United States v. Taylor Womack

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
• Decided: April 5, 2024
• Docket: 23-4656
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

USCA4 Appeal: 23-4656 Doc: 19 Filed: 04/05/2024 Pg: 1 of 4

UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 23-4656

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

TAYLOR WOMACK,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of West Virginia, at Charleston. Irene C. Berger, District Judge. (2:23-cr-00012-1)

Submitted: February 27, 2024 Decided: April 5, 2024

Before NIEMEYER and WYNN, Circuit Judges, and FLOYD, Senior Circuit Judge.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

ON BRIEF: Wesley P. Page, Federal Public Defender, Emily L. Szopinski, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Jonathan D. Byrne, Appellate Counsel, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER, Charleston, West Virginia, for Appellant. William S. Thompson, United States Attorney, Jonathan T. Storage, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Charleston, West Virginia, for Appellee.

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PER CURIAM:

Taylor Womack entered a conditional guilty plea to possession of a firearm by a

felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(a)(2), reserving his right to appeal

the district court’s denial of his suppression motion. On appeal, Womack argues that the

district court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence seized following a frisk of

his person. We affirm.

“When reviewing a district court’s ruling on a motion to suppress, we review factual

findings for clear error and legal determinations de novo,” and we “construe the evidence

in the light most favorable to the prevailing party.” United States v. Lull, 824 F.3d 109,

114-15 (4th Cir. 2016) (internal quotation marks omitted). “[A]n officer may stop and

briefly detain a person when the officer has reasonable, articulable suspicion that the person

has been, is, or is about to be engaged in criminal activity.” United States v. Coleman, 18

F.4th 131, 136 (4th Cir. 2021) (internal quotation marks omitted). “To establish reasonable

suspicion, an officer must have a minimal level of objective justification, meaning that [he]

must be able to articulate more than an inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or hunch

of criminal activity.” United States v. Gist-Davis, 41 F.4th 259, 264 (4th Cir. 2022)

(internal quotation marks omitted). Once an officer performs a valid stop, “[he] may

conduct a protective frisk of the person for weapons,” if the officer has reasonable

suspicion that the person stopped “may be armed and presently dangerous.” Id. (internal

quotation marks omitted). “The officer need not be absolutely certain that the individual

is armed; the issue is whether a reasonably prudent man in the circumstances would be

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warranted in the belief that his safety or that of others was in danger.” Terry, 392 U.S. at

27.

Courts assess the legality of a Terry* stop and frisk under “the totality of the

circumstances, giving due weight to common sense judgments reached by officers in light

of their experience and training.” Gist-Davis, 41 F.4th at 264 (internal quotation marks

omitted). “Judicial review of the evidence offered to demonstrate reasonable suspicion

must be commonsensical, focused on the evidence as a whole, and cognizant of both

context and the particular experience of officers charged with the ongoing tasks of law

enforcement.” United States v. Branch, 537 F.3d 328, 337 (4th Cir. 2008). “[M]ultiple

factors may be taken together to create a reasonable suspicion even where each factor,

taken alone, would be insufficient.” United States v. George, 732 F.3d 296, 300 (4th Cir.

2013).

We conclude that the district court did not err in finding that the officer had

reasonable suspicion that Womack was armed and dangerous. Womack does not dispute

that the officer had reasonable suspicion to stop him. And his actions at the time of the

stop—particularly his continuing to “mess with” his waistband when instructed not to do

so—gave the officer reason to believe that Womack had a weapon tucked into his pants.

Under the totality of the circumstances, it was reasonable for the officer, after validly

stopping Womack, to perform a Terry frisk to ensure the officer’s safety. Therefore, the

officer’s pat down search of Womack was valid under the Fourth Amendment.

* Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).

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Accordingly, we affirm the criminal judgment. We dispense with oral argument

because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this

court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED