United States v. Tapor-Ideal Dairy Company, Inc.

Sixth Circuit

United States v. Tapor-Ideal Dairy Company, Inc.

283 F.2d 869, 1960 U.S. App. LEXIS 3517

CourtCourt of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit

DecidedOctober 21, 1960

Docket14122

StatusPublished

Cited by1 cases

This text of 283 F.2d 869 (United States v. Tapor-Ideal Dairy Company, Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

United States v. Tapor-Ideal Dairy Company, Inc., 283 F.2d 869, 1960 U.S. App. LEXIS 3517 (6th Cir. 1960).

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Opinion

ORDER.

This appeal is from an order of the United States District Court dismissing a complaint brought by the Government under the Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act [7 U.S.C.A. § 601 et seq.].

A mandatory injunction was sought by the Government to require the defendant, Tapor-Ideal Dairy Company, Inc. (now appellee), to pay Dorset Cooperative Milk Company nearly ten thousand dollars for milk, which Tapor-Ideal had purchased from the Dorset Company. Appellant charged that the failure of the Dairy Company to pay the claimed amount constituted a violation of a specified order promulgated under the above-mentioned Act relating to control of the milk industry in the Cleveland, Ohio, area.

The appellee milk company avers that the disputed account had been settled; and that the Dorset Company had accepted the sum of some twenty-eight thousand dollars in full settlement, accord and satisfaction of the entire amount owed.

The controversy was tried in the district court on stipulated facts. Diver *870 gent views were advanced by the parties as to the appropzúate interpretation of the pertinent section of the Marketing Act by the Supreme Court of the United States in United States v. Ruzieka, 329 U.S. 287, 67 S.Ct. 207, 91 L.Ed. 290. The District Court concluded that the Supreme Court’s decision and opinion did not support the insistence of the Government in the present case. The United States District Judge held that the district court had jurisdiction to hear disputes arising under the Marketing Act, so long as the disputes require no special understanding of the milk industry and are of a strictly legal nature of the character found here; and the assumption of jurisdiction does not hinder or affect adversely the orderly administration of the program described. The Court considered that the assumption of jurisdiction by it did not in any way prejudice the functioning of the Cleveland area milk pool.

We think the order of the United States District Court, 175 F.Supp. 678, dismissing the complaint, should be affirmed upon the well-reasoned grounds set forth in the opinion of Judge Weick. It is so ordered.

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ORDER.

This appeal is from an order of the United States District Court dismissing a complaint brought by the Government under the Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act [7 U.S.C.A. § 601 et seq.].

A mandatory injunction was sought by the Government to require the defendant, Tapor-Ideal Dairy Company, Inc. (now appellee), to pay Dorset Cooperative Milk Company nearly ten thousand dollars for milk, which Tapor-Ideal had purchased from the Dorset Company. Appellant charged that the failure of the Dairy Company to pay the claimed amount constituted a violation of a specified order promulgated under the above-mentioned Act relating to control of the milk industry in the Cleveland, Ohio, area.

The appellee milk company avers that the disputed account had been settled; and that the Dorset Company had accepted the sum of some twenty-eight thousand dollars in full settlement, accord and satisfaction of the entire amount owed.

The controversy was tried in the district court on stipulated facts. Diver *870 gent views were advanced by the parties as to the appropzúate interpretation of the pertinent section of the Marketing Act by the Supreme Court of the United States in United States v. Ruzieka, 329 U.S. 287, 67 S.Ct. 207, 91 L.Ed. 290. The District Court concluded that the Supreme Court’s decision and opinion did not support the insistence of the Government in the present case. The United States District Judge held that the district court had jurisdiction to hear disputes arising under the Marketing Act, so long as the disputes require no special understanding of the milk industry and are of a strictly legal nature of the character found here; and the assumption of jurisdiction does not hinder or affect adversely the orderly administration of the program described. The Court considered that the assumption of jurisdiction by it did not in any way prejudice the functioning of the Cleveland area milk pool.

We think the order of the United States District Court, 175 F.Supp. 678, dismissing the complaint, should be affirmed upon the well-reasoned grounds set forth in the opinion of Judge Weick. It is so ordered.

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Bluebook (online)

283 F.2d 869, 1960 U.S. App. LEXIS 3517, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/united-states-v-tapor-ideal-dairy-company-inc-ca6-1960.

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