United States v. Swartz

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: May 16, 2025
• Docket: 24-1875
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MAY 16 2025 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, No. 24-1875 D.C. No. Plaintiff - Appellee, 3:23-cr-00085-WHA-1 v. MEMORANDUM* JESSE FRANKLIN SWARTZ,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of California William Alsup, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted May 14, 2025** San Francisco, California

Before: S.R. THOMAS, M. SMITH, and BRESS, Circuit Judges.

Jesse Swartz was convicted of one count of assaulting a federal employee, in

violation of 18 U.S.C. § 111(a)(1). He appeals two employment-related conditions

of his supervised release. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and affirm.

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). The district court has broad discretion pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d) to

impose conditions of supervised release, which “are permissible if they are

reasonably related to the goal of deterrence, protection of the public, or rehabilitation

of the offender, and ‘involve no greater deprivation of liberty than is reasonably

necessary for the purposes of supervised release.’” United States v. Rearden, 349

F.3d 608, 618 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting United States v. T.M., 330 F.3d 1235, 1240

(9th Cir. 2003)). District courts are entitled to “substantial deference” when

imposing conditions of supervised release because they have “far more familiarity

with the defendant’s criminal conduct and life circumstances than appellate judges

do.” United States v. LaCoste, 821 F.3d 1187, 1190 (9th Cir. 2016). District courts

are not required to articulate the reasoning behind every condition at sentencing, but

when a condition of supervised release “implicates a significant liberty interest, the

district court must support its decision on the record with evidence justifying the

condition.” United States v. Daniels, 541 F.3d 915, 924 (9th Cir. 2008).

Because Swartz did not object to the conditions at sentencing, we review for

plain error. LaCoste, 821 F.3d at 1190. “Relief for plain error is available if there

has been (1) error; (2) that was plain; (3) that affected substantial rights; and (4) that

seriously affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the judicial

proceedings.” United States v. Cannel, 517 F.3d 1172, 1176 (9th Cir. 2008).

The district court did not plainly err in imposing Standard Condition 8 and

2 24-1875 Special Condition 2. Standard Condition 8 requires Swartz to “at all times work at

least part-time (defined as 20 hours per week)” unless he is “excused from doing so

by the probation officer for schooling, training, community service or other

acceptable activities.” Special Condition 2 requires Swartz to “either have full-time

employment, full-time training for employment, or full-time job search, or some

combination thereof, unless otherwise excused by probation.” The record supports

that these conditions are reasonably related to the statutory purposes of sentencing,

as employment may “provide [Swartz] with needed education or vocational

training,” 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(D), and may also reduce the risk of reoffending,

serving the purposes of deterrence and protection of the public. See id.

§§ 3553(a)(2)(B), (a)(2)(C). The conditions permit Swartz to be excused from

compliance if necessary, and they do not involve a “greater deprivation of liberty

than is reasonably necessary.” United States v. Gibson, 998 F.3d 415, 420 (9th Cir.

2021) (quoting United States v. Wolf Child, 699 F.3d 1082, 1100 (9th Cir. 2012)).

Because the conditions do not implicate “an especially significant liberty interest,”

United States v. Weber, 451 F.3d 552, 560 (9th Cir. 2006), the district court was not

required “to articulate on the record at sentencing the reasons for imposing each

condition.” Rearden, 349 F.3d at 619.

Finally, Standard Condition 8 and Special Condition 2 are not inconsistent

with each other and thus are “sufficiently clear” to comport with due process. United

3 24-1875 States v. Guagliardo, 278 F.3d 868, 872 (9th Cir. 2002). There are various

combinations of activities that would satisfy both conditions. And both conditions

offer flexibility, allowing Swartz to be excused by probation.

AFFIRMED.

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