloquy under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11, the magistrate judge
asked Patterson if he had “been treated recently for any mental illness or addiction to narcotic
drugs of any kind”; Patterson replied that he had not. R. 60, Change of Plea Hr’g Tr., PageID 210.
However, subsequent questioning revealed that, after receiving an eight-year sentence in 2022,
Patterson either received or had continuously been receiving some sort of treatment while
incarcerated.
Patterson also denied that he was “taking any prescription drugs,” or that he was under the
influence of any drugs (prescription or otherwise) or alcohol. Id. at PageID 212. Patterson’s
counsel confirmed that Patterson was competent to change his plea. Patterson confirmed that his
counsel had informed him of the nature and elements of the charge against him and demonstrated
understanding of the rights he was forfeiting by pleading guilty.
Nonetheless, Patterson appeared temporarily confused at the end of this portion of the
colloquy. When the magistrate judge asked him if he understood that his guilty plea would waive
all the rights previously discussed, he asked for some clarification: “So that means, like, later on
down the line between now and sentencing, I can’t take my plea back?” Id. at PageID 217. “That’s
exactly right,” replied the magistrate judge. Id. Patterson responded that the magistrate judge was
telling him something different than what his counsel had told him and he “[didn’t] like that.” Id.
Patterson then conferred with his counsel.
After the brief conference, the magistrate judge went back and clarified that Patterson
would not be able to further change his plea and explained that if he was “not sure that [he]
want[ed] to plead guilty today,” then she did not “want [him] to plead guilty today.” Id. at PageID
219. Patterson responded: “I ain’t really sure.” Id. Counsel clarified that Patterson’s uneasiness
was not about the plea deal or his understanding of the consequences of pleading guilty.
2 No. 25-5252, United States v. Patterson
Instead, Patterson’s concern was that he would almost certainly not be allowed to withdraw his
plea. The magistrate judge explained that Patterson would not be able to withdraw his guilty plea
simply because he changed his mind. He said he understood this. The magistrate judge then asked
him directly whether he wanted to change his plea or go to trial and emphasized that this was a
“big” and “difficult decision.” Id. at PageID 221. Patterson decided that he would “go on and
take the plea” and said he understood the consequences of doing so. Id.
The magistrate judge then explained that the maximum penalty was fifteen years’
imprisonment, and Patterson said he understood. Later, the magistrate judge addressed the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines, and explained that the government had, as part of the plea deal, agreed to
recommend a high-end Guidelines sentence. Patterson pointed out that the top range of his
Guidelines was estimated at 96 months’ imprisonment, and asked if that estimate could be right.
The magistrate judge explained that any estimate would be preliminary because the Guidelines
range would not be calculated until sentencing and that the final decision would rest with the
district court judge. Patterson said he understood this. He also said he understood that the plea
agreement recommendations were nonbinding and that the district court judge had discretion to
hand down a different sentence.
This portion of the colloquy, however, did not end without some pushback from Patterson.
The magistrate judge carefully pointed out that the district court judge could impose a harsher
sentence than the one recommended in the plea agreement. Patterson replied: “I don’t like that.”
Id. at PageID 235. The magistrate judge repeated that the district court judge would not have to
follow the recommendation and that a harsher sentence would not be grounds to withdraw the
3 No. 25-5252, United States v. Patterson
guilty plea. Patterson said he understood. Satisfied that Patterson was competent to enter a plea,
and that his guilty plea was knowing and voluntary, the magistrate judge accepted the guilty plea.
Sentencing took place over two days. On the first day, Patterson’s counsel presented
mitigating evidence that Patterson’s mother had mental health issues, that serious mental health
issues run in their family, and that Patterson possibly had undiagnosed attention deficit
hyperactivity disorder. Counsel opined that Patterson “would benefit from some kind of therapy.”
R. 63, Day 1 Sentencing Hr’g Tr., PageID 290.
On the second day of sentencing, Patterson explained that he keeps committing crimes
“because I keep doing drugs. I need help. That’s all.” R. 62, Day 2 Sentencing Hr’g Tr., PageID
311. Patterson repeated that his drug problem was “the only problem.” He stated, “That’s why I
keep doing what I’m doing because I be under the influence. When I’m sober, I got a good mind,
but when I’m under influence, I do things that I wouldn’t do.” Id. at PageID 312.
The district court ultimately imposed an 88-month sentence. Patterson did not take this
news well, immediately objecting that it was “still 15 years” and that “[counsel] told me something
else.” Id. at PageID 317–18. It is unclear what Patterson was saying he was told, but he seemed
to suggest that he took the plea deal only because his counsel had predicted he would get a lighter
sentence. This did not dissuade the district court. The district court responded that the sentence
was “up to the [c]ourt and nobody else,” and recommended that Patterson receive drug treatment
while incarcerated. Id. at PageID 318. Dejected, Patterson asserted that “[b]y the time I get out I
have to be good [anyway] . . . . I won’t even need treatment. I’ll be good anyway.” Id.
Patterson timely appealed.
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NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION File Name: 26a0142n.06
No. 25-5252
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FILED FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT Mar 18, 2026 KELLY L. STEPHENS, Clerk ) UNITED STATES OF AMERICA ) Plaintiff - Appellee, ) ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED ) STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE v. ) WESTERN DISTRICT OF ) TENNESSEE TERRANCE PATTERSON, ) Defendant - Appellant. ) OPINION ) )
Before: BUSH, READLER, and DAVIS, Circuit Judges.
JOHN K. BUSH, Circuit Judge. Terrance Patterson pleaded guilty to being a felon in
possession of a firearm and was sentenced to 88 months’ imprisonment. He now argues that the
district court erred by accepting his guilty plea without sua sponte ordering a competency hearing.
He requests that we vacate his guilty plea and remand for a competency determination. We decline
his request and AFFIRM.
I.
In 2023, a federal jury indicted Patterson for one count of possessing a firearm as a felon
in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), conduct that occurred on or about July 17, 2022. In 2024,
he pleaded guilty to this charge in a written plea agreement. Under the terms of this agreement,
the government agreed to recommend that he receive full credit for acceptance of responsibility
and represented that it would not seek a sentencing enhancement under the Armed Career Criminal
Act. No. 25-5252, United States v. Patterson
During the colloquy under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11, the magistrate judge
asked Patterson if he had “been treated recently for any mental illness or addiction to narcotic
drugs of any kind”; Patterson replied that he had not. R. 60, Change of Plea Hr’g Tr., PageID 210.
However, subsequent questioning revealed that, after receiving an eight-year sentence in 2022,
Patterson either received or had continuously been receiving some sort of treatment while
incarcerated.
Patterson also denied that he was “taking any prescription drugs,” or that he was under the
influence of any drugs (prescription or otherwise) or alcohol. Id. at PageID 212. Patterson’s
counsel confirmed that Patterson was competent to change his plea. Patterson confirmed that his
counsel had informed him of the nature and elements of the charge against him and demonstrated
understanding of the rights he was forfeiting by pleading guilty.
Nonetheless, Patterson appeared temporarily confused at the end of this portion of the
colloquy. When the magistrate judge asked him if he understood that his guilty plea would waive
all the rights previously discussed, he asked for some clarification: “So that means, like, later on
down the line between now and sentencing, I can’t take my plea back?” Id. at PageID 217. “That’s
exactly right,” replied the magistrate judge. Id. Patterson responded that the magistrate judge was
telling him something different than what his counsel had told him and he “[didn’t] like that.” Id.
Patterson then conferred with his counsel.
After the brief conference, the magistrate judge went back and clarified that Patterson
would not be able to further change his plea and explained that if he was “not sure that [he]
want[ed] to plead guilty today,” then she did not “want [him] to plead guilty today.” Id. at PageID
219. Patterson responded: “I ain’t really sure.” Id. Counsel clarified that Patterson’s uneasiness
was not about the plea deal or his understanding of the consequences of pleading guilty.
2 No. 25-5252, United States v. Patterson
Instead, Patterson’s concern was that he would almost certainly not be allowed to withdraw his
plea. The magistrate judge explained that Patterson would not be able to withdraw his guilty plea
simply because he changed his mind. He said he understood this. The magistrate judge then asked
him directly whether he wanted to change his plea or go to trial and emphasized that this was a
“big” and “difficult decision.” Id. at PageID 221. Patterson decided that he would “go on and
take the plea” and said he understood the consequences of doing so. Id.
The magistrate judge then explained that the maximum penalty was fifteen years’
imprisonment, and Patterson said he understood. Later, the magistrate judge addressed the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines, and explained that the government had, as part of the plea deal, agreed to
recommend a high-end Guidelines sentence. Patterson pointed out that the top range of his
Guidelines was estimated at 96 months’ imprisonment, and asked if that estimate could be right.
The magistrate judge explained that any estimate would be preliminary because the Guidelines
range would not be calculated until sentencing and that the final decision would rest with the
district court judge. Patterson said he understood this. He also said he understood that the plea
agreement recommendations were nonbinding and that the district court judge had discretion to
hand down a different sentence.
This portion of the colloquy, however, did not end without some pushback from Patterson.
The magistrate judge carefully pointed out that the district court judge could impose a harsher
sentence than the one recommended in the plea agreement. Patterson replied: “I don’t like that.”
Id. at PageID 235. The magistrate judge repeated that the district court judge would not have to
follow the recommendation and that a harsher sentence would not be grounds to withdraw the
3 No. 25-5252, United States v. Patterson
guilty plea. Patterson said he understood. Satisfied that Patterson was competent to enter a plea,
and that his guilty plea was knowing and voluntary, the magistrate judge accepted the guilty plea.
Sentencing took place over two days. On the first day, Patterson’s counsel presented
mitigating evidence that Patterson’s mother had mental health issues, that serious mental health
issues run in their family, and that Patterson possibly had undiagnosed attention deficit
hyperactivity disorder. Counsel opined that Patterson “would benefit from some kind of therapy.”
R. 63, Day 1 Sentencing Hr’g Tr., PageID 290.
On the second day of sentencing, Patterson explained that he keeps committing crimes
“because I keep doing drugs. I need help. That’s all.” R. 62, Day 2 Sentencing Hr’g Tr., PageID
311. Patterson repeated that his drug problem was “the only problem.” He stated, “That’s why I
keep doing what I’m doing because I be under the influence. When I’m sober, I got a good mind,
but when I’m under influence, I do things that I wouldn’t do.” Id. at PageID 312.
The district court ultimately imposed an 88-month sentence. Patterson did not take this
news well, immediately objecting that it was “still 15 years” and that “[counsel] told me something
else.” Id. at PageID 317–18. It is unclear what Patterson was saying he was told, but he seemed
to suggest that he took the plea deal only because his counsel had predicted he would get a lighter
sentence. This did not dissuade the district court. The district court responded that the sentence
was “up to the [c]ourt and nobody else,” and recommended that Patterson receive drug treatment
while incarcerated. Id. at PageID 318. Dejected, Patterson asserted that “[b]y the time I get out I
have to be good [anyway] . . . . I won’t even need treatment. I’ll be good anyway.” Id.
Patterson timely appealed.
4 No. 25-5252, United States v. Patterson
II.
Due process does not permit a court to convict a legally incompetent defendant. Pate v.
Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 378 (1966). A district court thus has the duty to inquire into competency
“whenever there is reasonable cause to believe that the defendant is incompetent to stand trial.”
United States v. Dubrule, 822 F.3d 866, 879 (6th Cir. 2016) (quoting United States v. White, 887
F.2d 705, 709 (6th Cir. 1989)); 18 U.S.C. § 4241(a). And the standard of competency to stand
trial is identical to the standard of competency governing guilty pleas. Godinez v. Moran, 509
U.S. 389, 397 (1993). Factors that contribute to reasonable cause—or absence thereof—include
irrational behavior, demeanor, medical evidence, and defense counsel’s opinion. Dubrule, 822
F.3d at 879. The most important factor, though, is the “ability to participate in court proceedings
by giving coherent responses to questions from the court.” United States v. Alfadhili, 762 F. App’x
264, 267 (6th Cir. 2019). We give great deference to the decision not to order a competency
hearing because “[t]he bare record that [we] review[] on appeal is a poor substitute for the district
court’s personal observation of the defendant’s demeanor and the district court’s considered
judgment of the defendant’s ability to conduct trial proceedings.” United States v. Stafford, 782
F.3d 786, 791 (6th Cir. 2015).
Our caselaw has not yet resolved whether we review the decision not to order a competency
hearing for abuse of discretion or plain error when, as here, the defendant did not request such a
hearing in the district court. United States v. Day, No. 22-3154, 2022 WL 17547518, at *3 (6th
Cir. Dec. 9, 2022). We too leave that issue unresolved, as the district court did not abuse its
discretion, much less plainly err.
5 No. 25-5252, United States v. Patterson
III.
Patterson consistently demonstrated his competency to proceed during his change-of-plea
hearing and at sentencing. At the change-of-plea hearing, defense counsel affirmed that Patterson
was competent to enter his guilty plea. See Dubrule, 822 F.3d at 879 (stating that a “court may
also consider an attorney’s opinion about his client’s competency”). Patterson indicated that he
had read and understood his plea agreement. See Alfadhili, 762 F. App’x at 267 (stating that
indicators of competency “include the ability to read and understand a plea agreement”). He
consistently gave coherent answers to questions from the court. See id. (stating that the “most
frequently cited factor” in determining competency is the “ability to participate in court
proceedings by giving coherent responses to questions from the court”); Eley v. Bagley, 604 F.3d
958, 966 (6th Cir. 2010) (finding defendant competent in part because “[h]is answers . . . were
cogent”). When he expressed disagreement or confusion with the pleading process—like his
inability to withdraw his guilty plea or the district court’s discretion to hand down a harsher
sentence than recommended—he successfully resolved these issues by communicating with his
counsel and with the district court. See Alfadhili, 762 F. App’x at 267 (stating that indicators of
competency include “cooperat[ing] with defense counsel [and] engag[ing] with legal arguments”);
United States v. Coleman, 871 F.3d 470, 478 (6th Cir. 2017). Rather than “chaotic and confusing,”
Appellant Br. 26, Patterson’s behavior demonstrated a rational mind struggling with a difficult and
consequential decision. And such struggle, along with the “flip-flopping” or “trouble making up
his mind,” indicates “angst, not a lack of understanding of the plea’s consequences.” United States
v. McIntosh, 29 F.4th 648, 656 (10th Cir. 2022).
Further, Patterson’s allocution at sentencing was cogent, articulate, and rational. See
Coleman, 871 F.3d at 477; Day, 2022 WL 17547518, at *3 (noting that the defendant “spoke
6 No. 25-5252, United States v. Patterson
cogently at the hearing”). Patterson apologized for his behavior’s impact on the public, his
community, and his family, and explained that he engaged in criminal behavior solely because of
his drug addiction. As he stated in his allocution, he has “a good mind” but does “things that [he]
wouldn’t do” when under the influence of drugs. R. 62, Day 2 Sentencing Hr’g Tr., PageID 312.
Just as striking as the evidence for Patterson’s competency is the lack of record evidence
of incompetency. The record contains no medical evidence of any mental health issue (apart from
drug addiction). In fact, the presentence report states that Patterson had never received mental
health treatment or experienced any symptoms of mental or emotional health issues, and that there
was no documented evidence suggesting otherwise. Additionally, the record contains nothing that
would indicate Patterson was under the influence of drugs during the relevant hearings, and
Patterson confirmed he was sober during his change-of-plea hearing. Although the hearing
transcripts reveal temporary misunderstandings and occasional frustration, the misunderstandings
were easily remedied, and mere frustration is not indicative of incompetency.
Patterson’s arguments in response do not convince.
Patterson argues his change-of-plea hearing indicated possible past treatment for mental
illness. However, that portion of the colloquy was almost certainly discussing treatment for drug
addiction. Elsewhere, Patterson openly acknowledged his struggles with addiction, his failure to
stay clean, and the link between his addiction and his criminality. His counsel suggested Patterson
had never received mental health treatment, and the presentence report confirmed he had never
received such treatment. Given that context, the best read of the relevant exchange is that Patterson
received treatment for drug addiction while incarcerated in 2022, the treatment failed to cure his
addiction, and his continued drug use led to the instant felon-in-possession charge. In sum, the
7 No. 25-5252, United States v. Patterson
magistrate judge did not abuse her discretion by forgoing a competency hearing notwithstanding
this portion of the colloquy.
Patterson also points to his family history of serious mental illness. But he provides no
evidence that this history was passed on to him. Patterson’s mother’s speculation that he may
suffer from undiagnosed ADHD is similarly unconvincing. A competency hearing may not be
required even when the defendant has previously been diagnosed with schizophrenia. Mackey v.
Dutton, 217 F.3d 399, 414 (6th Cir. 2000); Day, 2022 WL 17547518, at *4 (holding that “a
defendant’s mental illness alone,” even if his conditions include paranoid schizophrenia, “does not
automatically signal” incompetency when the defendant displays “mental acumen” throughout the
proceedings). Mere family history and lay opinion are therefore insufficient.
The cases to which Patterson analogizes are either inapposite or cut the other way. Day
declined to find sufficient evidence of incompetency to vacate a guilty plea even where the
defendant had been diagnosed with paranoid schizophrenia. 2022 WL 17547518, at *4. United
States v. Winnick involved a defendant who said he was under the influence of psychiatric
medication during his plea colloquy, unlike Patterson, who testified he was not under the influence
of any drugs or medication. 490 F. App’x 718, 719 (6th Cir. 2012). And United States v. McIntosh
involved a defendant who said he had been prescribed psychiatric medication, but had not been
taking it, and therefore that “his judgment was not ‘right’ as a result.” 29 F.4th at 657. This is in
stark contrast to Patterson, who never said he had been prescribed psychiatric medication and never
told the district court anything to call into question his present state of mind.
8 No. 25-5252, United States v. Patterson
Simply stated, the district court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to inquire into
Patterson’s competency to plead guilty sua sponte. And to the extent Patterson separately argues
that his plea did not comport with Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b), we likewise lack any reason to doubt
whether Patterson’s plea was knowing and voluntary. We therefore AFFIRM.