USCA4 Appeal: 22-4722 Doc: 20 Filed: 11/16/2023 Pg: 1 of 6
UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 22-4722
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
TAQUAN JONES, a/k/a Ta’quan Ty’rell Jones,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina, at Greensboro. William L. Osteen, Jr., District Judge. (1:21-cr-00388-WO-1)
Submitted: October 3, 2023 Decided: November 16, 2023
Before QUATTLEBAUM and HEYTENS, Circuit Judges, and FLOYD, Senior Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
ON BRIEF: Louis C. Allen, Federal Public Defender, John A. Dusenbury, Jr., Assistant Federal Public Defender, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER, Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellant. Sandra J. Hairston, United States Attorney, Nicole R. DuPré, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. USCA4 Appeal: 22-4722 Doc: 20 Filed: 11/16/2023 Pg: 2 of 6
PER CURIAM:
Pursuant to a plea agreement, Ta’quan Jones pled guilty to possession of a firearm
by a convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g), 924(a)(2). * The district court
sentenced Jones to 72 months’ imprisonment, an upward variance from the 37- to 46-month
advisory Sentencing Guidelines range. Jones appeals, contending that the sentence is
greater than necessary to accomplish the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) sentencing goals.
We review criminal sentences for both procedural and substantive reasonableness
“under a deferential abuse-of-discretion standard.” United States v. Lewis, 18 F.4th 743,
748 (4th Cir. 2021). When reviewing a sentence for reasonableness, we first must
ensure that the district court committed no significant procedural error, such as failing to calculate (or improperly calculating) the Guidelines range, treating the Guidelines as mandatory, failing to consider the § 3553(a) factors, selecting a sentence based on clearly erroneous facts, or failing to adequately explain the chosen sentence—including an explanation for any deviation from the Guidelines range.
United States v. Fowler, 948 F.3d 663, 668 (4th Cir. 2020) (internal quotation marks
omitted). For a sentence to be procedurally reasonable, “a district court must conduct an
individualized assessment of the facts and arguments presented and impose an appropriate
sentence, and it must explain the sentence chosen.” United States v. Nance, 957 F.3d 204,
212 (4th Cir. 2020) (internal quotation marks omitted). “[A] district court’s explanation
* Section 924(a)(2) was amended and no longer provides the penalty for § 922(g) convictions. The new penalty provision in 18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(8) sets forth a statutory maximum sentence of 15 years’ imprisonment for a § 922(g) offense. See Bipartisan Safer Communities Act, Pub. L. No. 117-159, § 12004(c), 136 Stat. 1313, 1329 (2022). The 15- year statutory maximum does not apply here, however, because Jones committed his offense before the June 25, 2022, amendment of the statute.
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should provide some indication that the court considered the § 3553(a) factors and applied
them to the particular defendant.” Id. at 212-13 (cleaned up). In fashioning its sentence,
the “court must address or consider all non-frivolous reasons presented for imposing a
different sentence and explain why it has rejected those arguments.” United States v.
Fowler, 58 F.4th 142, 153 (4th Cir. 2023) (cleaned up).
We have reviewed the record on appeal and conclude that the district court properly
calculated Jones’ advisory Guidelines range and committed no other procedural error. We
therefore conclude that the sentence is procedurally reasonable.
