United States v. Tellier

19 F.R.D. 164, 1956 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4293
CourtDistrict Court, E.D. New York
DecidedJune 11, 1956
DocketCr. 44203
StatusPublished
Cited by9 cases

This text of 19 F.R.D. 164 (United States v. Tellier) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
United States v. Tellier, 19 F.R.D. 164, 1956 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4293 (E.D.N.Y. 1956).

Opinion

RAYFIEL, District Judge.

This is a motion for a bill of particulars. The indictment to which it is addressed contains 36 counts, the first 35 of which are substantive counts and charge the defendants with engaging in a scheme to defraud and obtain money from members of the public by making false representations in connection with the offer for sale and the sale of four series of debentures of Alaska Telephone Corporation, hereinafter called Alaska, one of the defendants. The 36th count charges the defendants with conspiring to commit the substantive offenses involved in the first 35 counts. The particulars demanded are too numerous and detailed to be repeated here. Reference will be made to them as they are numbered in the notice of motion.

Under item 1 and its subdivisions particulars are demanded of the agreement between Alaska and the defendant Tellier, referred to in subparagraph “One C” of Count 1 of the indictment, providing for the sale of the Serie3 A debentures. The terms and conditions of the alleged agreement, to which, as the indictment avers, the defendants were parties, should be familiar to them; however, even if not, the defendants are not entitled to the information since the terms and conditions are described in the indictment in considerable detail, and with greater particularity than is required by Rule 7 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 18 U.S.C.A. The same is true of the agreements involving the sale of Series B and C of the debentures. Furthermore, the agreement is evidentiary in nature, and is not in itself inculpatory. For the foregoing reasons items 1(a), 1(b) and 1(c) are denied.

Under items 2(a), 2(b) and 2(c) the defendants ask that they be in[166]*166formed as to those of their allegedly untrue statements and representations, as well as omissions, made in connection with the sale of the debentures, which are not specifically referred to in sub-paragraph “One D” of Count 1 of the indictment. The granting of such relief would not only require the Government to reveal its evidence relating to those matters, but would have the effect of limiting the extent of such evidence at the trial. Accordingly, those items are denied.

Items 2(d), 2(e) and 2(f), as well as 3(a), 3(b), 5(a), 5(b), 5(c) and 7(a) will be obtainable upon an inspection of the books, papers and records of Alaska, for which provision is hereinafter made.

Inasmuch as the demands made under items 3(c), 5(d) and 7(b) are similar in import to those made under items 1(a), 1(b) and 1(c) they are likewise denied. Items 4, 6 and 8(a) are denied for the reasons given for the denial of items 2 (a), 2(b) and 2(c).

Under items 8(b) and 8(c) the defendants seek information concerning certain commitments alleged to have been made respecting the application of part of the proceeds of the sale of the aforementioned debentures, referred to in Count 1 of the indictment. The nature and substance of the commitments in question are adequately described in the indictment. They are alleged to have been made by the defendants. If that be so, the defendants should be familiar with them. This appears to be an attempt to obtain Government evidence in advance of the trial and, accordingly, items 8(b) and 8(c) are denied.

Under item 9 the defendants ask that the Government inform them as to the date or approximate date when it is claimed that the conspiracy alleged in Count 36 commenced, and when the defendants first employed the devices, schemes and artifices referred to in Count 1. The indictment fixes the time as “prior to the 1st day of May, 1951.” That is too indefinite. The Government will furnish the defendants with the approximate date.

The information sought under items 2(d), 2(e), 2(f), 3(a), 3(b), 5(a), 5(b), 5(c) and 7(a) can be obtained by inspecting the books, records and documents of Alaska. On the argument of the motion herein, Mr. Windels, the Assistant United States Attorney in charge of the case, agreed to make Alaska’s books available to the defendants for inspection. However, in or about November, 1955, Alaska filed its petition in the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington for re-organization under Chapter X of the Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C.A. § 501 et seq., and its books, records and other property were delivered to or seized by Richard D. Harris, Trustee in said proceeding, who has since retained possession thereof.

In or about April, 1956, the Securities Exchange Commission moved in the District Court for the Western District of Washington for an order authorizing and directing the said Trustee to deliver Alaska’s books and records to it. That application was denied by an order of District Judge Lindberg, dated April 12, 1956, chiefly because the continued possession of the books and records by the Trustee was essential in the performance of his official duties in connection with the estate of the Debtor (Alaska). However, the said order authorized and directed the Trustee to co-operate in the preparation of photostatic copies of said books and records, to have the same certified as true copies, and to furnish them to the Department of Justice, free, howrever, of any cost or expense to the Debt- or or the Trustee.

It appears from the aforementioned order of April 12, 1956, that some of Alaska’s records were on that date in the possession of the Securities Exchange [167]*167Commission, which obtained them prior to the commencement of the aforementioned Ghapter X proceeding.

I am satisfied that the information sought under the items last hereinabove mentioned is required for the proper preparation of the defendants’ case for trial.

Accordingly, the United States Attorney will furnsh the defendants with photostatic or other copies, certified as true and correct, of aU the books, records, documents and memoranda in any manner related to the matters, charges and claims contained in the indictment herein, including any of such records or memoranda as may be in the possession of the Securities Exchange Commission, or, at his option, make the same available to counsel for the defendants at all reasonable hours for inspection and copying. If, upon inspection, such copies appear to be illegible, inadequate or otherwise unsatisfactory counsel for the defendants may apply to this Court for further relief respecting the same. This direction will not apply to certain papers, records and memoranda, photostatic copies of which, as the Court has been informed, have been delivered to counsel for one of the defendants since the argument of the motion herein.

Settle order on notice.

On Motion to Transfer.

An indictment was filed in this District against the above-named defendants, charging them with conspiracy, and with engaging in a scheme to defraud members of the public by making false representations in connection with the sale of debentures of the defendant Alaska Telephone Corporation, hereinafter called Alaska, which operates telephone and power facilities in several communities in the Territory of Alaska, and maintains its principal offices in the City of Seattle, in the State of Washington.

The acts charged in the indictment are alleged to have been committed in the City of Seattle, in the Western District of Washington, the Borough of Brooklyn, New York City, in this District, as well as in other districts.

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Bluebook (online)
19 F.R.D. 164, 1956 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4293, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/united-states-v-tellier-nyed-1956.