United States v. Terence L. Jones

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
• Decided: February 22, 2000
• Docket: 99-4413
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee,

v. No. 99-4413

TERENCE LORENZO JONES, Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Richmond. Robert E. Payne, District Judge. (CR-98-355)

Submitted: January 31, 2000

Decided: February 22, 2000

Before WILKINS and KING, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior Circuit Judge.

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Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

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COUNSEL

John B. Mann, LEVIT, MANN & HALLIGAN, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellant. Helen F. Fahey, United States Attorney, John S. Davis, Assistant United States Attorney, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellee.

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Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 36(c). OPINION

PER CURIAM:

Terence Lorenzo Jones appeals his jury convictions and resulting 120-month concurrent sentences for conspiracy in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846 (1994) and possession with intent to distribute in viola- tion of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a) (1994) and 18 U.S.C. § 2 (1994). We affirm.

Jones first contends that the district court improperly admitted expert testimony on the mode and operation of drug dealing. Expert testimony based upon specialized knowledge is admissible if it will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence. See Fed. R. Evid. 702. A trial judge has wide discretion in balancing the probative value of such evidence against any danger of unfair prejudice under Fed. R. Evid. 403. See United States v. King, 768 F.2d 586, 588 (4th Cir. 1985). We have reviewed the record and find that the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the testimony. Jones next argues that there was insufficient evidence to sustain the jury's ver- dict. We find that the evidence presented at trial, taking the view most favorable to the Government, was sufficient to support the conviction. See Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 80 (1942). We therefore affirm Jones' convictions and sentences. We dispense with oral argu- ment because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the deci- sional process.

AFFIRMED