“If the Court finds no significant procedural error, it then considers the substantive
reasonableness of the sentence imposed.” United States v. Arbaugh, 951 F.3d 167, 172
(4th Cir. 2020) (cleaned up). To be substantively reasonable, a sentence must be
“sufficient, but not greater than necessary,” to satisfy the goals of sentencing. 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a). “We will generally find a variance sentence reasonable when the reasons
justifying the variance are tied to § 3553(a) and are plausible.” United States v. Provance,
944 F.3d 213, 219 (4th Cir. 2022) (internal quotation marks omitted). “However, when
the variance is a substantial one . . . we must more carefully scrutinize the reasoning
offered by the district court in support of the sentence. And the farther the court diverges
from the advisory guideline range, the more compelling the reasons for the divergence must
be.” Id. at 219-20 (cleaned up). “That said, district courts have extremely broad discretion
when determining the weight to be given each of the § 3553(a) factors, and the fact that a
variance sentence deviates, even significantly, from the Guidelines range does not alone
render it presumptively unreasonable.” Nance, 957 F.3d at 215 (cleaned up). “Instead, we
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must give due deference to the district court’s decision that the § 3553(a) factors, on a
whole, justify the extent of the variance.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
At sentencing, Jones argued for a sentence at the high end of the 37- to 46-month
advisory Sentencing Guidelines range. Although Jones conceded that he committed the
instant § 922(g) offense while serving a supervised release term for a prior § 922(g)
conviction and in the course of a domestic altercation, he maintained that the circumstances
of the instant offense were mitigated because he refrained from displaying or deploying the
weapon even though he claimed he was the victim rather than the aggressor. The district
court observed that it was difficult to determine who the aggressor was in the domestic
disturbance, but viewed Jones’ forbearance as diminishing the aggravating nature of
possessing the gun under these circumstances. But the court found that Jones’ argument
did not diminish the need for deterrence, noting that Jones had previously used a firearm
while committing robbery and that he had fired a gun at a female in the course of his
previous § 922(g) offense, demonstrating that he was capable of violence. Additionally,
the court found nothing to suggest that Jones would not deploy a gun again. Furthermore,
the court observed that Jones’ 57-month sentence for the earlier § 922(g) conviction had
not deterred him from possessing a firearm and the fact that he committed the instant
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USCA4 Appeal: 22-4722 Doc: 20 Filed: 11/16/2023 Pg: 1 of 6
UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 22-4722
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
TAQUAN JONES, a/k/a Ta’quan Ty’rell Jones,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina, at Greensboro. William L. Osteen, Jr., District Judge. (1:21-cr-00388-WO-1)
Submitted: October 3, 2023 Decided: November 16, 2023
Before QUATTLEBAUM and HEYTENS, Circuit Judges, and FLOYD, Senior Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
ON BRIEF: Louis C. Allen, Federal Public Defender, John A. Dusenbury, Jr., Assistant Federal Public Defender, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER, Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellant. Sandra J. Hairston, United States Attorney, Nicole R. DuPré, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. USCA4 Appeal: 22-4722 Doc: 20 Filed: 11/16/2023 Pg: 2 of 6
PER CURIAM:
Pursuant to a plea agreement, Ta’quan Jones pled guilty to possession of a firearm
by a convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g), 924(a)(2). * The district court
sentenced Jones to 72 months’ imprisonment, an upward variance from the 37- to 46-month
advisory Sentencing Guidelines range. Jones appeals, contending that the sentence is
greater than necessary to accomplish the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) sentencing goals.
We review criminal sentences for both procedural and substantive reasonableness
“under a deferential abuse-of-discretion standard.” United States v. Lewis, 18 F.4th 743,
748 (4th Cir. 2021). When reviewing a sentence for reasonableness, we first must
ensure that the district court committed no significant procedural error, such as failing to calculate (or improperly calculating) the Guidelines range, treating the Guidelines as mandatory, failing to consider the § 3553(a) factors, selecting a sentence based on clearly erroneous facts, or failing to adequately explain the chosen sentence—including an explanation for any deviation from the Guidelines range.
United States v. Fowler, 948 F.3d 663, 668 (4th Cir. 2020) (internal quotation marks
omitted). For a sentence to be procedurally reasonable, “a district court must conduct an
individualized assessment of the facts and arguments presented and impose an appropriate
sentence, and it must explain the sentence chosen.” United States v. Nance, 957 F.3d 204,
212 (4th Cir. 2020) (internal quotation marks omitted). “[A] district court’s explanation
* Section 924(a)(2) was amended and no longer provides the penalty for § 922(g) convictions. The new penalty provision in 18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(8) sets forth a statutory maximum sentence of 15 years’ imprisonment for a § 922(g) offense. See Bipartisan Safer Communities Act, Pub. L. No. 117-159, § 12004(c), 136 Stat. 1313, 1329 (2022). The 15- year statutory maximum does not apply here, however, because Jones committed his offense before the June 25, 2022, amendment of the statute.
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should provide some indication that the court considered the § 3553(a) factors and applied
them to the particular defendant.” Id. at 212-13 (cleaned up). In fashioning its sentence,
the “court must address or consider all non-frivolous reasons presented for imposing a
different sentence and explain why it has rejected those arguments.” United States v.
Fowler, 58 F.4th 142, 153 (4th Cir. 2023) (cleaned up).
We have reviewed the record on appeal and conclude that the district court properly
calculated Jones’ advisory Guidelines range and committed no other procedural error. We
therefore conclude that the sentence is procedurally reasonable.
“If the Court finds no significant procedural error, it then considers the substantive
reasonableness of the sentence imposed.” United States v. Arbaugh, 951 F.3d 167, 172
(4th Cir. 2020) (cleaned up). To be substantively reasonable, a sentence must be
“sufficient, but not greater than necessary,” to satisfy the goals of sentencing. 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a). “We will generally find a variance sentence reasonable when the reasons
justifying the variance are tied to § 3553(a) and are plausible.” United States v. Provance,
944 F.3d 213, 219 (4th Cir. 2022) (internal quotation marks omitted). “However, when
the variance is a substantial one . . . we must more carefully scrutinize the reasoning
offered by the district court in support of the sentence. And the farther the court diverges
from the advisory guideline range, the more compelling the reasons for the divergence must
be.” Id. at 219-20 (cleaned up). “That said, district courts have extremely broad discretion
when determining the weight to be given each of the § 3553(a) factors, and the fact that a
variance sentence deviates, even significantly, from the Guidelines range does not alone
render it presumptively unreasonable.” Nance, 957 F.3d at 215 (cleaned up). “Instead, we
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must give due deference to the district court’s decision that the § 3553(a) factors, on a
whole, justify the extent of the variance.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
At sentencing, Jones argued for a sentence at the high end of the 37- to 46-month
advisory Sentencing Guidelines range. Although Jones conceded that he committed the
instant § 922(g) offense while serving a supervised release term for a prior § 922(g)
conviction and in the course of a domestic altercation, he maintained that the circumstances
of the instant offense were mitigated because he refrained from displaying or deploying the
weapon even though he claimed he was the victim rather than the aggressor. The district
court observed that it was difficult to determine who the aggressor was in the domestic
disturbance, but viewed Jones’ forbearance as diminishing the aggravating nature of
possessing the gun under these circumstances. But the court found that Jones’ argument
did not diminish the need for deterrence, noting that Jones had previously used a firearm
while committing robbery and that he had fired a gun at a female in the course of his
previous § 922(g) offense, demonstrating that he was capable of violence. Additionally,
the court found nothing to suggest that Jones would not deploy a gun again. Furthermore,
the court observed that Jones’ 57-month sentence for the earlier § 922(g) conviction had
not deterred him from possessing a firearm and the fact that he committed the instant
offense while on supervised release from the earlier conviction was particularly concerning
to the court.
Jones also argued that his commitment to full time employment during his term of
supervised release on the earlier § 922(g) conviction supported a within-Guidelines
sentence. In considering Jones’ history and characteristics and the nature and
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circumstances of his offense, the court acknowledged Jones’ recent work record, but also
observed that Jones had continued to engage in “extraordinarily dangerous” criminal
activity.
Because the facts surrounding the domestic altercation were unclear, the court did
not consider the incident itself to be an aggravating factor in terms of the circumstances of
the offense but explained that Jones’ possession of the firearm at that particular time was
an aggravating factor in terms of the need for deterrence, to promote respect for the law,
and to protect the public from Jones’ further crimes. In deciding to impose an upward
variance sentence, the court considered the 37- to 46-month Guidelines range inadequate
to deter Jones, reiterating that Jones’ previous 57-month sentence had not been sufficient
to deter him from illegally possessing firearms. The court also found Jones’ base offense
level did not reflect the seriousness of his offense, given his past use of firearms in the
course of committing crimes. All of these considerations, the court explained, required a
significant upward variance from the advisory Guidelines range. In light of the deference
accorded a district court’s determination that the § 3553(a) factors, as a whole, justify the
extent of a variance, and considering the totality of the circumstances, as well as the district
court’s thorough analysis of the § 3553(a) factors, we conclude that the extent of the
upward variance here is not substantively unreasonable. See, e.g., United States v.
Hargrove, 701 F.3d 156, 163-65 (4th Cir. 2012) (affirming variance from 0-to-6-month
Guidelines range to 60-month sentence); United States v. Diosdado-Star, 630 F.3d 359,
366-67 (4th Cir. 2011) (affirming variance sentence six years greater than Guidelines range
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because sentence was based on the district court’s examination of relevant § 3553(a)
factors).
Accordingly, we affirm Jones’ sentence. We dispense with oral argument because
the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court
and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED