United States v. Teriek Edwards

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
• Decided: September 4, 2024
• Docket: 22-3306
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT _________________

No. 22-3306 _________________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

v.

TERIEK EDWARDS, Appellant ________________

On Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey (D.C. Criminal No. 2-19-cr-00111-001) District Judge: Honorable John M. Vazquez ________________ Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) May 9, 2024

Before: MATEY, MONTGOMERY-REEVES, and ROTH, Circuit Judges.

(Opinion filed: September 4, 2024) ___________

OPINION* ___________

MONTGOMERY-REEVES, Circuit Judge.

In this appeal, Teriek Edwards challenges his conviction and sentence relating to

various charges of possession of drugs, a firearm, and ammunition. Edwards argues that

* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not constitute binding precedent. the District Court improperly denied his motions for a new trial and for a judgment of

acquittal based on the Government’s suppression of impeachment materials. Because

Edwards effectively used the impeachment evidence at trial, he suffered no prejudice by

the tardy disclosure. As such, we will affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

In 2018, officers found narcotics on Edwards while arresting him. Afterward,

officers put Edwards into a police vehicle. Upon arrival at the police station, a handgun

fell from Edwards’s pants leg onto the floor of the vehicle. Edwards was charged with

various offenses relating to his possession of drugs, a firearm, and ammunition.

During his trial on these charges, an officer gave impeachment testimony that had

not been disclosed and that was inconsistent with the testimony of another officer.

Officer Eugene Tolliver testified that after he heard “a noise, like something dropped[;]”

he observed a loaded firearm on the floorboard of his police car; and Edwards said,

“That’s not mine.” App. 197. Officer Kemon Lee did not testify that Edwards made this

statement. The statement also did not appear in the police reports or Tolliver’s affidavit

of probable cause against Edwards, nor was it produced upon Edwards’s request for all

impeachment materials before trial.

Edwards moved for mistrial, arguing that he was prejudiced by the Government’s

failure to timely disclose the impeachment materials in violation of Giglio v. United

States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972). The District Court denied the application for a mistrial,

holding that Edwards suffered no prejudice by the tardy disclosure because he was able to

effectively use the evidence during trial. A jury found Edwards guilty of all charges, and

2 the District Court sentenced Edwards to three concurrent sentences of 33 months’

imprisonment, followed by a consecutive sentence of 60 months’ imprisonment.

II. DISCUSSION1

Edwards argues that the District Court erred by denying his motions for a new trial

and for a judgment of acquittal based on the Government’s failure to disclose

The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that “[n]o person

shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” U.S.

Const. amend. V. Under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), “the prosecution’s

suppression of evidence favorable to a criminal defendant violates due process when the

evidence is material to guilt or punishment.” United States v. Risha, 445 F.3d 298, 303

(3d Cir. 2006) (citing 373 U.S. at 87). In Giglio, the Supreme Court extended Brady’s

holding to include “evidence affecting credibility” when “the ‘reliability of a given

witness may well be determinative of guilt or innocence.’” Giglio v. U.S., 405 U.S. 150,

154 (1972). Where the government makes Brady evidence available during the course of

a trial in such a way that a defendant is able effectively to use it, due process is not

violated and Brady is not contravened.’” U.S. v. Fallon, 61 F.4th 95, 123 (3d Cir. 2023)

(quoting United States v. Johnson, 816 F.2d 918, 924 (3d Cir. 1987)). Thus, we must

1 The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. This Court reviews Brady violations “de novo for conclusions of law[] but applies a clearly erroneous standard to findings of fact.” United States v. Fallon, 61 F.4th 95, 122 (3d Cir. 2023).

3 consider whether Edwards was “able to use the material and suffered prejudice from an

untimely disclosure.” Id.

Edwards argues that the delayed disclosure prevented him from developing a

contradictory set of factual observations and occurrences, which prejudiced his defense.

Not so. Defense counsel cross-examined Tolliver about the omission in the arrest report

and affidavit of probable cause. And defense counsel spoke to the inconsistency during

closing argument. Further, the District Court offered to allow Edwards to reexamine Lee,

but Edwards declined. And Edwards’s other arguments that counsel would have

generally used an alternative trial strategy or opted to challenge the evidence in an in

limine motion (as opposed to an objection, motion to strike or for mistrial) are unavailing.

Thus, while the evidence was disclosed late, Edwards was still able to effectively use the

evidence during trial and was not prejudiced by the late disclosure. Johnson, 816 F.2d at

924 (holding the appellant was not prejudiced by the tardy disclosure of fingerprint

reports because the reports were disclosed before cross-examination took place and

utilized by the appellant in their own arguments, and the district court precluded expert

testimony on the report’s significance to minimize possible unfairness to the appellant).2

Because Edwards has not demonstrated prejudice from the delayed disclosure, and

2 See also United States v. Higgs, 713 F.2d 39, 44 (3d Cir. 1983) (“The Brady material in this case was information that appellees could use on cross-examination to challenge the credibility of government witnesses. For that type of material, we think appellees’ right to a fair trial will be fully protected if disclosure is made the day that the witness testifies.”).

4 because he was able to make effective use of the disclosed materials, his Giglio argument

fails.

III. CONCLUSION

For the reasons discussed above, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.